Page 1 1 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ................................................................................................................. January 2004 SITUATION REPORT 4 Luigi De Martino cimera publications ................................................ Page 2 2 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Design: David Hakobyan, Andrey Izmalkov Photo: «Camels of Ronkul,GBAO», Albert Longy Printed by Premier Ltd. Print House, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan copyright by CIMERA. All rights reserved. ISBN: 2-9700358-9-8 cimera SITUATION REPORT 4 .................................................................................................................................................... We would like to thank the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV for its support and encouragement. We also would like to give special thanks to Dr. Parviz Moullajanov, Executive Director of the Public Committee for Democratic Processes in Dushanbe for his constant support and friendship. .................................................................................................................................................... The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIMERA. Geneva January 2004 C Page 3 3 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... CONTENT Foreword Current Local Government Policy Situation in Tajikistan Tajikistan local self-governance: a potential bridge between government and civil society? Regional government in Tajikistan (centre and regions) Economic aspects of the interrelation between centre and regions in Tajikistan Economic Relations between Centre and Regions: the Case of Sughd Province Regionalism and its perception by major political and social powers of Tajikistan. From Ambivalence to Ambiguity? Some Paradigms of Policy Making in Tajikistan Tajikistan at a Crossroad: Contradictory Forces at the Heart of the Tajik Political System. 3 7 16 25 32 46 85 119 151 Page 4 4 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Reflections from the Praxis In mid-2000, two Tajik non-Govern- mental Organisations, the Tajik Cen- tre for Citizenship Education (TCCE) and the Public Committee for Dem- ocratic Processes (PC) approached the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a project proposal. Active sup- porters of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue Process1 created the TCCE in 1997 and the PC in 2000. As the official negotiations moved ahead and final- ly lead to a peace agreement in 1997, the TCCE and the members of the Inter-Tajik dialogue felt that it was not enough to support the Tajik peace process through unofficial di- plomacy. The leaders of the organ- isations identified as a main new chal- lenge the need to broaden support for peace by including wider circles of citizens and government officials into the process and to begin to ad- dress the root causes of the conflict. Since they considered that «region- alism» was one of the main causes of the conflict, they started to con- duct a series of workshops on this topic in different regions of the coun- try. This concern was shared by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af- fairs, Political Division IV (Support to Civilian Peace Operations) and in 2002 the Ministry supported the two Tajik organisations and CIMERA, a Swiss private organisation based in Geneva, in developing a project aimed at providing an informal plat- form for political discussion on the issue of centre-regions relations in Tajikistan. The present paper tries to retrace and assess some of the ex- periences within the framework of that project. The project had foreseen to estab- lish three main interlinked discus- sion platforms: Expert meetings in Dushanbe, «Public» Discussion Fo- rums in Dushanbe and the regions and a Study Tour to Switzerland. Starting from December 02, the project has started inviting on a reg- ular basis up to 15 experts2 within the Tajik administration, the legisla- tive power and international organi- sations who are currently dealing with such topics as intergovernmental re- lations and local governance. The meetings were chaired by a senior personality within the Presidential Ad- ministration or the Government. Three meetings have been carried out during the period December 02 - March 03. After this date the prep- arations of the June 22 constitutional referendum have disrupted some of the project’s activities including the expert meetings. Parallel to the Expert meetings the project has launched several research activities on topics related to region- alism and local governance: A study on fiscal and budget- ary relations conducted by Dr. Avezov at the Khujand State University A study on the legal and in- stitutional frame of the rela- tions between central gov- ernment and regions con- ducted by Mr. Zafar Aliev, newly appointed Chairman of the Constitutional Court. A study on the perceptions of regionalism conducted by Dr. Saodat Olimova, of the Sharq Centre. 1 The Inter-Tajik Dialogue is a track-two nego- tiation process, which accompanied the official Tajik peace negotiations. Participants were mid- level leaders from the two sides; many of them now in high-level official functions. The process was initiated by the Kettering Foundation (USA, Dayton) and the Russian Strategic Research Center, Moscow, in the framework of the Dart- mouth Conference. 2 Experts: those currently part of the different government / parliamentary initiatives aimed at reforming the present situation regulating lev- els of government and local self-governance. ....................................................................................................................................... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Foreword Page 5 5 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... A study on the economic re- lations of Soghd Oblast con- ducted by Dr. Boymatov in Khudjand as a case study of the economic relations be- tween centre and regions. A study on the political cul- ture of Tajikistan conducted by Dr. of the French CNRS and Marc Bloch University in Strasbourg. The role of these papers was two- fold: on one hand they would rep- resent one of the elements for the preparation of the other project’s initiatives and would also give im- portant information for understand- ing what is the «margin of manoeu- vre» for decentralisation in the coun- try. On the other hand, the second paper would provide important in- sights on the perception that politi- cal and regional leaders have of the issue of regionalism in the country. During the course of the project we have decided to increase the num- ber of research papers in order also to better consider the fiscal and economical as well as the political dimension. After having reached a certain level of trust with our government part- ners, in February 2003 we decided that the conditions were given to open the discussions to a larger and more political public. Through the in- strument of «Public3» Discussions Fo- rums, the project should have ad- dressed relevant topics trough se- ries of round tables first in Dushanbe and then in the regions. The imple- mentation of the PDF has suffered delays from the original schedule (foreseen for February 03). The main responsible for the delay was the is- sue of finding the right «political» moment when to organize such meetings is a cumbersome process in Tajikistan. The preparations of the 22 June 03 constitutional referendum have once more caused problems for the implementation of the project. Many of the officials at all levels were unavailable for meetings and / or other activities not related to the referendum. At the same period, other interna- tional organisations such as the UI were sending international experts to Tajikistan to work with the govern- ment WG on local governance in order to speed up the drafting of the new legislation. Due to this situation and while dis- cussing an eventual extension of the project, the donor requested not to start this line of activity until the ref- erendum in June 03 and a decision had been taken on the future of the project. As the donor decided to phase out the project by end of August 03, no forum has been car- ried out. As for the last platform, the study tour to Switzerland, the project signed a Memorandum of Under- standing with the Institute for Feder- alism at the University of Fribourg (IF). IF would organize and imple- ment the study tour for a Tajik dele- gation to Switzerland. The tour was originally scheduled for October 2002 but then postponed to April 03. Unfortunately, in March 03 the Tajik Government has decided a trav- el ban for all high-ranking officials un- til the completion of the June 03 ref- erendum. As a consequence, the tour could not be implemented before the conclusion of the project in Au- gust 03. This represented a major blow for the project since we were planning to use the occasion of the travel to Switzerland to: Enlarge the discussion start- ed with the Experts Meetings to a more political group of interlocutors. Provide inputs to the ongo- ing discussion process on reform of the local gover- nance legislation through learning the Swiss experi- ence in dealing with centre- region-local government re- lations 3 The term «public» means «enlarged», the Fo- rums were targeting a public that goes beyond the participants to the Expert Meetings but are not open to the general public. The idea was to reach specific relevant political and social per- sonalities concerned by the project’s themes. FOREWORD Page 6 6 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Experiences and Lessons Learned The fact that the project could oper- ate «at full speed» only over a peri- od of three to four months shows clearly that timing is essential in a short-term political initiative such as this one. In our case, timing was favourable since it could use the new opportunities created by the gov- ernment willingness to discuss issues of «decentralisation». At the same time the holding of the referendum of June 03 has been a major source of disruption for the project4. The time factor was in this situation important also from another perspec- tive. Originally planned for 12 months5, the project could not ab- sorb the «shock» of the disruption caused by the referendum. Given the fluidity of the environment, the need for establishing trustful relations with the government, political actors and other international organisations in order to discuss sensitive issues, a period of 18 to 24 months6 for project implementation would have been more appropriate. In a context that lacked transparen- cy, the project adopted an approach of a «pilot or learning initiative», try- ing to adapt to a changing situation. This approach has demanded from the local project partners, CIMERA and from the donor an important in- vestment in terms of communication and flexibility. In terms of strategy, the chosen ap- proach (using the experts meetings as «entry point» to the central gov- ernment) still seems to be adapted to the situation in Tajikistan though it contributed to create a (mis)-percep- tion of the project being a technical assistance initiative and to frame the discussion from a technical-juridical perspective. At the same time the project should have tried earlier to reach more political personnel espe- cially at the regional level. In a context where decisions are tak- en by a centre in top-down and non- participatory way, reaching the right political personnel is fundamental. The project tried to multiply its chances by using three different platforms for discussions. In a situation where me- dia7 seem to play a secondary role in forming the opinion of the elite, the project put the development of cooperation with media as a second priority. The experts meetings have proved to be a valuable tool for increasing exchange of information and trans- parency in the domain of initiatives supporting local governance. On the other hand a longer input in terms of time and energy by at least one main actor (in this case was CIMERA) was needed in order to sustain these re- sults. After only three meetings they could not be continued without ex- ternal support. The expert meetings could not play the role of forum for developing new ideas for reform. On one hand the margin for reform was very tight, and on the other the external expert inputs from other organisation such as the UI came after the meetings had stopped. The two other platforms (PDF and study tour) could have plaid an inter- esting role in enlarging the debate to a more political public if the condi- tions would have allowed to continu- ing with their implementation. In gen- eral the four instruments of the project (PDF, study tour, expert meetings and research) have a lot of potential though they demand an important amount of internal coordi- nation and risk to be affected by changes in the environment (as it happened in our case). The results of three out of the four instruments depend on the availabil- ity of well-prepared and competent 4 Which also shows that when the groups in power are dealing with the consolidation of their position all the rest becomes of secundary importance. 5 Then extended to 15 months in order to allowing phasing out and completion of the on- going activities such as research and publica- tions. 6 At the time of project approval, the donor could legally committ resources for more than 12 months. 7 Though according to certain analysts, in the case of the press, the number of copies sold is not a good indicator of the public reached by a publication. Newspapers seem to be read (and discussed) in a group. More research would be needed in this sector. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 7 7 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... moderators able to facilitate the dis- cussion platforms in a local language. The study tour is an interesting in- strument to help breaking down bar- riers of mistrust and allowing the dis- cussion to take place in an environ- ment outside the usual constraints of (political) life. On the other hand, it can bring the expected results only if inserted in a longer-term process. The project’s instruments and expe- riences are relevant for similar work in Tajikistan or other countries with similar situation though the issue of the interest in reform from the ac- tor’s perspective is as always essen- tial for the success of political initia- tives. In our case, the interest of the central authorities seems to be more related to the possibility of access- ing WB credit lines than to the rec- ognition that another type of rela- tion between centre and regions would be beneficial for the country. Publishing the Research Results At the end of almost 15 months work, we have decided to publish the results of the research sponsored by the project8. Too often reports developed within the frame of inter- nationally supported projects are not shared with a larger public. The report of Aliev deals with the legal and institutional perspective of the relations between centre and regions, the papers by Avezov and Boymatov try to illustrate these re- lations from the budget /fiscal and economic perspective (using the case of the economic relations of Sughd Oblast). The report by Olimova is a first-hand research that presents the percep- tions of «regionalism» by established political and social leaders and by a group of university students. As for the article by Dudoignon, it consti- tutes the results of a four months work in Tajikistan looking at the log- ics of the Tajik political system as it has been working since the signa- ture of the peace agreement be- tween the Rahmonov government and the then United Tajik Opposition. Moreover, we also have added to the present publication two papers by Freizer and Abdullaev on the issue of local governance that we think are complementary to the project’s research reports. In a last paper I will try to present my own analysis of some aspects of the Tajik political situation and of the perspec- tives for the future. At the end of these few pages I would like to express my deepest thanks to all those who made this project possible and supported it. Special thanks go to Jean-Nicolas Bit- ter at the PDIV, to Parviz Moullojan- ov at the Public Committee for Dem- ocratic Processes in Dushanbe and at all his team, to Gulya Nazarova at the Tajik Centre for Citizenship Edu- cation, to Gisela Nauk at the UN Of- fice for Peace-building in Dushanbe (UNTOP), to Arne Seifert and Stephane Dudoignon, to Cathrine Widrig at the Federalism Institute in Fribourg, to Andre Loersch at CI- MERA and to the team of the in Dushanbe. luigi De Martio, CIMERA 8 A sister publication exists in Russian. FOREWORD Page 8 8 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... The emergence of independent Tajiki- stan out of the USSR is one of the most painful state building attempts of modern Central Asian history. Dur- ing last twelve years, this country has experienced bloody civil war, the UN-sponsored reconciliation, return- ing of opposition and Islamic fight- ers, and re-distribution of power. Born in crisis and chaos, the current Tajikistan’s political system assimilat- ed deep seated traditional political loyalties, Soviet standards and recent rational-legal requirements. Beyond the facade of Western patterned legal arrangements, in Tajikistan hides a remarkable blend of secular and traditional features that can poorly connect civil and political society, promote the perceived interests of individuals and different solidarity groups. Quasi-democratic rule is be- ing built on a highly fragmented soci- ety with yet declared, but unabled protection of civil liberties. This foun- dation feeds growing violence, and corruption in society and govern- ment. The instability of political sys- tem has been worsening by a se- vere economic crisis that discredits the present regime. Non-inclusive character of the government, ab- Current Local Government Policy Situation in Tajikistan ....................................................................................................................................... Abdullaev Kamoludin Independent Scholar, Tajikistan sence of free competition for lead- ership positions, cause disproportion in terms of distribution of power among regions. The control of the official central government is unsta- ble. In result sub-national loyalties and foreign countries exert great influ- ence. This paper briefly evaluates the local government policy situation in Tajiki- stan. It argues that although current political system of Tajikistan prevents effective political mobilization and good governance, there is a poor ground for optimism. During last twelve years Tajiks gained far richer experience then other Central Asian nations. Hopefully, political learning to pay its crucial role in the strength- ening of local self-government over time. Traditional Institutions of Power and Civil Society The basic unit of traditionally seden- tary Tajik society and dominant insti- tution of power was avlod - an as- cent patriarchal extended family that sometimes can be developed into a clan based on partilineage. Further, upwards, avlod would give its loyal- ty to region-based groupings, then to local ruler and/or monarch. For generations, this avlod system pro- vided survival, autonomy, and adapt- ability to its members, serving tradi- tionalism and sustainability of the so- ciety. Yet avlod loyalties had some- times questioned ultimate ruler’s pow- er and authority, the representative government and the concept of pop- ular sovereignty, are not among dominant features in Tajik political culture. In the Soviet era (1917- 1991) the avlod system was consid- erably eroded, yet existed as a par- allel - to a quasi-national government - system of power. Exactly this com- munity-oriented identity and clan network determined political loyalty during the civil war in 1992-1993 and later. The totality of political power and command over resources in Tajiki- stan belongs to a limited number of ruling elites who run governmental and legal institutions, as well as econ- omy to serve their private interests. Current Tajik power structures are rooted in a regionally-balanced coa- lition between capital-based elites with the president on the top- who TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 9 9 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... controlled the state apparatus - and local power holders. This personified patron-client connection provided the illusion that links between local com- munities and the government exist- ed. In fact, the civil society has al- ways been disconnected from poli- tics in Tajikistan, allowing political elites to use and corrupt traditional avlod/ clan social structures and safety net- work. These kinds of alliances will in- evitably lead to a type of nation build- ing that is characterized by a weak and corruptive state without civil so- ciety, political parties, and free mar- ket. Administrative Structure The territory of Tajikistan is divided in a descending hierarchy into: veloyats (provinces or oblasts in Russian), nohiyas (districts or rayons in Russian), towns of republican signifi- cance, towns of provincial signifi- cance, towns of district significance, settlements (or posioloks, in Russian), and qyshloqs (villages) Administratively Tajikistan is present- ly divided into four territorial regions (a group of nohiyas and three veloyats): Nohiyas of Republican Control (NRC) Nohyiahoi Tobei Jumhuri situated in central part of the country with Dushanbe as its center and including the Qarategin valley, and the Kofarnihon area and the Hisar valley. It has 13 nohiyas (districts), 4 towns of republican signifi- cance, 8 settlements and 91 rural jamoats (village centers). The NRC stretches over 28,000 square kilometers. As of January 2002 the total population of the NRC stood at 1,900,000 (with 174,700 urban population), including the capital Dushanbe (562,000). Unlike veloyats, the NRC is not united admin- istratively. Each nohiya is di- rectly subordinate to the Cen- tral government in Dushanbe. Four NRC municipalities are administrated separately by city administrations: Dushan- be, Vahdat (former Kofarni- hon), Rogun and Tursunzoda. Sughd (former Leninabad) veloyat with Khujand city as its center. Sughd covers the Zerafshan valley and western part of the Ferghana valley. Sughd, also known as North- ern Tajikistan, is the most eco- nomically advanced province in Tajikistan. Sughd’s territory is 26,100 square kilometers, and the population in 1999 stood at 1,870,000 (includ- ing 531,100 urban dwellers), mainly Tajiks, with an Uzbek minority of around 30 per- cent. Sughd includes 14 nohi- yas, 8 towns of provincial sig- nificance and 20 settlements. Surrounded by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the province is separated from the rest of the country by the mountain ranges of Turkestan, Zarafs- hon and Hisor. The Trans-Tajik Railway Konibodom-Dushan- be runs through Uzbekistan, connecting the province with central and southern Tajiki- stan. Sughd’s economic weight facilitated its political prominence in the republic. Traditionally representatives from Leninobod headed the Communist Party of Tajikistan. Rahmon Nabiev was the last Leninobodi to lead Tajikistan, until September 1992 when he was forced to resign by opposition. From 1991 to 1998 Sughd was considered as an aspirant for indepen- dence, even secession from the rest of Tajikistan. Howev- er, these trends have weak- ened after the defeat of the 1. 2. CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN Page 10 10 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Colonel Khudoberdiev’s anti- governmental and pro-Uzbek mutiny in 1998. Imposed by Islam Karimov restrictions to the movements of the Tajik citizens to Uzbekistan and the mining of the Tajik-Uzbek border have also contributed into decline of the pro-Uzbek feeling all over Tajikistan. In result, the integration of Tajik North into the country’s eco- nomic and political environ- ment is growing. Neverthe- less some frustration concern- ing the decline of political in- fluence of the North in cen- tral government in compari- son with its economic power remains among Northern elites. Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Veloyat (MBAV). Veloyati Mukhtori Kuhistoni Badakhshon in Tajik (Gorno-Badkhshanskaya Avtonomnaya Oblast in Rus- sian). The MBAV is most geo- graphically isolated part of the country. It covers a territory of 63,700 square kilometers and accounts for 44.5 per- cent of Tajikistan’s territory but only three percent of its population (206,000). MBAV’s center is the city of Khorugh; the province con- sists of 5 nohiyas, one city and 42 rural jamoats. The majori- ty of the population belongs to the Ismaili branch of Islam, and follows Aga Khan. The MBAV also contains compact pockets of Tajik Sunni popu- lation in the three nohiyas of Darvoz, Vanch and Ishkash- im. Six percent of the MBAV population is Sunni Kyrgyz liv- ing in Murghob. Inhabitants of Badakhshon speak Shughni, Rushani, Yazgulami, Wakhi and other dialects of the East- ern Iranian languages, distinct from West Iranian Tajiki-Far- si, but use Tajik as their inter- communal and state language. The MBAV is the least eco- nomically developed region of the republic. Since 1925 when it was given autono- mous status, Tajik Badakhshon depends on supplies brought in by two motor roads. Bada- khshon possesses a distinct socio-political and cultural iden- tity from the rest of Tajikistan. Following the collapse of the USSR, calls for Badakhshon’s independence from Tajikistan heightened. Since he second part of the 1990s, however, this separatist tendency has fallen. Currently, the Badakhs- honi elites acknowledged their fidelity to Dushanbe and the Tajik nation-building project. Khatlon Veloyat. This south- western province is the most populated part of Tajikistan. It was formed at the end of 1992 after the merging of Kulob and Qurghonteppa veloyats. Its territory is 24, 600 square kilometers, and population in 2002 stood at 2, 151, 000 (401,400 ur- ban). Khatlon is the country’s most ethnically diverse prov- ince. It is populated by Tajiks (Kulabis, Gharmis, Badahksho- nis, Leninabadis), Uzbeks (from Ferghana valley and local tribes), Tajik-and Uzbek- speaking Arabs, as well as Russian, Tatars, etc. The prov- ince composed of 24 nohiyas, five cities of provincial signif- icance, one city of district sig- nificance, 18 settlements, and 128 rural jamoats. This region had suffered the greatest shock during the civil war in 1991-1997 caused by peo- ple displacements, refuge flows, inter-ethnic clashes and mass killings. Since 1993, there has been a wide-spread opinion in Tajikistan that Ku- lob - the native region of the acting president enjoys par- ticular attention of the capi- tal. However, seemingly, the expectations of the “victori- ous” Kulob were not satisfied, 3. 4. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 11 11 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... as the North appeared to maintain a higher economic position. The Tajik war was not a primitive war of ethnic and regional groups. Rath- er, this was a war of regional politi- cal entrepreneurs and newborn “field commanders” who succeeded to various degrees in securing popular support in respective areas. Today there is almost zero open expres- sion of antagonism between com- munities of different regions and eth- no-confessional origin. Yet some ex- perts argue that the Tajik peace is a result of the short-term balance of interests of sub-national leaders and wartime grievances and revenge impulses soon or later could cause a new war. Local Government Structure The local representative authority in regions, towns, and districts is the Majlis (assembly) of people’s depu- ties, which is chaired by the chair- person. In Tajikistan chairperson of province, district, and town is a key element of local government, and president’s main client. The province, town and nohiya have a local branch of the hukumat (government) which is the central administration. Execu- tive and representative powers in all these locations are vested in the chairperson of hukumat. According to the constitution, chairperson heads both (!) executive (as a head of hu- kumat) and representative (as a chair- person of Majlis) authority. As high administrator, the president has ex- clusive authority to appoint heads (chairpersons) of veloyats (provinc- es), nohiyas (regions), and towns, thus providing for a strong vertical of the executive, and, in fact, rep- resentative powers. In 1994-1996 the former villages Soviets have been replaced by ja- moats (groups of neighborhoods), mahallahs (local communities) and their leadership. Each nohiya is sub- divided into jamoats. A jamoat there- after, comprises a varying number of kolkhozes (collective farms) and sovkhozes (farms based on state form of ownership), which are made up of several qyshloqs (villages) or smaller villages (deha in Tajik) each. Jamoats are rural self-governing or- ganizations arranged on a territorial basis. They derive their financial re- sources from public budget funds al- located by town, regional Majlises and donations. According to the «Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages» passed in De- cember 1994, jamoats have a wide range of competencies and duties. They adopt decisions on current is- sues by open vote. The chairperson of jamoat is selected by the chair- person of the town or nohiya and approved by the jamoat. Local grass root activity below ja- moats (mahalla councils etc.) is not covered by legislation. The mahalla does not have administrative func- tions. In some regions mahallas co- operate closely with state institutions, and sometimes even merge with lo- cal state bodies. In many cases, chair- persons of mahalla receive salary from hukumat. Problems and Needs Assessment Within existing legal framework, lo- cal government serves as a reliable agent of central government, respon- sible for the social and economic development of the region, realiza- tion of the Constitution, laws, and acts of Majlisi Oli and the president. To a lesser extent, it desires to en- courage political education, partici- pation, assessing needs and protec- tion local interests. There is an ur- gent need, therefore, to help local government to build relationships with the center not in terms of client-pa- tron politics, but in terms of respon- sible partnership of free democratic institutions. Unfortunately, yet Tajik society has maintained the strong sense of communal identity, local communities remain politically pas- sive. Tajikistan rural communities failed to develop and support tradi- tions of participatory politics. Strengthening of jamoats and mahal- las as rural self-governing bodies should be in the center of the re- CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN Page 12 12 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... form of the local government. Tradi- tional institutions of power should serve as a counterbalance to the personified power of central and re- gional leaders who habitually corrupt these communal structures to pro- mote their individual and group in- terests. These traditional institutes and networks, long-lasted erosion not- withstanding, are likely to remain central to Tajik politics. Such issues as role of communities and govern- ment in human rights protection, tra- ditional institutes of power and their role in civil society, partnership with mahallas and hukumats, reform of the legislative base of local government, training of chairpersons of mahallas in the area of leadership, social part- nership and market economy should be given special attention. Creation and supporting of accountable and effective Tajik institutions of local self- governance to promote participatory democracy as well as traditional con- cepts of self-help, volunteerism, and community mobilization is crucial for sustainable social and economic de- velopment in Tajikistan. System of Power: Towards Strong Presidency and Weak Institutions Tajikistan, following other USSR re- publics’ example adopted declara- tion of state independence and de- clared a presidential system of gov- ernment in September 1991. The presidential election of Novem- ber1991 led to the struggle of the opposition coalition of Islamic groups coupled with newborn secular dem- ocratic movements versus old Sovi- et elites. Debates turned into open armed confrontation in 1992. Politi- cal antagonism pro and contra com- munism was gradually overpowered by the region-based group discord. In November 1992, a government led by Emomali Rakhmonov had re- gained control, backed by Russia and Uzbekistan. In November 1994, Emomali Rakhmonov (by this time a chairman of parliament) was elected president of Tajikistan. Current Con- stitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was adopted on 6 November 1994 after a nation-wide referendum. It replaced the Soviet Constitution that had been in effect since 1978 and amended after independence. Ac- cording to it Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, law-governed, secular, and unitary state with separated ex- ecutive, legislative, and judicial pow- ers. The supreme legislative body, a parliament, is Majlisi Oli (Supreme Council) of the Republic of Tajikistan. Amendments to the Constitution, adopted in general referendum on 26 September 1999, sanctioned that the president is elected directly for one seven-year term (instead of maximum of two five-year terms). In November 1999 presidential elec- tions, Emomali Rakhmonov won 96, 91 per cent of votes, while his op- ponent from the Islamic Renaissance Party got only 2, 1 per cent. Simul- taneously, a bi-cameral parliament replaced the national uni-cameral parliament. Since March 2000, the Majlisi Oli consists of two chambers: Majlisi Namoyandagon (assembly of representatives, or lower chamber) and Majlisi Melli (national assembly, which acts as the upper chamber or senate). Majlisi Namoyandagon con- sists of 63 members elected direct- ly in a half-mixed basis (65 % as sin- gle member district candidates and 35 % according to party lists), for a five-year term. The upper house - Majlisi Melli is elected indirectly for a five-year term and consists of 33 members, elected by local majlises (parliaments). The remaining eight deputies of Majlisi Melli are appoint- ed by the President. These election laws, codifies simultaneous plurality and proportional representation rac- es. The aim of lawmakers here was to undermine traditional patron-client networks and provide for presiden- tial system balanced by strong legis- lature. However, growing presiden- tial authority challenges the autono- my of legislature from executive power. The post of prime minister is rather nominal as according to the Constitution, the president is both a head of the state and the govern- ment. Most of political power is concen- trated in the presidential office, which during last four years has consider- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 13 13 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ably widened its authority and turned into a sort of “super government”. This process of the shift of execu- tive power from the cabinet to the presidential office has started after the General Peace Agreement of 1997, according to which the Unit- ed Tajik Opposition was given a 30% quota in the governing structures. In that time representatives of the op- position filled mostly governmental posts, not presidential office. The lat- ter has remained beyond of any kind of control from the side of parlia- ment. The Office of State Finance Control under the president of Tajiki- stan, formed in January 2001 as- sumed exclusive responsibility to control all finances , state property, and money flows (including foreign credits and humanitarian aid), tasks traditionally performed by the Minis- try of Finance. In result, the presi- dential office increased its size and responsibilities, even duplicating the structure of the cabinet of ministries. In addition, the judiciary was becom- ing more open to influence by the presidential office as indicated in the in the scope of sphere of the Coun- cil of Justice. Through this Council, the president consumes exclusive power to nominate and control courts. Finally, as a leader of the most powerful regional grouping of Kulo- bis, the president enjoys mighty sup- port of regional elite and militaries. Officials from Kulob fill four power ministries, plus the General Prosecu- tor Office, Council of Justice, Com- mittee on Radio and TV, the Nation- al University, and other key positions. The mayor of Dushanbe and chair- man of Majlisi Melli, the official num- ber two in Tajikistan, is also from Kulob. Multipartism? In the 1990s eleven parties (in addi- tion to existed previously Commu- nist party of Tajikistan) were formed in Tajikistan. As of autumn 2003, six political parties were registered in Tajikistan. In addition to the most in- fluential presidential People’s Demo- cratic Party (PDP), the Islamic Re- naissance Party (IRP), Democratic Party (DP), Communist Party (CP), Socialist Party (SP) and Social Demo- cratic Party (SDP) operate. Tajikistan differentiates itself from other CIS countries as the right to form a party on the basis of religious ideology is enshrined in the Constitution. This is, however, rather confusing as secu- larism remains principal point of the acting Constitution. The most active oppositional political party in Tajikistan is the IRP. Born from a clandestine militant religious move- ment in the 1970s, today’s IRP tries to survive in the modern world of participatory politics. IRP has never openly pleaded for an Islamic state. Despite their Islamist ideals, Tajik Is- lamists have been closely attached to ethnic nationalism, and to the Tajik state building project, since the first days of independence. In 1991- 1997 they had allied with the official clergy, nationalist-minded secular democrats and the country’s non- Sunni (Ismaili) minority. Likewise, they could form coalitions with secular forces during the next parliamentary and presidential elections (in 2005 and 2006). The firm pressure of the Gen- eral Peace Accord’s international sponsors forced the Government to legalize the IRP, and accept a 30% power sharing agreement with the IRP. However, this imposed power- sharing arrangement has not result- ed in the formation of the coalition government and institutionalization of opposition. Most of United Tajik Opposition (UTO) nominees, joined to the party of power as soon as they took governmental posts. Some members of the Government were still opposite to the IRP’s inclusion and assert that the party’s members are closely linked to terrorists and Islam- ic extremists. Escalation of persecu- tion of IRP members and supporters and excluding them from legal polit- ical process could lead to a rapid rad- icalization of Tajikistan’s political Is- lam and transformation of IRP back to militant religious movement. The Communist Party of Tajikistan inherited a relatively developed So- viet time administrative infrastructure CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN Page 14 14 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... all over the country, considerable estate, and enjoyed the support of the part of Tajik masses dreaming about restoration of the USSR. How- ever, the CP having no patrimonial guardianship from outside patrons, and an effective support from re- gional elites and armed structures, almost lost mass-elite linkages and real influence upon politics. Generally, all parties lack institution- alized ties between voters, leaders, candidates, and activists. They are elitist in character, have an amor- phous mass base, and lack solid in- frastructure. Both pro-governmental and opposition parties poorly articu- late issue-based political programs or platforms. Despite the relative suc- cess of the Tajik peace process, political dialogue yet has not become a normal attribute of Tajikistan’s po- litical reality. In general, all political parties remain outside of the real political process. The President pre- fers contracting and patronage of real and potential opponents to direct competition and open debate. War on Terror and its Ambivalent Implications In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Tajikistan has officially declared it will cooper- ate with the US-led campaign to com- bat terrorism. Soon Tajikistan together with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan be- came frontline states in Operation Enduring Freedom. Tajikistanis hoped that along with US assistance and at- traction of foreign investment, their country could move towards the opening of political process, liberal- ization, fighting corruption, drug traf- ficking, etc. Their expectations were met partially. Indeed the US military presence has stopped activities of militant Islamists, like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. It also contributed in combating drug traf- ficking along the Tajik-Afghan bor- der. Together with this there were other more negative consequences of the US involvement in Central Asia. Since the civil war of 1992-1997 Tajikistan has a negative image of an highly unstable region with a gov- ernment unable to rule the country effectively. For that reason despite its geographical closeness to Afghan- istan, the US did not pay much at- tention to Tajikistan (comparing to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). To at- tract the US interest Tajikistan partic- ularly assigned itself the task to com- plete the consolidation of state au- thority by spreading executive pres- idential power in all regions and tak- ing control on the totality of non-state actors. In result, the main beneficia- ries of the war on terror are the cen- tral government, not localities and civil society actors. Sadly, the US in- volvement indirectly gave impetus to anti-democratic tendencies. Par- ticularly, not capable to resolve prob- lems arising from Islamist mobilization and driven by Soviet-time authori- tarian impulses the Tajik government is hardening its position vis-a-vis Is- lamists and seeking to strengthen its control over the clergy and mosques.1 The main threat to the Central Asian security however is not in radicaliza- tion of Muslim policies and terrorism but in general failure of political and economic transformation, non-inclu- sive government and widespread corruption. The lack of cooperation between Central Asian governments and rapid militarization of the region further deteriorates the situation. The June 2003 Referendum and its Significance The national referendum held in June 2003 obtained popular support for a package of 56 Constitutional amend- ments. Amongst these is an amend- ment of Article 65 of the Constitu- tion, which previously limited the President to one seven year term in office. Three (DP, SDP and IRP) out of six political parties expressed, in 1 In July 2002 the president of Tajikistan during his visit to Isfara (Sughd) accused IRP in connec- tion with Al-Qaeda terrorists. Subsequent state- lead de-registration of mosques and re-attes- tation of imams led to the firing of tens of imams and refusing to grant new licenses to several mosques. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 15 15 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... different ways, their objections with regard of the referendum. The Dem- ocratic Party of Tajikistan had boy- cotted the referendum totally. While IRP, the most powerful opposition party, having cautiously disagreed with the idea of referendum refrained from boycotting and protest. The Social Democratic Party hoped till the last moment that Parliament will change its decision and accept a SDP’s proposal to return to public discussing of the amendments. These objections and constructive propos- als, however have not been taken into account by the government. Si- lent disagreement of UN and OSCE and cautious objection of domestic opposition notwithstanding, a 51- year Emomali Rakhmonov has cleaned a path for another two sev- en-year presidential terms after the expiration of his recent term in 2006. In Tajikistan few doubt that Rakh- monov, having in his command pow- erful administrative recourse, may succeed in staying in power till 2020. Some may think that Tajikistan merely followed suit of some of CIS leaders that legally guaranteed their life-time non-alternative leadership. Howev- er, ensuring the succession of pow- er that may occur in Tajikistan would not stabilize the situation and lead to the strong presidential power. Three main reasons could confirm this pre- diction - the first is the relatively weak (comparing to other Central Asian states) national cohesion, elite’s fragmentation on domestic level and lack of autonomy in international are- na. The IRP, which de facto sup- ported Rakhmonov in June 2003, re- mains out of governmental control and it may at any moment change its position and become a real oppo- sition. Second, the growing secular opposition (DPT and SDPT) whose opinion has been explicitly ignored has nothing to do but to take in a post-June Tajikistan a hard opposition stance. In addition to the above po- litical competition, inter-regional grievances have never seized to exist in Tajikistan. This political and regional elite’s fragmentation would continually weaken the existing Tajik presidency. Another factor undermining Rakh- monov’s presidency is his failure to meet challenges of a rapidly chang- ing world. The current government of Tajikistan lacks autonomy and re- spect in the international sphere. The persistent and non-effective depen- dence on Russia comes in addition to the failure of privatization and re- structuring of economy, growing poverty and wide-spread corrup- tion. Apparently the current gov- ernment opted for balancing be- tween Russia and USA interest in maintaining minimum security pres- ence of both actors in this part of Central Asia. This would allow act- ing president to keep lowest level of required Western legitimacy. Surely this minimalist formula would not be able to ensure sustainable development and attract significant inflow of investments. CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN Page 16 16 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Addendum Table 1 Tajikistan’s administrative structure Tajikistan’s executive power at the local level e c n i v o r P e c n i v o r P e c n i v o r P e c n i v o r P e c n i v o r P f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N s a y i n o n f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N s n w o t f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N st n e m e ltt e s f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N f o r e b m u N st a o m aj l a r u R l a r u R l a r u R l a r u R l a r u R s e g alli v n o it al u p o P n o it al u p o P n o it al u p o P n o it al u p o P n o it al u p o P s d n a s u o h t y r o tirr e T y r o tirr e T y r o tirr e T y r o tirr e T y r o tirr e T d n a s u o h t 2 m k C R N C R N C R N C R N C R N 3 1 5 1 1 9 5 2 2 1 0 0 9 . 1 6 . 8 2 d h g u S d h g u S d h g u S d h g u S d h g u S 4 1 0 1 0 2 3 9 4 5 6 0 7 8 . 1 4 . 5 2 V A B M V A B M V A B M V A B M V A B M 7 1 0 2 4 6 9 3 6 0 2 2 2 . 4 6 n o lt a h K n o lt a h K n o lt a h K n o lt a h K n o lt a h K 4 2 7 7 1 0 3 1 8 2 5 1 1 5 1 . 2 8 . 4 2 L A T O T L A T O T L A T O T L A T O T L A T O T 8 5 3 2 7 4 6 5 2 3 0 8 2 7 2 1 . 6 1 . 3 4 1 Central Government Hukumats of MBAV, Khatlon, Sughd veloyats, and city of Dushanbe Hukumats of Nohiyas of Republican Control (NRC) Hukumats of towns, nohiyas, districts of Dushanbe Jamoats Jamoats TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 17 17 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Tajikistan local self-governance: a potential bridge between government and civil society? ....................................................................................................................................... Sabine Freizer Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), England Introduction Five years after the signing of the Tajik Peace Agreement, Tajikistan is immersed in a process of political, social and economic reform which goes to the heart of the country’s system of government. The State faces the challenge of establishing mechanisms to ensure good gover- nance, decentralization and increased accountability. The Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, passed in November 1994, and a series of subsequent laws lay the foundations for the country’s cur- rent governing institutions. However this reform process dealt mainly with higher echelons of government. Eight years later one of the fundamental questions policy makers and legisla- tors face, is how to further encour- age decentralization and regulate the lowest levels of governmental author- ity. Since 1991, an armed conflict, loss of contacts and trade with the Soviet Union, and the rapid plunge of the country’s economic production and living standards, have left all Tajik localities suffering deeply from unem- ployment, social disruption, loss of revenue and lack of energy sources and communication links. Localities have been left mainly on their own, to cope with the situation in a most basic way, seeking piecemeal solu- tions to structural problems. Howev- er as social, political, and economic conditions have begun to gradually improve, the question of how to for- malize the competencies of institutions of local self-government has come to the fore. The concept of local self- governance is not new in former com- munist regimes; and it was previous- ly heralded during Khrushchev’s re- forms. Today local self-government has become a popular notion in de- velopment fields, where it is being applied in a host of countries from India to Costa Rica. In Tajikistan a de- facto tradition of local self-governance exists, which was partly superseded by socialist institutions, but regained legitimacy during 1994 legislative re- forms. For the purpose of this paper, local self-governance is defined as a mechanism enabling citizens to decide about their common interests, and satisfy their common needs, in the fields of infrastructure development, housing, communal activities, service provision and other areas of commu- nity and economic life. Empirical evi- dence reveals shortcomings in the leadership of existing institutions of local self-governance in Tajikistan, their degree of representativeness and ac- countability, competencies and abili- ty to collect resources. Most signifi- cantly experience suggests that the de-jure institution of local self-govern- ment - the jamoat - is less a mecha- nism of self-government then a pure- ly governmental form. At the com- munity level a host of other tradi- tional and new institutions function more effectively as local self-gov- ernment entities. Since 1997 sever- al internationally funded projects, adopting different approaches, have attempted to strengthen local self- government. The most substantial of these efforts was initiated by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) village orga- nization program. The AKF’s short- comings and successes provide use- ful lessons to be integrated into Tajiki- stan’s conceptualization of local self- government. TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? Page 18 18 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Theoretical and legal bases for Tajikistan local self-government Local self-governance is historically ingrained in Tajik society and gov- erning practice. Mahallas are a his- torical example of effective Tajik lo- cal self-governance. Mahallas brought people living on the same territory together on a voluntary basis, along interest lines based on profession or good neighborliness. They created a forum where local values, rules of behavior, and common interests were defined, through which group interests were protected and joint actions organized. Tea-houses (Chaihana) served as the meeting point for mahalla members. Though mahallas had limited powers and au- thority to oppose themselves to state decisions, mahallas could lob- by neighborhood interests. Mahallas had some resources collected from the voluntary contribution of people belonging to them. 1. The concept of Jamoats According to 1994 Tajik legislation The concept of local self-government as it is used today in Tajikistan was enshrined in the 1994 Constitution. According to the Constitution, a ja- moat is defined as an institution of self-government in towns and villag- es. The framework for their authori- ty is set forth in the Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Vil- lages passed in December 1994. In this law, local self-governance is de- scribed as «the system of organiz- ing public activities to address issues of local importance autonomously and at their own discretion, directly or indirectly, in accordance with the legislation of Republic of Tajikistan. Local self-governments resolve is- sues within their competence direct- ly or through their representatives.» (Preamble) Jamoats were set up on a territorial basis, and generally took over the jurisdiction of the former village councils. Local self-govern- ment was clearly set up as separate and distinct from other forms of gov- ernment, whose competencies were defined under the Law on Local Governing Bodies. Significantly the legal basis for local self-government institutions in rural areas was provid- ed for, while no such institutions were envisioned for cities. In 2002 some 350 jamoats existed on the territory of Tajikistan. The legislation on Local Self-gover- nance in Towns and Villages provides jamoats with a large range of com- petencies and duties. Fundamental- ly, as an institution of local self-gov- ernance, jamoats assist «in the fulfill- ment of the rights of citizens to par- ticipate in the management of the activities of the state and society, and unites them to solve social and economic problems on their territo- ry, as well as the most important problems directly touching the inter- ests of the population.» (Article 1) The lists of tasks assigned to the ja- moat are extensive and include many that may be considered as falling within governmental competency. The jamoat should thus organize im- plementation of the Constitution, leg- islation, acts of the president, Parlia- ment or the government of Tajiki- stan as well as local government decisions. It also assists government bodies in tax collection, and in the notification of reservists and recruits about their call to military service. (Article 19) 2. The absence of any legal basis for the work of mahallas Though mahallas have existed for centuries as a traditional form of lo- cal self-governance, when the legis- lation on local self-governance was drafted in 1994, mahallas were not included. This is particularly surprising as during the Soviet era, though mahallas as a representation of ur- ban self-organization weakened sig- nificantly, they gained new influence in rural areas. In urban areas many traditional forms of civic organization - such as the mahallas - were usurped by communist-style social organiza- tions. But in rural communities, the communist system was much less successful in replacing and eradicat- ing traditional structures. Therefore TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 19 19 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... in the 1980s a wide range of village level institutions - mahallas, shura ak- sakal - with their different forms of leadership - rais mahalla, rais chaiha- na, sardor, rohbar - continued to func- tion. In the Karetegin Valley during the 1980s the population of villages gathered together to make decisions concerning the construction of pub- lic buildings - schools, mosques, teahouses (chaihana), libraries. They raised funds through benevolent con- tributions, carried out work through voluntary labor (hashar), secured the provision of assistance from the col- lective farm and established their own supervising bodies to ensure that the projects were carried out.1 Although traditional rural institutions are not defined by law, as local self- government structures they carry out many self-governing tasks. Tra- ditionally, mahallas are governed by a council of elders (shura aksakal), which helps resolve social problems and conflicts within the community. Mahalla committees facilitate the or- ganization of key events in the lives of local citizens: births, marriages and burials. Mahallas help solve conflicts within families and between neigh- bors, thus helping build social cohe- sion and maintaining peace and uni- ty. Mahalla committees can also ini- tiate community work through hashar - for example, garbage collection, the cleaning of irrigation ditches, re- habilitation of public buildings, recon- 1 Information collected in interviews in the Garm region in July, 2002 2 Interview with Farrukh Tyuryaev, General Di- rector, Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia, on 27 June, 2002 in Khojand. struction of the homes of widows and the elderly. Though this practice continues to exist in Tajikistan, accord- ing to a survey carried out in the NGO ASTI in Sughd Oblast, a large major- ity of mahallas did not organize a hashar between 2000-2002.2 In fact though mahallas continue to play a significant role in the national psyche of Tajikistan, since the end of the civil war, they are increasingly passive and risk withering away. Tajikistan legislation defines local self- governance as «a system of orga- nizing public activities to address is- sues of local importance autono- mously.» Though a strong tradition of local self-governance exists in Tajikistan, as does a legal basis for the functioning of local self-gover- nance entities, a large percentage of what in practice represents local self-governance - the work of ma- hallas - is not regulated or legally recognized. Local self-governance in practice: problems and opportunities The problems and challenges which institutions of local self-government face in Tajikistan, were the topics of a series of political discussion clubs, with members of Tajik Gov- ernment, jamoats, political parties and NGOs, organized by the Unit- ed Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP) and the National Association of Tajik Political Scientists in 2001 and 2002. The clubs were held throughout the country, and provided an open form for discussions on jamoats’ shortcom- ings and advantages. Three main areas of weakness were defined. They concern leadership, represen- tation and participation in local self- government; undefined competen- cies and tasks of jamoats; and re- source deficits. 1. Local self-government leadership and representativeness Though jamoats are termed local self- government bodies, the executive powers in the jamoat are controlled from above. The chairperson of the jamoat is selected by the govern- ment (hukumat) chairman of the city or region, and approved by the ja- moat council for a five-year term. The chairperson is responsible for nominating his/her own deputy, sec- retary, and committee - though in practice the hukumat may also influ- ence this selection. Local participa- tion in the selection of the chairper- son and committee is nominally guar- anteed as all nominations must be ap- proved by the jamoat majilis. Jamo- TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? Page 20 20 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... at majlis representatives are ad-hoc appointees selected at the level of the mahalla, village, street... They approve the jamoat chairman and staff nomination by a show of hands; rarely do jamoat representatives pro- pose alternative candidates (in this case a closed vote may be orga- nized). In practice the powers of majlis representatives are weak as the hukumat has the power to de- cide when the elections will be held, and how many representatives are needed to hold a vote. The huku- mat’s influence over the selection of the jamoat chair may provide the jamoat with better access to higher levels of government, yet it clearly limits the jamoat’s accountability to local citizens. Within the jamoat the majority of powers are consolidated in the hands of the chairman, and are only nom- inally delegated to members of the jamoat committee. The committees range in size, with an average of five to seven employees, depend- ing on the vastness and population of the territory. They receive a nominal salary from the government (approximately 25 somoni for the chairman, and 10-18 somoni for the others). The role of the committee members is to carry out the admin- istrative tasks assigned to the jamo- at. Representation in the jamoat is guaranteed by the jamoat majilis. The jamaot chairperson must call ja- moat majlis meetings not less than twice a year. These meetings are attended by jamoat representatives who may be considered to be the lowest-level of citizen representa- tion. However as they are tempo- rary appointees, and meetings of the jamoat representatives are rare, their powers are limited. Though jamoat committees and ja- moat majlis by law unite citizens to solve economic and social problems on their territory - in practice this is rarely possible, due to the jamoats’ size. In 2002 356 jamoats functioned with populations ranging from 50,000 to 1,500. On average ja- moats tended to represent some 6- 12,000 inhabitants, or since the country was made up of 3,200 vil- lages, cover about 10 villages. Many municipalities in Western Eu- rope are much smaller; in Germany the average size of a municipality is 5,430, in Italy 7,120 and in Slove- nia 10,360. The very size of most jamoats makes it difficult for com- mittee staff to have a firm under- standing of local needs. As some jamoat chairmen pointed out during the political discussion clubs, they frequently have neither the funds to travel throughout the jamoat ter- ritory, nor the time. Consequently the jamoat system therefore does not serve as an effective represen- tative or participatory mechanism of government. 2. Tasks and competencies of the jamoat The Law on Self-government in Towns and Villages distinguishes be- tween the powers allocated to the jamoat (powers of the bodies of self- management) and the to the jamoat chairman. The jamoat majlis has eight main responsibilities according to law (Article 14), while the chairman has twenty-seven (Article 19). The main role of the majlis is to pass the pro- gram of activities and budget of the jamoat, hear the annual reports pre- sented by the chairman, and moni- tor spending (Art. 14). In fact the jamoat is given few legal powers or means to fulfill its essential legal duty of «organizing public activities to address issues of local importance.» These responsibilities are under the competencies of the jamoat chair- man who, «takes measures to im- prove the material and living condi- tions of citizens, and can represent the interests of citizens in the bodies of state authority» (Art. 19). Never- theless according to the law, the chairman of the jamoat also repre- sents the executive branch of local government and is thus engaged in a variety of tasks delegated to him by higher governmental authorities. Though by law the jamoat chairman and his staff have vast responsibili- ties and competencies, in practice they are unable to fulfill many of its tasks because of a lack of staff and TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 21 21 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... resources. Instead jamoats appear most frequently to divide their time between carrying out tasks of local government and addressing citizens’ complaints. In many instances, a large percentage of the jamoat’s efforts are concentrated on revenue collec- tion. According to the Nosiri Khisrav jamoat secretary, «60-70% of the time of the jamoat is used in the collec- tion of taxes on property, land, and transport and state duties/ fees. The jamo- at is responsible for insuring that people pay on time, yet people have few monetary resources so it’s difficult for them to pay. Because of this we have little time to do anything else then go after these people.» This particular jamoat estimated that it collects approximately 3000 somo- ni ($1000) a year. The degree to which institutions of local self-govern- ment are engaged in tax collection varies between localities, as legally Tax Authorities are responsible for tax collection, but may request as- sistance from jamoats. The second main function of jamoats is to receive citizens, examine complaints, regis- ter them and take appropriate mea- sures. Complaints may concern group problems - such as the use of water, land, and waste - or personal disputes - such as marriage, divorce or neighborly quarrels. Many citizens approach the mahalla chair or his/ her staff in the first instance, then the jamoat, and only afterwards turn to the police or the courts. Mahallas and jamoats therefore maintain a higher degree of trust among the population then law enforcement bodies. In many parts of Tajikistan there is a dearth of judges, and in- adequate courts, thus jamoats help fill an existing gap in judicial service provision. 3. Resources Like all other levels of government in Tajikistan since 1991, institutions of local self-government suffer from a lack of financial and material re- sources. In addition, as they are not legally part of the country’s govern- ing structure, jamoats do not have official budgets or their own bank accounts, but are dependent on lo- cal governmental financial depart- ments. During the political discussion club meetings, jamoat chairmen not- ed that one of the main factors limit- ing their work is the lack of a clear mechanism regulating how they can collect and employ funds. When asked whether they regularly pre- pared their own annual budgets, only a small minority of the jamoat chair- men responded affirmatively. Instead they rely almost exclusively on city or district councils’ budget allocations, and employ the funds according to the budget lines that the higher lev- els of government have assigned. In many instances jamoat chairmen are unaware of how much money they have at their disposal and how much they have spent. Each district gov- ernment determines how much fund- ing it wishes to allocate to jamoats and the sum may vary significantly from region to region. Theoretically the strength of a jamo- at lies in its ability to collect volun- tary contributions from citizens, en- terprises and other organizations operating on its territory. Yet since the end of the civil war few jamoats have successfully collected revenues from communities, or mobilized them in hashar. Jamoats also benefit from financial control over community property, which may include means of transportation, equipment and oth- er facilities, public or social, which these institutions have built or pur- chased. They have broad rights to lease or use their property, as well as discretion over the use of the as- sets. Nevertheless it is extremely difficult to determine to what extent jamoats take advantage of these resources. Two jamoats attending a political discussion club, in the Kara- tegin Valley, exemplified to what extent revenue collection differs. In 2001 one jamoat located in the Jir- gital district collected 128,000 somo- ni (approximately $40,000) while another in the Darban district gath- TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? Page 22 22 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ered only 26,000 somoni. Both ja- moats have similar populations and are in neighboring districts, but the chairman in Jirgital collected some $26,000 from potato producers on his territory. He claims that he con- vinced the producers to offer these funds as a voluntary contribution, and that he did not impose an indirect tax. However this example also re- veals how the lack of regulation con- cerning jamoat revenue collection and budgeting leaves room for a host of distortions, inequalities and lost opportunities in resource manage- ment. One of the greatest challenges for institutions of local self-government is the re-awakening amongst citizens of the former spirit of self-help, com- munity participation and volunteer- ism that used to exist, especially in rural areas. Jamoat chairman are find- ing this to be an impressive obstacle to their work; local communities are passive and unwilling to organize or participate in any form of communi- ty action. In this context local self- government is top-driven, and be- coming increasingly weak. What changes may be proposed to re- verse this trend? A future model of local self-government: MSDP village organizations The Aga Khan Foundation, Mountain Societies Development and Support Program (MSDSP) has been one of the most successful externally fund- ed community development projects in Tajikistan. Since 1998 the MSDSP has been supporting the strengthening of local «village orga- nizations» (VOs) with the goal of «mobilizing human, physical and fi- nancial resources to empower local villagers, give them greater owner- ship of development activities and generate wealth.»3 From 1998- 2002, the MSDSP became engaged in 400 villages in Gorno-Badakshan and 72 in the Karategin Valley. Dur- ing that time the MSDSP achieved its immediate objective of ensuring the availability of enough food for the local population’s survival; and it is now in the process of working with communities to reach food self-suffi- ciency. It can be argued that the MSDSP’s VOs are a form of local self-governance because they are representative bodies of households living in a given geographic locality, who voluntarily come together to make decisions and undertake activ- ities to advance common interests and improve community livelihoods.4 When the MSDSP initiated its VO program, it did not seek to create entirely new community structures, but rather based itself on existing in- stitutions such as the mahallas and shura aksakal. It also promoted tra- ditional concepts of self-help, volun- teerism, and community mobilization (hashar, sadoka, maraka). Local citi- zens participating in VOs saw a di- rect link between these entities and traditional Tajik forms of village self- governance. During interviews car- ried out with six VOs in the Karate- gin Valley during Summer 2002, com- munity members described how «everything that we are doing now through the village organizations, we used to do before.»5 As the VOs are accepted as a continuation of more traditional forms of organizing, they are clearly embedded in local communities. As described above, though mahal- las and other traditional village enti- ties play a significant role in the na- tional psyche of Tajikistan, since the end of the civil war, they have be- come passive and ineffectual. The goal of the VO program is thus to reverse this trend. According to the MSDSP 2002-2007 Strategy: «During the Soviet period village-level institutions were sponsored by the government, but they had neither the funding nor the skills and experience to make long term plans and generally had few respon- sibilities. Lack of experience 3 MSDP Five Year Strategy 2002-2006, Khorog, April 2002 (p.6) 4 A Charter for Village Organizations, MSDPS, Khorog, February 2001 (p.4) 5 Interviews carried out in 6 village organiza- tions in the Karategin Valley, July, 2002. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 23 23 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... in election procedures led to the selection of poorly qualified people, and in practice, the institutions only carried out instruc- tions from above. Over the last few years the MSDSP has adopted the village institu- tions and has been working to transform them into structural and better led vil- lage organizations with the potential to play a dynam- ic role in village level gov- ernance and resources management.»6 To improve the effectiveness of vil- lage structures, the MSDSP initiated efforts to support the development of democratic leadership, increased participation and accountability, the acquisition of resources and their transparent management, and project planning and development. 1. Village organization, leader ship and citizens’ participation Village Organizations are based on the system of direct participatory democracy. The leadership of MSD- SP village organizations - including a chair, deputy, bookkeeper and the head of the women’s organization - is selected through open and fair elec- tions, with the participation of at least 80% of village households. While representatives of official govern- 6 MSDP Five Year Strategy 2002-2006, Khorog, April 2002 (p.11) mental structures often attend the elections, they do not play a role in the nomination of candidates. Unlike jamoat chairmen, village organization heads are selected by direct suffrage, for a period of two years. While the VO leadership is responsible for the entity’s day-to-day activities and planning, it is not authorized to exe- cute decisions without consulting the community. Monthly the chair must call for a general VO meeting where projects are discussed and agreed upon. Within VO participatory deci- sion-making is employed; this direct form of democracy is possible be- cause VOs represent between 500 and 50 households, and cover a rel- atively small territory. VO leadership is more aware of local needs be- cause they are expressed directly by citizens in the monthly meetings. The VO general gathering is consid- ered to be the legitimate entity rep- resenting the community, through which citizens carry out self-manage- ment. 2. Village organization tasks The main aim of Village Organiza- tions is to improve the management of available resources - human, so- cial, financial, natural and cultural - to increase the livelihoods of all seg- ments of the village. The VO chair is responsible for articulating a de- velopment vision for the village, and communicating it with citizens, donors, governmental officials, etc. The primary role of VO meetings is to serve as a forum where mem- bers can discuss needs, make pol- icy decisions and agree on imple- mentation. Members also hear ac- tivity reports, monitor spending, and may hold leadership account- able. Members have the right to initiate their own public activities and to request support from the VO as a whole. When governmental offi- cials wish to provide information, or to request something from the village community, jamoat authori- ties participate in VO meetings - they do not directly delegate tasks to the VO or its leadership. The VO chairmen are ultimately responsible for insuring that members pay their dues. But since this is a voluntary contribution that can be bestowed in cash or kind, and is usually col- lected at the general monthly meet- ings - it does not require the same kind of effort as jamoa’ tax collec- tion. Examples in the Karategin Valley demonstrate that VO chair- men also facilitate social cohesion- building, as citizens come to them to advise and arbiter when there are problems within the family and between neighbors. TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? Page 24 24 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3. Village organization resources and funding While Village Organizations carry out many of the same tasks as jamoats, they may more readily access ex- ternal funding and local financial and physical resources. According to the MSDSP Regional Manager in the Ka- rategin Valley, 378 projects have been completed since 1998. Twelve main types of activities were imple- mented, including vegetable-plant- ing, bird-farming, irrigating, infrastruc- ture and micro-credit for women. VOs benefit from the MSDSP fund- ing ranging from 30 to 70% of project costs. The financial injection provided by the MSDSP to VOs in 2001 in the Karategin Valley totaled 387,000 somoni. However, citizens also participate through voluntary contributions - collected through monthly member fees or ad hoc donations - and through the provi- sion of their labor. In 2001 in the Karategin Valley MSDSP estimated that VOs provided approximately 234,781 somoni towards the imple- mentation of projects. Though the infrastructure projects are generally financed by the MSDSP as grants, in the majority of the other projects were distributed as credits, which beneficiaries have to pay back in cash or kind. The aim of the credit sys- tem is to ensure that «We do not give anything to anyone for free. We want people to learn how to work, to earn money for the bread them- selves. Now farmers start under- standing that in order to have some- thing they have to work.»7 One of the goals of the MSDSP pro- gram is to help formalize VOs - es- pecially in regards to the manage- ment, spending and planning of the use of resources. Since 2001, VOs have been encouraged to apply a Village Development Planning Pro- cess to regulate how they analyze existing assets, plan expenditures, collect resources, implement activi- ties, monitor and report. This pro- cess aims to assist all involved to in- crease their awareness about local needs, resource allocation and bud- geting - knowledge which jamoats, who have no clear mechanism regu- lating how they can collect and em- ploy funds, sorely lack. VOs are also provided with their own budget through the establishment of Village Development Funds. These funds are set up with a one-time contribution by the MSDSP (generally between 500-2000 somoni), and supplement- ed over time with VO member con- tributions and other VO fund-raising activities. Since the MSDSP program started functioning in the Karategin Valley in 1998, the 72 VOs in the region have amassed a total of 72,316 somoni in membership dues for the Village Development Funds. In July 2002, the total savings the 72 village organizations had placed in their Village Development Funds equaled 174,874 somoni.8 Conclusions A fundamental questions which poli- cy makers and legislators engaged in governance reform in Tajikistan face is: how can Tajik institutions of local self government be supported to lay the foundation for self-sustain- ing social and political development? In 2001 The Presidential Office of the Government of Tajikistan estab- lished a committee to work on new draft legislation on institutions of lo- cal self-governance. According to Rahmatillo Zoir, Legal Advisor to the President of the RT, it will include several significant changes: for the first time mahallas will be included as institutional form of local self-govern- ment. While this will positively bring local self-governance closer to the people, it will also become impor- tant to delineate at this level the role of local self-government institutions and public associations - or NGOs. Several mahalla committees and MSDSP village organizations, with no other regulating edict to refer to, have already registered as public associations. 7 Interview with MSDSP Regional Manager for the Karategin Valley, July, 2002 8 Statistics from «Information about the savings of VOs of Rasht Valley,» prepared by MSDSP, dated 30.06.02 TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 25 25 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Lessons learned from past experi- ence with jamoats and the MSDSP village organizations provides help- ful indications for Tajik policy makers and legislators. Jamoat representa- tives are themselves vocal about the need to delineate their competen- cies; regulate their collection and use of funds; and allow them to have access to their own budgets. A fun- damental lesson for local self-gover- nance entities is the importance of reaching deep into local communi- ties - at the level of individual villag- es, neighborhoods, or mahallas, rath- er then at the level of territories rep- resenting on average 6-12,000 in- habitants. The VO experience indi- cates that when local self-gover- nance is organized at the village lev- el participation of local citizens is more easily promoted. While jamo- ats may more appropriately be for- malized as governmental institutions, rather then self-government bodies, reforms in jamoats leadership, struc- ture, funding and working mecha- nisms are also needed. The jamoat chairman position should be directly elected, and there should be more opportunity for community consulta- tion through the jamoat majlis. There is room for greater cooperation and division of competencies between jamoats, mahallas, higher governmen- tal authorities, local NGOs and inter- national donor agencies. After over fifty years of communism, Tajikistan rural communities do not lack mobilizing capacities or a sense of volunteerism. They are, howev- er, suffering from a loss of direction, passivity, and the absence of eco- nomic resources. Reforms that sup- port more direct participation of citi- zens in local decision-making may potentially increase popular partici- pation. While deficits will continue as Tajikistan undergoes massive macro- economic reform, there is room for more efficient and equitable utiliza- tion of existing financial, human, and natural assets. A system rewarding voluntary contributions, and enabling a percentage of revenues collected in one territory to be directly utilized in the same region, has the potential of contributing to better resource allocation. For international donor agencies and political organizations interested in promoting good gov- ernance, decentralization and in- creased accountability, a clearer com- mitment to supporting Tajik institu- tions of local self-governance also has the potential of insuring more sus- tainable social and economic devel- opment in Tajikistan. TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? Page 26 26 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Tajikistan is a unitary (as an entity, non-federative) state. To govern the state the territory of the republic is divided into separate units. The na- ture and structure of these units is determined in the Constitution and the Constitutional Law «On Proce- dure of Administrative-territorial Or- ganization of the Republic of Tajiki- stan» passed on November 4, 1995. They are the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), re- gions or oblasts (Khatlonskaya, Sog- diiskaya), the city of Dushanbe, cit- ies, districts or rayons, settlements and villages. Within these adminis- trative units the local State and self- governance representative and ex- ecutive bodies were created on the oblast, rayon and city levels. State bodies do not exist below the levels of the city and rayon. As to self - governance bodies called Jamoats (sub-district) they were established on the levels of village and settle- ment. In the Republic of Tajikistan the existing rayons and cities are includ- ed into different administrative units: GBAO, Khatlon and Sughd oblasts and Dushanbe city. Some rayons and cities called «rayons and cities of re- publican subordination» do not be- Regional government in Tajikistan (centre and regions) ....................................................................................................................................... Zarif Aliev, Chairman Constitutional Court Tajikistan long to oblasts (these cities and ray- ons are located around the capital mostly in the Hissor and Rasht val- leys) but they are directly subordi- nate to the central Government. Local State power is divided into two levels: 1) Oblast level 2) City and rayon level. The lowest level of governance consists of local self-gov- ernance bodies: settlement and vil- lage jamoats (communities). The above-mentioned Jamoats are inde- pendent and have equal status. There are so called rural jamoats in rural areas and settlement jamoats in settlements. The self-governance bodies (jamoats) are not created in urban industrial areas, cities and ray- ons (Dushanbe rayon and some oth- ers) because there are no correspon- dent administrative units such as vil- lage and settlement. In urban areas a mahalla council (city block council) does exist. The Mahalla Council is a public association of citizens living on the same territory; it is created by local residents on a voluntary base. GBAO as an autonomous formation, and the city of Dushanbe as the cap- ital of the republic, have some pe- culiarities. The following factors: a specific natural-climatic feature that resulted in a particular and complete social economic system of the oblast, as well as the language, household and other ethnic features of the lo- cal population were taken into con- sideration to form Gorni Badakhshan as an autonomous entity. Taking into account these GBAO peculiarities, there is a separate chap- ter (Chapter 8) in the Constitution of the Republic enacting that the status of GBAO is to be determined by a constitutional law. The constitutional law «On Gorno-Badakhshan Auton- omous Oblast» passed on Novem- ber 4, 1995 determines a specific status of this oblast. Taking into consideration the auton- omous character of GBAO, the law enacts not to change the borders of the oblast without the GBAO Majlisi of People’s Deputies’ (representa- tive body of the oblast) consent; that the government shall create condi- tions for the languages (Kyrgyz, Rus- han, Vakhan, and Yazgulyam) to be freely developed and used; one of the Majlisi Milli deputy chairmen (up- per chamber of the Parliament) shall be a deputy from GBAO (as usual he is one of the people’s deputies TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 27 27 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... elected to Majlisi Oli from GBAO); one of the judges of the Constitu- tional Court shall be a GBAO repre- sentative, (the appointment proce- dure is not defined by the Tajik Con- stitution and the Law on Constitutional Court. As usual his candidature is pro- posed by the Head of the Oblast. After that the candidature is pro- posed by the Tajik President, along with the candidatures of other Con- stitutional Court judges, to the Up- per Chamber of the Parliament for further approval) to form the GBAO permanent representation to keep the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan in constant touch with the GBAO executive bodies under the Government of the Republic of Tajiki- stan. (This permanent representation is formed in accordance with the central Government). These rights enacted by the law are the guarantee for GBAO as an au- tonomous oblast in the structure of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the form to protect its interests (not as a State unit but as a social and cultural entity). As in some other similar cas- es around the world, during the cre- ation of GBAO its cultural, language and some ethnic peculiarities as well as its geographical isolation were tak- en into consideration. The city of Dushanbe has similar rights as the other oblasts. Since Dushanbe is the capital of the republic, it has some peculiar features. These fea- tures are specified in the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan, «On the Sta- tus of the Capital of the Republic of Tajikistan» passed on December 13, 1996. It should be noted that in com- parison with the other regions includ- ed in the structure of the oblast many of the social and economic problems of Dushanbe must be solved by the city itself rather than by the districts included in the structure of the city. Thus, the law (Article 5) stipulates that the Dushanbe government shall be responsible for the transfer of the land, buildings, structures, construc- tions and premises, amount of hous- ing, utilities, transport and other ser- vices. Costs for services rendered by the local executive bodies locat- ed in Dushanbe should be reimbursed by donations and subventions from the republican budget. There is a special line in the republican budget for this purpose, (and a separate line for all other regions). The law also specifies a definite character of mu- tual relations that the city of Dushan- be has with the regions of republi- can subordination, especially those that border on Dushanbe (Hissor, Lenin, Varzob and Kafirnihon (Vah- dat) rayons). These regions should support the development of Dush- anbe, including working out and im- plementing development programs to be fulfilled in the regions of re- publican subordination and develop- ment of the utilities that render ser- vices to Dushanbe, the regions of republican subordination, and others. The administrative-territorial organi- zation of the Republic of Tajikistan has been historically formed. The pre- revolutionary Russia and part of the present Tajikistan that used to be in the structure of czarist Russia were divided into the following local terri- torial structures - provinces, volosts (small rural districts), and districts. After the 1917 revolution it was decided to break this old local gov- ernment system. In the late twenti- eth and early thirtieth of the 20th century a new system of local terri- torial organization of the Soviet state was developed that consisted of oblasts, areas, cities, regions, settle- ments and villages which are all in- cluded in the governmental system. This system existed before the USSR collapsed and it still exists in Tajiki- stan at present. Before 1994, when the Republic of Tajikistan passed the Constitution, there were self-govern- ment bodies in settlements and vil- lages. In the territorial structure system of Soviet and present Tajikistan, a ray- on is the basic part of the rural area and a city is the basic part of the industrial centers. Since rayons and cities are situated closer to the agri- cultural and industrial enterprises they unite the agricultural objects and in- dustries in the territory they are situ- ated, and they are also nearer to REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN TAJIKISTAN (CENTRE AND REGIONS) Page 28 28 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... the population than oblasts and ar- eas. All rayons are included into dif- ferent oblasts or Dushanbe city. (As stated before, the rayons of repub- lican subordination are not part of an oblast but they are directly subordi- nated to the Central Government). This peculiarity of the area was spec- ified when Soviet power was being established. For example, the reso- lution of the XVI VKP(b) Conference specified that «the central unit for the Party and Soviet power instruc- tions to be implemented is a region» (CPSS in the resolutions and decisions, volume 4, page 234) A rayon is the basic unit in modern Tajikistan, the district is the lowest level of government. It is the rayon that solves the important problems of local government, economic and social-cultural development. The State power is limited at the rayon level beyond which the next level of self-governance unit is called the Jamoat. Jamoats are included into the territory of the rayons. The oblast is an intermediate part to govern the territory between the Central Government, rayons and cit- ies. In fact the oblast governs the territory, existing bodies, enterpris- es, departments and organizations. As it has already been mentioned the Republic of Tajikistan consists of GBAO, the Sogdiiskaya oblast, the Khatlonskaya oblast and the city of Dushanbe (Dushanbe actually has the rights of the oblast with some differ- ences peculiar to the capital of the republic) In Dushanbe city many eco- nomic, social and cultural questions are solved on the city level because there is a united administrative unit consisting of different branches and bodies (such as the water supply unit called Dushanbe Water Channel, the electricity provision unit called Gorelectroset, Heating System Net- work unit, Telephone Communication unit etc). Some regions and cities (so- called cities and regions of republi- can subordination (RRS)) have no part in an oblast. They directly communi- cate with the republican bodies. The situation of the RRS (lack of oblast part) limits their opportunity to ex- press and implement their rights and interests, also to protect the rights of the population. For example, lack of the oblast court does not enable the people to appeal to the court of second appearance in order to pro- tect their rights. They must go di- rectly to the Supreme Court of the republic. The upper chamber of par- liament basically includes represen- tatives from oblasts and the city of Dushanbe, (five representatives from each oblast, Dushanbe city and ray- ons of republican subordination). The law developed a new structure for the RRS that do not have their own oblasts - a joint meeting of people’s deputies for the regions of republi- can subordination, RRS cities, and others. This Joint Meeting of peo- ples’ deputies is created only for one purpose, which is the election of the Rayons of Republican Subordination representatives to the Upper Cham- ber of the Parliament. After the dep- uties are elected the Joint meeting is over because it has no other tasks or capacity. Thus, local governance is carried out in the oblast, city, and district. There are local self-government bodies in the settlements and villages which are not administrative management bodies but are self-governance units. The local State power is represent- ed by executive and representative bodies. They cooperate and inter- act with each other and with other levels (oblast level) representing the State power on a local level. The representative and executive bod- ies represent the local government. They cooperate with each other and carry out local governance together with the other levels (region and self- governance level). The representative bodies include Madjlisi (councils) of the deputies of oblasts, cities and regions elected by the population of these territories for five years. They regularly meet with their constituency voters. The num- ber of deputies of the Madjlisis is dif- ferent. The constitutional law «On Election of Deputies to the Local Madjlisis of People’s Deputies» en- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 29 29 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... acts the quota for the oblast madjli- sis and the Dushanbe madjlisi to be not more than 70 deputies, and for the regional and city madjlisis not more than 40 deputies (Article 7). Local madjlisis should express and represent the interests of the city and oblast population. Local madjli- sis, as the representatives of the appropriate territory, approve local budgets and hear reports on the budget execution; approve perspec- tive, social and economic develop- ment programs; approve general plans and rules of redevelopment; approve local taxes, charges and tariffs; approve the chairman and his assistants, chiefs of the structural di- visions in the executive bodies, hear their reports; make decisions on is- sue, conditions and placement of local loans, lotteries and others. They make these decisions within the lim- its of the competencies. The deputies of the local madjlisis do not work on a constant basis. They convoke sessions not less than twice a year. The chairman of the oblast, region and city heads a local madjli- si. The President of the republic ap- points chairmen of the local madjlisis from among the deputies of these madjlisis for five years. The chairmen are approved at the session. The Chairmen usually head the executive and representative powers on the correspondent territorial units, which means that there are Chairmen of oblast, city, rayon and Chairmen of peoples’ deputies meetings of the territories. Mutual relations between different local madjlisis are as follows: local madjlisis implement their activity in- dependently within the limits of their competence. Higher local madjlisis can delegate part of their authority to the lower madjlisis, lower madjli- sis can also, on mutual consent, trans- fer part of their authority to the higher madjlisi; higher madjlisis have the right to cancel the resolutions of the low- er madjlisis if they contradict the law; the lower madjlisis have the right to go to court and contest the deci- sions of the higher madjlisis; the mad- jlisis also have the right to cancel the decisions of their chairmen, if the resolutions do not correspond to cur- rent legislation. These rights are not widely used but are in theory avail- able. The chairman of GBAO, the chair- man of the city of Dushanbe, as well as the chairmen of oblasts, regions and cities, head the local govern- ments. The chairman has a first dep- uty and assistants and his own office (administration) appointed by him. The chairman has overall charge of the structural divisions of the local executive bodies, and other bodies, enterprises and departments under the jurisdiction of the oblasts, cities and regions. There are three types of bodies, enterprises, and organization accord- ing to the current legislation in place: enterprises, establishments and organizations of the com- munal property; structural divisions of local governments; local agencies, establish- ments, enterprises and orga- nizations of the republican property. The local governments manage the enterprises, establishments and or- ganizations of the communal prop- erty; the chairman directly appoints their chiefs; and they have contracts. Government Resolution No.216 as of March 17, 1995 determined the structural divisions of the local gov- ernments. The structural divisions in- clude oblast, regional, and urban structures of education, public health services, culture, environmental pro- tection, economics and foreign eco- nomic relations, justice, finance, ag- riculture and others which are in dou- ble subordination: first of all they are subordinated to the Chairman and then to the heads of Ministries and correspondent Government bodies. Heads of the structural divisions are appointed by the corresponding Chairmen in accordance with the Ministers and heads of governmen- tal bodies. Their chiefs are appoint- REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN TAJIKISTAN (CENTRE AND REGIONS) Page 30 30 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ed by the appropriate chairmen with the consent of higher bodies (Minis- tries, departments, organizations, agencies, etc.). The third group of organizations is the one not included in the first and second groups. They belong to the republican property. Their chiefs are appointed and relieved of their posts by ministers and chiefs of the de- partments as agreed with the appro- priate chairman. These different groups should follow the resolutions of the local Madjlisis and chairmen passed by them within the limits of their competence. Organizational issues and issues of territory management are in the au- thority of the chairmen of oblasts, cities and regions, and the chairman of the city of Dushanbe. Thus, the chairman convokes sessions of the local madjlisis, presides at the ses- sions, supervises the structural divi- sions of local governments, manag- es the communal property, coordi- nates the activity of the enterprises, organizations and establishments of the republican property, regulates land utilization and organizes the lo- cal budget execution, etc. So, the chairman has real actual pow- er and bears responsibility for the business situation in his territory (oblast, rayon, city). The chairman, within the limits of his competence, makes resolutions for all the bodies, organizations, enter- prises and departments to follow. The Chairmen of oblast, Central Government and Court have the right to cancel the decisions of heads of rayons and cities. Central Gov- ernment and Court may cancel the decisions of oblast Chairmen. The decisions of all Chairmen (of oblasts, Dushanbe city, rayons and cities) may be canceled by the corresponding Majlisi Oli on oblast, city and rayons levels in the case of contradiction with existing legislation. Mutual relations of the chairman, as the head of the local government, with local bodies and organizations are as follows: the chairman directly supervises the en- terprises, establishments and organi- zations of the communal property, coordinates the activity of the re- publican property organizations, su- pervises the activity of all organiza- tions located in his territory when it deals with land utilization and other natural resources, environmental pro- tection, construction of communica- tions, trade welfare service, social protection, administration of legality, law and security, protection of the citizens’ rights and freedom. The enterprises, establishments and organizations can appeal against and challenge the chairman’s decisions to the higher chairman or in court. (For instance many farmers in Leninski ray- on have objected to the decision of the rayon Chairman applying to the Upper Economic Court of Leninski rayon) The higher chairman and court have the right to cancel the chair- man’s decision if the decision con- tradicts the law. The Government or the President of Tajikistan can cancel the decision of the chairman of GBAO and the chairmen of oblasts, the chairman of the city of Dushan- be and the chairmen of the cities and regions of republican subordination if they contradict existing laws or leg- islative norms. The local representative and execu- tive bodies have the following rela- tions with the ministries, departments and other central executive bodies: in the case that local governments’ rights and interests are infringed, the local governments have the right to address the Government or the President of the republic, or the court. So, the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan «On the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Tajikistan» prescribes that the state bodies (including local governments) have the right to address the Con- stitutional court when the problems deal with constitutional doubt of the normative acts approved by the min- istries, state committees and other departments (Article 37). Public utilities of the communal prop- erty intended to satisfy the direct social and economic needs of popu- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 31 31 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... lation form the economic and finan- cial basis of the local governments. (Government Resolution No.383 as of August 6, 1993 determines the difference between communal and republican property). The basis also includes local budget, non-budget- ary and target funds, credit resourc- es, as well as subventions and dona- tions from the republican budget. Thus, the 2002 republican budget stipulates a 32,648 thousand-somo- ni donation for the local budgets (10 million US$), and a 2,500 thousand- somoni donation - for the city of Dushanbe (7.9 million US$). Local taxes and tariffs (retail sales taxes, immovable property taxes, passenger taxes); state taxes, do- nations and subventions from higher budgets; deductions from the state budget (85% of the land tax, 100% of VAT- except for the Sogdiiskaya oblast, the city of Dushanbe and the city of Tursunzade that contribute to the local budget 30%, 50% and 20%, income tax is 100 % , and etc.) draw up the local budget. Local self-government in the Republic of Tajikistan Local self-government in the Repub- lic of Tajikistan is determined at the level of settlements and villages. It was established by the 1994 Con- stitution of the Republic of Tajikistan. Prior to 1994 there were settlement village councils and their executive committees. There is no local self- government in the cities. In the cit- ies there are bodies of social activity in the form of Mahalla councils. The law of the Republic of Tajikistan «On Bodies of Self-government in Settle- ments and Villages» (December 1, 1994) regulates organization and functioning of the local self-govern- ment. Jamoats of shakhrak (settlement) and dekhot (village) are the bodies of the local self-government. They are formed in settlements and villages. Jamoats are formed to realize the citizens’ rights to govern the com- munity and the state, to unite the citizens in order to solve their social and economic problems, to decide the most important questions direct- ly touching the interests of the pop- ulation, to facilitate the execution of the Constitution and other normative legal acts. Jamoat, a local self-government body, is formed from the represen- tatives (delegates) of streets, ma- khallyas, and villages. These elected representatives have meetings at least twice a year. The chairman, his deputy (deputies) and the secretary of the Jamoat are elected for five years. The chairman has a small of- fice. The Chairman of the oblast (city) or the Madjlisi of people’s deputies of rayon (city) level determines the number of the staff. The Jamoat has limited powers. It is basically engaged in landscaping and improvement of a sanitary situation of the communities, streets, and etc. The Jamoat’s activity is basically fi- nanced by the regional (urban) bud- get. A Jamoat has practically no self- financing sources and may be fi- nanced by voluntary funds trans- ferred by the enterprises, organiza- tions, establishments, and citizens. The basic weight of work is assigned to the chairmen of Jamoats. The chairman practically implements all the work including organization of work, representation and protection of the Jamoat’s interests; organization of public control for the sanitary situa- tion in the communities, water sup- ply system, dwellings, schools, and other establishments; registration of division of family property in the dekhkan households, registration of the inhabitants living in their territo- ry; promotes due payment of tax- es, insurance and other payments by the population; organizes obligatory presence of registrants and recruits in the commissariats, involves the population to participate in civil de- fense arrangements. It should be noted that the powers of the former settlement and village councils and their executive commit- tees were insignificant and this is also the peculiarity of current jamoats. The jamoat’s powers are not very signif- icant either, and are insufficient for REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN TAJIKISTAN (CENTRE AND REGIONS) Page 32 32 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... the complete functioning of the local self-governments, jamoats. Besides local self-governance bodies there are locally based public self-gover- nance units (street councils, mahalla committees, neighborhood associa- tions etc) which are public (non-state) citizen associations. Their activities are regulated by the Law, «On Pub- lic Associations) Conclusions: Local governments and local self-government bodies were formed after the Con- stitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was passed in 1994; they are practically new struc- tures. They have proved their viability but need to be de- veloped. The powers of the local Mad- jlisis of people’s deputies and their chairmen should be de- termined more precisely. The law should more clearly stipulate mutual relations of the local representative bod- ies and the chairmen with oth- er local governments, public associations and citizens. The economic and financial basis of the local govern- ments and local self-govern- ment bodies should be strengthened. With this pur- pose it is necessary to ex- pand and precisely identify the financing sources of the local budgets and the bud- gets of the local self-govern- ment bodies. The legal structure of the lo- cal governments and local self-government bodies should be developed. The law should regulate more pre- cisely the competence of dif- ferent local governments (oblast, urban and regional), and expand the competence of local self-government bod- ies, fix the judicial protection of the rights and interests of the local governments and local self-government bodies, and others. It should be noted that in order to develop these laws, the President of Tajikistan approved the Decree on July 11, 2002, and formed a Working group to develop new laws on local governments and local self- government bodies. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 33 33 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Economic aspects of the interrelation between centre and regions in Tajikistan ....................................................................................................................................... Azizullo Avezov Doctor of Economic, professor, Khodjent State University Introduction Economical and financial relationships between central government bod- ies and regions mainly predetermine the development of democratic pro- cesses in society. Either flawed leg- islation in this field or existing mecha- nisms infringing upon legitimate inter- ests of parties can be sources for political instability, social tension and the development of separatism pro- cesses in the regions. On the con- trary, a coordinated mutual relation- ship between center and regions is a strong catalyst for social and eco- nomical development in the regions as well as nationally. The Chinese experience is a good example: some experts believe that the Chinese economic marvel is a consequence of a successful financial relationship between central and local adminis- trative bodies during last twenty years. History demonstrates that central governments often intend to violate the mandates of local bodies, restrict their independence and exceed their constitutional powers. Sometimes local administrative bodies give up a part of their rights or lose some of them in contradiction to the Consti- tution. Therefore regions often re- sist the efforts of the center to med- dle with their mandates. A well-de- signed financial mechanism for inter- relationship between the center and regions guarantees political stability in society, success in the country’s economy development and nation prosperity. The society develop- ment level, its industrial capacity, and its historical, cultural or religious men- talities determine the features of the interrelationship. After approving the strategy to move towards market economies, the majority of former Soviet states faced the need to choose financial mechanisms for proper interrelations between center and regions. The European Charter on Local Adminis- tration is the legal foundation for fi- nancial interrelation between center and local governance bodies in the majority of European nations [33]. Russia was among the first former Soviet countries to sign the Europe- an Charter on Local Administration on December 27, 1996. The reform of the Tajikistan legisla- tion system is still in process. As a result, there are no rules and regula- tions regarding financial interrelation- ship between the Center and re- gions. However, financial mecha- nisms regulating the interrelationship between the Center and regions have been improved. The Constitu- tion of Tajikistan (1), Constitutional Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on State Governance in Regions (2), Tax Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, The Law on State Budget (3), as well as a number of state rules and regu- lations are its legal foundation. A brief essay on the history of in- terrelation between the Center and regions in Tajikistan. The his- tory of interrelation between the Center and regions is very long. Before 1917, there existed the local executive, legislative and judicial bodies such as the mingbashi, aksakal, and qazi in the Bukhara Emirate. In 1917-1920 these bodies were re- moved and the Councils of work- ers, peasants and army deputies (in northern Tajikistan) and Revolution- ary committees (in Pamir) were es- ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Page 34 34 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... tablished instead. In 1936 these bod- ies were replaced by the Councils of workers deputies. In 1977 the councils were renamed Councils of People’s Deputies. People’s Depu- ties to these Councils were elected by public, equal and direct ballot. According to their mandates, Coun- cils approved a local budget financial report, plans on social and economic development and supervised local administrative bodies, enterprises, organizations and agencies. In ac- cordance with article 77 of the Sovi- et Tajikistan Constitution, the local representative authorities in provinc- es, cities and districts were Majlis of People’s Deputies and in villages and towns - jamoats. The state policy on local authorities changed several times. In the early 1980s the center announced that local administrations would be re- sponsible for integrated and balanced socio-economical development in the region. However, their real legal sources and economic capacities were not widened. At the same time, the most important source that determines successful economic ac- tivity is the economic entity power extent. Without such a legal source - and recourse - it is impossible to implement economic activities. In the late 1980s private businesses and cooperatives started to expand and develop. They were the first nongovernmental enterprises that substantially influenced the region’s further development. Since than, the interrelation between center and re- gions has been based on self-sup- port. However, the nature of the interrelation between center and re- gions was unchanged. Local author- ities designed an initial plan of eco- nomic development, then they sought income resources to imple- ment their plans and pleaded for both the plan and its income resources in the Government. In this situation the largest part of financial resources flew up and the rest was spent re- strictedly. At the same time, com- mand-administrative governance was still in common use in the country. In the early 1990s the state started gradually to go over to market econ- omy and to establish economic and financial mechanisms for local admin- istration. To analyze the history of Tajikistan’s budget federalism we should use categories such as the level of local authority self-independence and the extent of political centralization in the country. We will use the system of coordinates whose axes will be the above-mentioned categories and then will have the general picture of Tajikistan budget federalism devel- opment during the last century. On figure 1 the analyses results have been outlined. We can see the same evolutions occurred in China, Russia and Germany in their budget devel- opments [34, 35, 38]. Before the Soviet era, people did not elect representatives of local authorities and the level of popular political activity and extent of local administration independence were very low. Such economic systems were defined as the «Asian mode of production», since plots and pro- duction sites were the property of local owners, while the irrigation sys- tem was state property. Due to this situation the state was able to im- pose high taxes. Point 1 on Figure 1 corresponds with such a situation of interrelation between the center and regions. During the Soviet era, Tajikistan was notable for its high level of political and economical centralization. All means of production were state property. There was a vast indivisi- ble economic space in which the Soviet integral economic complex functioned. The State Planning Com- mittee of the USSR elaborated the centralized frame of economical de- velopment. The Ministry of Finance and its branches designed local bud- gets. All appointments to positions were under Communist Party con- trol. Point 2 on Figure 1 corresponds with such a budget federalism situa- tion. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 35 35 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Level economic independence high low Figure 1. Budget Feudalism Development in Tadjikistan Chinese option: of economic decentralization and Political centralization German option: high centralization of income, ensuring high living standards throughout the country Russian option Level of political centralization high low Chinese budget system Tadjikistan before 1917 Tadjikistan as a part of USSR (1917-1991) 1 2 4 «Democratic centralism» (1998-2003) Budget systen of Russia (2003) «Regional Feudalism» (1992-1997) 3 Budget systen of Germany The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent civil war in Tajikistan caused a new situation in interrela- tion between the Center and local authorities. Economical links be- tween different regions were cut, the territory of the country was di- vided by many «appanage princes» who were unwilling or unable to pay taxes to the state budget due to the collapse of the economy. Weak state power was unable to protect the economic integrity of the coun- try or to efficiently collect taxes. Experts call such an option «regional feudalism». Point 3 on Figure 1 cor- responds with such a situation. The Peace Accord signed by the Government and Opposition in 1997 allowed for rehabilitating the coun- try’s economic unity. The interrela- tion between the center and regions has got new features, characterized by the very weak economic inde- pendence of local authorities and the strong political centralization in the country. The characteristic features of such interrelation between the Center and local authorities that we will deal with are the following: Lo- cal authorities have not enough pow- er to regulate the economy in their territory. The cause of such a situa- tion is that the majority of enterpris- es located in the territory of any dis- trict (rayon) or city, as a general rule are either province or central gov- ernment property. Therefore the total volume of output produced by enterprises under local authority con- trol is very low. As a result local ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Page 36 36 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... authorities are unable to amass enough financial surplus to develop their own territory economy. Local share to consolidated budget does not exceed 10-15% of overall bud- get. The low level of local authority motivation to develop the local econ- omy occurs due to both the scanti- ness of local administration expens- es power and the existing system of dividing income between local and center management bodies. More- over, local management bodies have limited rights to impose tax types and rates. Thus, our conclusion is that there exists a weak economic inde- pendence of local authorities in the country. As for the second category used in our study, namely political central- ization in the country, our research uncovers a high level of political cen- tralization in the country. In Tajiki- stan, there is no counterbalance and deterrence mechanism due to the conflict of interests among different branches of power. We have such a situation since legislative power, the justice system and the mass media are under the control of executive power. The «party of power» has been established and is in operation. According to the Constitution Arti- cle 69, the center is authorized to appoint local administration leaders and to dismiss them. The center of- ten issues such decisions on appoint- ment or dismissal without any com- ment. There are no criteria for the evaluation of local administration lead- ers’ activities. The local population does not demonstrate political activ- ity, because citizens are afraid to criticize administrative bodies for their inefficiency. There is no protection for local administrative bodies inde- pendency in the frame of power outlined by legislation. The option of interrelation between the Center and regions is defined as «democratic centralism». The option is shown as point 4 on figure 1. The next subjects of our research are budget and fiscal mechanisms of in- terrelation between the Center and regions. Budget Mechanism of Interrelation between Center and Regions: Pre- view and Major Constraints. The budget mechanism determi- nates the process of economic and financial planning, budget design, fi- nancial results and monitoring (12- 27). The method of financial pro- cess applied today in Tajikistan has been elaborated by the former USSR Ministry of Finance. The method takes into account the best achieve- ments of Soviet economic school and has been elaborated and applied throughout the Soviet Union regard- less of the different regions’ eco- nomical development features. The method, having been changed only a little, is in use in Tajikistan of today. The method consists of three stages - (1) approving development plan after situation analyses, (2) design- ing the budget, and (3) monitoring its financial results. It should be men- tioned that the distinguishing feature is that a large part of the process is pretentious, but its implementation focuses on maintaining the achieved level but not developing further lo- cal economy. Unfortunately, of late, the abovementioned shortcomings have worsened. The management system consisting of four levels (country, province, city, jamaat) operates in Tajikistan today. The three first levels elabo- rate independent budgets. Econom- ic Departments of districts, cities, and provinces deal with economic and financial planning. In accordance with the regulations regarding depart- ments and other operation manuals, during the first stage of budget plan- ning process the economic depart- ments are obliged to accomplish in- depth analyses of economy and so- cial infrastructure development in a proper region for the past period. The analyses should substantiate so- cio-economic development direc- tions and clarify priorities by classifi- cation. The analyses also should de- fine the region’s socio-economic development weak points and doc- ument existent and potential sourc- es (material, financial, practical) that could be used in forecasting periods. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 37 37 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... During the second stage regional budgets are elaborated and ap- proved. The main task of hukumat economic departments is to identi- fy, justify and adopt the most effi- cient budget for the region estab- lishing its sources of incomes, amounts and expenditures (12-27). The developed budget has to be approved by time. Monitoring the budget process is the third and final stage of budget implementation. The Ministry of Fi- nance and its regional branches are responsible for monitoring financial results. This monitoring is designed to detect misplanning and misper- formance, elimination of such mis- takes, as well as for the establish- ment of a feedback system be- tween center and regions. The monitoring also provides an oppor- tunity to audit the accuracy of im- plemented management systems, optimization of deadlines, expen- ditures and final outcomes. In or- der to evaluate the quality of fi- nancial results a special system of indicators, which assess the form and effectiveness of management, is applied. According to internal regulations the plan of economic development for next year shall be submitted by May 15 of the current year. The gov- ernmental standard plan scale is used for planning. Usually, the number of such minimum standards to be followed, like economic growth in- dex and expected inflation rate, are very small. The number of such in- dices has been increased after ap- proval of the poverty alleviation strategy. The concrete forecast in- dices set by region socio-economic development would be mapped through this planning process. After adoption at the Parliament session (Majlisi Oli) the plan of socio-eco- nomic development of region will become a background for prepara- tion of the budget draft. In accordance with the approved plan for economic development, the regional budget draft is developed six months before the fiscal year. The Ministry of Finance submits con- trol indices of inflation and ratio of minimum growth. Until August 15 of the current year, regional (oblast) administrations summarized the bud- gets of cities and districts and sub- mitted them to the Ministry of Fi- nance. After taking into consider- ation the budgets submitted to the Ministry of Finance, the estimate is revised and clarified. (By the way, clarifications are often restrictions. For example, the expenditure part of the Soghd oblast final budget draft submitted by local administra- tions was cut by the higher authori- ties in 16 out of 17 cases. The in- come part of the final budget draft was increased in all 17 cases). The budget drafts of cities, districts, provinces, and countries should be submitted for consideration and approval to relevant representative bodies. The analyses of existing budget mechanisms and the interrelation between the center and local gov- ernance have uncovered a number of issues appearing in the process of local budget development and ap- proval. All the issues have to be taken into consideration by those who are responsible for elaborating a new version of the law on Local Administration. The problems out- lined below are obstacles for the socio-economical development of regions. 1. The cause of a main problem of existing interrelation mechanism be- tween the center and regions is a feature of local governance, name- ly, its two -faced nature. The prob- lem calls forth contradiction between the formally equal legal status of all local governance system elements and the different economical capac- ities. This weakens local governance efficiency, and destabilizes gover- nance vertical low levels. The prob- lem in essence consists of the fol- lowing: on the one hand, the local governance body plays like an equal economy partner at the market, ac- cording to its by-law. It can inde- pendently dispose of property, fi- ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Page 38 38 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... nancial sources and land for execu- tion of its public functions. On the other hand, the local governance bodies act as a subcontractor con- tracted by the government for exe- cuting state functions. The functions the local governance bodies are obliged to accomplish are to take care of accounting of migration of population and property, social se- curity, daily communication with lo- cal population and others. Such ac- tivities demand substantial regulation on behalf of the state and create a base for effective performance of state power at every level. There is no official budget division: but in reality two types of local budget are applied: a budget directed at imple- mentation of regional power by lo- cal administration; and a budget di- rected at in accordance with the Law on entities of local governance bod- ies. This creates a base for central government intervention in the bud- get process, and, as result, not only expenditures linked with the execu- tion of state power, but also local budget incomes and expenditures should be submitted for approval. This phenomenon leads to a conflict of interests and the violation of local governance rules on management division. As result, the regional bud- get is approved by central govern- ment, whose objectives and tasks are rather different from regional ones. So, we can conclude that the central government uses the old method of command-administrative management. In some cases local governance bodies incur additional expenditures after higher-level gov- ernment decisions that do not en- sure increasing incomes (privileges for some categories of citizens, social payment etc). There is fund reallo- cation for financing the priorities cho- sen by the central government bod- ies. Moreover, local budget com- pletely loses its independency and becomes an expenditure estimate. 2. The majority of enterprises that have an impact on regional econom- ic development are under state sub- ordination. In practice, regional governments are unable to run the economic development of such en- terprises or influence their policy. En- terprise interests quite often do not concur with the regional interests. The process of planning is narrowed to the interests of large enterprises and sector agencies, but not to the regional integrated development. The interests of industrial sectors sub- stitute real goals of regional devel- opment. As rule, constant shortag- es of resources do not allow plan- ning for middle term and long-term objectives and their implementation. Local administration has to postpone objective implementation in the long term. This phenomenon aggravates a very insufficient integration in plan- ning the activities of local governance bodies. 3. There is no evaluation table for controlling the budget efficiency. Almost impossible to asses and con- trol investments made in regional entities. The evaluation of results and the budget planning for next year based on yearly achievements com- plete the budget process. Based on actual achievements rather than the plan of regional development, the planning process goes ahead. This kind of budget process is incon- sistent and ruins any initiative by lo- cal administrations towards self-de- velopment and does not allow the formation of efficient and the region integral development. 4. The financial resources of local administrations are too poor and af- ter receiving money from the national budget more than 80% of new local budget must be spent on so-called earmarked articles of expenditure. This situation weakens capacities for efficient management of the socio- economic environment of the region. The economic incapacity of local ad- ministrations restricts their impact on economic and social sectors in their regions. 5. All abovementioned factors sig- nificantly reduce the capacity of lo- cal governance bodies to develop regional economical strategies and to implement them. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 39 39 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Fiscal Mechanism of Interrelation between Center and Regions: Pre- view and Major Constraints. Arti- cle 9 of the European Charter on Local Administration defines general principles regarding central govern- ment policy on taxes and budget in application to local governance bod- ies. The conclusion of the Article is as below: 1. Local governance bodies have rights in the framework of national economical policy to possess their own sufficient funds, which they can freely spend to implement their func- tions. 2.Financial means of local gover- nance bodies shall be in proportion with powers granted by the Consti- tution or law. 3. At least a part of the financial means of local governance bodies should be collected by gathering lo- cal taxes and duties whose rates lo- cal governance bodies have the right to impose within limits defined by the law. 4. The financial systems on which the funds of local governance bodies are based should be various and flexible in order to follow as far as possible the change of expenses taking place during the implementation of local administration competence. 5. To protect poorest local gover- nance bodies in terms of finance it is necessary to implement the proce- dure of financial alignment or equal measures, intended for correcting the results of uneven assessment of po- tential sources and expenditures. Such procedures or measures should not limit the freedom to choose lo- cal governance bodies in the frame- work of their competence. The tax system of Tajikistan is based on surcharges and deductions. It assumes to impose universal state taxes and their apportionment among all administrative levels. The taxes of Tajikistan consist of state and local ones. State taxes are: 1) income tax, 2) profit tax, 3) VAT, 4) excises, 5) social levies, 6) land tax, 7) tax on users of mineral resources, 8) enter- prise property tax, 9) transport tax, 10) road tax, 11) entrepreneurship tax, 12) sales tax (on cotton and alu- minum), 13) customs duties and lev- ies, and 14) state duties. The local taxes are: 1) retail sales tax, 2) in- tangible property tax and 3) public transport tax The state budget of the republic of Tajikistan for 2003 has been ap- proved for income in the amount of 637”018”000 somoni (US$206”200”000; rate 1$=3.09 somoni) and for expenditure in the amount of 655”018”000 somoni with deficit in the amount of 18”000”000 somoni [3]. The republic budget for 2003 has been approved for income in the amount of 427”568”000 somoni (US$138”000”000; rate 1$=3.09 somoni) and for expendi- ture in the amount of 445”568”000 somoni. The budget deficit is equal to the amount of 18”000”000 somo- ni. A part of the deficit equal to the amount of 7”500”000 is foreseen to be covered by funds received after privatizing state property. Tax- es provide more than 90% of state budget. Other sources of budget income, such as non-tax proceed- ings, profits from state business and municipal credits are almost insignifi- cant. Table 1 demonstrates that only three kinds of taxes (VAT, sales tax (on cotton and aluminum), and cus- toms duties and levies) provide more than 71% of budget income. The phenomena show that the budget income items are very few and un- stable. It should be noted that in 2003 the Soghd oblast allocates 50% of VAT, 100% of cotton sales tax- es, and 100% of custom duties to the state budget for centralized re- allocation. More than 41% of budget expendi- ture items are spent to finance gov- ernance bodies, defense, law-en- forcement structures, prosecutor and justice bodies (Table 1). ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Page 40 40 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 1. Incomes and expenditures of the State budget in 2003 TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Incomes amount % Total 427568 100 Including: 1. VAT 166754 39 2. excises 35863 8.4 3. Sales taxes (aluminum, cotton) 66636 15.5 4. profit tax 8121 1.9 5. enterprise property tax 5202 1.2 6. income tax 4638 1.1 7. Custom duties and levies 72508 17.1 8. land 1888 0.4 9. road tax 11151 2.6 10. Other taxes and incomes 27807 6.5 11. International communities grants 27000 6.3 Page 41 41 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... There is a strong shortcoming in the existed tax mechanism: it supposes to regulate budgets at all levels. With such a scheme the easiest way to increase own incomes is the re- distribution of income sources be- tween power levels. But such re- distribution, in its turn, leads to con- flicts between local governance bodies and the central government when they are in the process of forming and implementing the bud- get. Opportunity to manipulate deduction rates is a cause of local governance body dependence from the central government. It is easy to transform profitable regions into unprofitable ones and visa ver- sa by changing deduction rates. A region, which would have collected more taxes and got its tax base wid- ened, would lose transfers from high-level budget in next year. In such case no one is interested in in- creasing the level of tax collection. Besides, it is usual to make up re- tarded regions to the minimum lev- el. Therefore those who are below the minimum level do not have a strong motivation to increase bud- get income hoping to receive trans- fers. Thus, in 2003, of 17 towns and districts of relatively successful Soghd oblast, seven receive sub- vention (Table 2). Planned volume of subventions allocated from Soghd oblast budget form from 15.5% (Asht) up to 66.1% (Ayni) of all ex- penditures of local budget (average app. 50%). Such a system kills any incentive to develop and improve the base of taxation since budget adjustments level any initiation. It is impossible also to plan income sourc- es for the long-term perspective. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Expenditures amount % Total 396575 100 Including: 1. Governance bodies, defense, law-enforcement structures, prosecutor and justice bodies 166115 41.9 2. Education 18281 4.6 3. Health services 8131 2.1 4. Social insurance and social protection 24179 6.1 5. Environment protection and infrastructure of cities 4569 1.2 6. Cultural, sport and social events 13746 3.5 7. Energy sector 6296 1.6 8. Agriculture, forestry, fishery, and hunting 18407 4.6 9. Mineral mining and their processing, mining industry and construction sector 3724 0.9 10. Transport and communication 30246 7.6 11. Ministries and agencies conducting their business activities and offering their services 3434 0.9 12. Other activities 99447 25 Page 42 42 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 2. Income, expenditures, and subventions of budget for Soghd oblast towns and districts in 2003 Towns and districts names Incomes Subventions Expenditures 1. Isfara 3827392 3827392 2. Kayrakumì 867400 867400 3. Kanibadam 3000000 3000000 4. Khojand 7079002 7079002 5. Penjikent 4803408 4803408 6. Istravshan 2476306 2476306 7. Chkalov 957864 957864 8. Taboshar 158612 163326 321938 9. Ayni 536770 1048969 1585739 10. Asht 1730677 318030 2048707 11. Ghonchi 804162 1257321 2061483 12. Zafarabad 1345755 1345755 13. Matcha 1843387 1843387 14. Spitamen 1891580 1891580 15. Jabbor Rasulov 1863583 1863583 16. Shahristan 238803 466744 705547 17. Mountain Matcha 270615 200109 470724 In general, the amount of 3”454”499 somoni (or US$1”118”000; rate: $1=3.09 somoni) is allocated to towns and districts budgets as subventions (Table 3). The mentioned amount forms 37% of expenditure budget. In 2003 the amount of 39”993”000 somoni is allocated to local budgets from the state budget as funds for special purposes (Table 4) Regional and local privileges do not improve the system, as all the abovementioned shortcomings still exist. Income division between administrative bodies though differ- ent models of taxation improves the first system slightly. In this case ei- ther the Government or local gov- ernance bodies impose the same kind of taxes but the principles of charge and collection might differ. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 43 43 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 3. The Soghd oblast budget for 2003 Income and expenditures items Items Total income 9293239 Including: 1. Income tax 4264125 2. Profit tax 2454894 3. VAT 2656250 4. Land tax Íàëîã íà çåìëþ 104484 5. Entrepreneurship tax 501070 6. Tax on users of mineral resources 1136862 7. Local non-tax incomes 274328 8. Road tax 1355724 9. Other revenues from the oblast budget -3454499 Total expenditures 9293239 Including: 1. Governance management sector 1199269 2. Reserve foundation of the head of oblast 495860 3. Oblast archive 5620 4. Defense and law-enforcement structuresà 1616850 5. Education 1448100 6. Health service 2626675 7. Social protection 291854 8. Other aid to population 286484 9. Cultural events 277602 10. Sport and physical trainingò 19000 11. Agriculture 165925 12. Centralized revenues 600000 13. Other expenditures 260000 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Page 44 44 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 4. State budget expenditures for 2003, according to Economical classification À. Current expenditures 379266 1. Expenditures for goods and services 213499 nterest payment for internal and external debts 82821 3. Subsidies and transfers 82946 including Subsidies to state enterprises and organization 12752 Funds allocating to local budget for special purposes 39993 Transfers to non commercial organization 450 Transfers to population 18136 B. Investments 65193 C. Crediting refugees, migrants, and states employees according to Tajikistan 1109 There are some suggestions to im- prove the system of taxation though the division of incomes between power bodies. The suggestion en- visages introducing the following prin- ciples [28, 29, 30, 34, 35]: 1. There should be the correspon- dence of income sources with sub- jects under local governance body control. The local administrations can more efficiently implement taxation in those spheres, wherein they build up their policy. 2. The taxes that are linked with managing the social important activ- ities in municipal entity should be as- signed to local government bodies. Bound up with this is that the right for local governance appears not as a private right but as a public right. Thus, taxes restricting rights to im- plement any concrete activity should also be attached to the competen- cy of local governance. Transport tax might be a good example. Mean- while, taking the abovementioned principle into consideration it would be much better to use for regulation the income taxes that the state rais- es from population. Thus, income tax is a regulating one in the majority of countries. 3. Opportunity to apply sanctions by local governance bodies. State pow- er bodies impose types of penalties and define their rate. This approach leads to that situation that penalties and fines are not imposed, as local governance bodies are not interest- ed. Besides, it is well known that state power is very inert and unable adequately to react to fast changing conditions. It is important for local governance bodies to apply sanc- tions using them not only as income sources, but also as a mechanism applying their power. Thus, severe and wise decisions on implementing different rules and regulations made by local governance bodies will not work if there is no constraint mecha- nism as a sanction for nonobser- vance. Difficulties in forming the Govern- ment Regional Strategy. Unequal socio-economic development of sep- arate regions and hence, different TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 45 45 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... income levels are an objective fact. It is related to natural-climatic condi- tions and industrial capacity of re- gions. Therefore, a number of re- gions are behind the average socio- economic standards. The Govern- ment is responsible for the socio-eco- nomic development of all regions. Unequal development of regions and hence unequal incomes might cause high social tension and political insta- bility. There is an obvious need to support such regions and the Gov- ernment does so. However, there are few options for assistance. There is a very good metaphor: you can grant a fish daily, but also grant a fishing rod and show how to catch fish. So far we still are on the first way. But such a system is unable to find solution for problems our coun- try has faced. Either wrong objec- tives or structure, due to which the achievement of declared objectives are unprofitable for all players, cause its shortcomings. The main mistake of the existing system objectives is that the system operates to equal- ize all levels of population life stan- dards instead of providing equal op- portunities for all citizens from all the regions of Tajikistan, wherever they reside. Thus, the strategy of assis- tance should be not catching up back- ward regions but providing equal opportunities for development in all the regions of the country. The pol- icy should be transparent and guid- ed by the legislative base. A main instrument used for the de- velopment of individual entities by the Government is the design and implementation of the State Invest- ment Program. The Program has elaborated for five years and every year the Government revises it. The financial sources of the Program are means of the state budget, long-term loans and grants. Of late, the Gov- ernment has invested in the building programs for the Kulyab internation- al airport, the Kurgan-Tyube-Kulyab railway, the highway approach to Karokarum highway, the improve- ment and development of individual towns on the occasion of their jubi- lees (for example, the 2500th anni- versary of the town of Istravshan or the expected 2700th anniversary of the town of Kulyab). The confer- ence of donor countries held in Dus- hanbe in May 2003 supported the State Investment Program. Accord- ing to the plans, in the next three years 900”000”000 somoni will be invested in the frame of the Program. Regional policy is a kind of policy such as foreign trade or economic: it has its goals and objectives [31, 32, 34]. It is necessary to evaluate the re- gional policy not only in the terms of economical aspects but also in the terms of social and political efficien- cy. Regional policy should not be under the control, say, of the Minis- try of Economy and Trade: they are oriented to efficiency and treat it as their major priority. Regional policy should be implemented by a special agency, e.g. the Ministry of Region- al Affairs. However, the Govern- ment has not discussed such a sug- gestion yet. In general, the concept of budget relationship should provide a compromise between economic and budget efficiency, social justice and political stability in society. Bibliography 1. The Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan. 2. The Constitutional Law of the Re- public of Tajikistan on State Gover- nance at Places (as of May 22, 1998, No. 616). 3. The Law of the Republic of Tajiki- stan on State Budget, 2002. 4. The program on socio-economic development of Zafarobod district, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Zafarobod district, Sughd province, 2001. 5. The program on socio-economic development of Qairokkum city, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Qairokkum city, Sughd province, 2001. 6. The program on socio-economic development of Chkalovsk city, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Chkalovsk city, Sughd province, 2001. 7. The program on socio-economic development of Istravshan district, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Istravshan ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN Page 46 46 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... district, Sughd province, 2001. 8. The program on socio-economic development of Isfara district, 2001- 2005, Khukumat of Isfara district, Sughd province, 2001. 9. The program on socio-economic development of Bobojon Ghafurov district, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Bobojon Ghafurov district, Sughd province, 2001. 10. The program on socio-economic development of Khujand city, 2001- 2005, Khukumat of Khujand city, Sughd province, 2001. 11. The program on socio-econom- ic development of Konibodom dis- trict, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Koni- bodom district, Sughd province, 2001. 12. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Khujand city, Khukumat of Khujand city, Khujand city, 2002. 13. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Qairokkum city, Khukumat of Qairokkum city, Qairokkum city, 2002. 14. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Chkalovsk city, Khukumat of Chkalovsk city, Ch- kalovsk city, 2002. 15. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Bobojon Ghafurov district, Khukumat of Bob- ojon Ghafurov district, Bobojon Ghafurov district, 2002. 16. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Isfara district, Khukumat of Isfara district, Isfara dis- trict, 2002. 17. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Konibodom city, Khukumat of Konibodom city, Konibodom city, 2002. 18. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Istravshan dis- trict city, Khukumat of Istravshan dis- trict, Istravshan district, 2002. 19. The Regulation on Economic Di- vision of Khukumat of Zafarobod dis- trict city, Khukumat of Zafarobod district, Zafarobod district, 2002. 20. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Khujand, Khukumat of Khu- jand city, Khujand city, 2002. 21. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Qairokkum city, Khukumat of Qairokkum city, Qairokkum city, 2002. 22. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Chkalovsk city, Khukumat of Chkalovsk city, Chkalovsk city, 2002. 23. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Bobojon Ghafurov district, Khukumat of Bobojon Ghafurov dis- trict, Bobojon Ghafurov district, 2002. 24. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Isfara district, Khukumat of Isfara district, Isfara district, 2002. 25. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Konibadam city, Khukumat of Konibadam city, Konibadam city, 2002. 26. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Istravshan city, Khukumat of Istravshan city, Istravshan city, 2002. 27. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- mat of Zafarobod district, Khukumat of Zafarobod district, Zafarobod dis- trict, 2002. 28. Local governance: techniques of socio-economic growth, Saint Peters- burg, 1999. 29. Municipal management, under the editorship of T. MOROZOVA, M., YSRTI, 1997. 30. The bases of management of municipal administrations, A. VORO- NIN, V. LANIN, A. SHIROKOV, M., Delo, 1998. 31. The concept of reforming of in- ter-budget relations, The Messenger of RIEI, No. 6, M., 2000. 32. Regional policy and socio-eco- nomic disproportions, The Messen- ger of RIEI, No. 6, M., 2000. 33. European Charter on Local ad- ministration. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 47 47 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Economic Relations between Centre and Regions: the Case of Sughd Province ....................................................................................................................................... Alijon Boymatov, Doctor of Economics, Professor Synopsis This is the first ever comprehensive study devoted to the emergence and development of a market econ- omy in the Sogd Region, Republic of Tajikistan. The report contains 6 sections, cov- ering the different aspects of the regional economy. 1. The Sogd Region: Introduction. A geographic profile of the Sogd Re- gion is followed by a description of the Gross Regional Product and its structural variation, and an assessment of the impact of transitional process- es on the regional economy. 2. Interregional Economic Ties. We look at commodity exchange trends between the Sogd Region and oth- er regions of Tajikistan before and after independence, determine the respective roles of industry and ag- riculture in interregional relations, identify the driving factors of nation- al disintegration, and review the flaws in the transportation sector as a hold- back for interregional relations. 3. International Economic Ties of the Sogd Region. We analyze the change patterns in the region’s in- ternational trade turnover, import and export; separately review Sogd’s cross-border trade with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; stratify the markets for domestic and imported goods; and assess the influx of foreign in- vestment into the region. 4. Plurality of Ownership Formats in Sogd Regional Economy. We ana- lyze privatization as the groundwork of a market economy; the growth of the private sector in industry, ag- riculture, retail, catering, services, and other forms of enterprise. 5. Emergence of Market Institutions. We analyze the reasons of the one- time growth and subsequent decline of cooperative businesses, the strengthening of private companies, and the growth of sole entrepreneur- ship as a form of small business. 6. The Center and the Region. We identify the flaws of the existing sys- tem of economic administration and the imperative need for its decen- tralization; look at the reasons why regional needs are ignored and the same decision-making powers are given to different governmental bod- ies, and why the economic role of bottom-level administrative bodies, the Jamoats, has been unjustifiably reduced. I. The Sogd Region, Republic of Tajikistan: Introduction 1.1 Geography The Sogd Region is located in north- ern Tajikistan, in the heart of Central Asia, bordering on the Uzbek regions of Tashkent, Jizak, Syrdarya, Samar- kand, Fergana, and Namangan, and the Kyrgyz regions of Osh and Bat- ken. One of the principal Central Asian waterways, the Syrdarya, flows through the Sogd Region, and many important international roads and railways cross it. The region is close to several major cities: Tash- kent and Samarkand in Uzbekistan, and Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan (see map in Annex 1). Originally established on October 27, 1939, the Sogd Region was recon- stituted as an administrative entity on December 23, 1970. Its territory is 26,100 sq. km; population: 1,956,300, of which 513,300 (26.2%) live in cities and towns, and 1,443,000 (73.8%), in rural commu- ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 48 48 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... nities. Administratively, the region is divided into 10 cities, 20 townships, 14 districts, and 93 Jamoats. The capital of the Sogd Region, Hu- jand, is 2500 years old, located on the route of the ancient Great Silk Road. Climate and Terrain: The climate of the Sogd Region is continental with steep seasonal and diurnal fluctuations. A relatively cold winter is abruptly followed by a rainy spring that, with equal promptness, gives way to a dry summer with next to no rainfall for months. Unstable air temperatures are typical for the au- tumn. The local flora is exceptionally diverse and rich. The terrain is incred- ibly uneven and varies, from a height of 2000 m above sea level in the Turkestan Ridges, to terraced flood plains along the Syrdarya, surround- ed by the Adyrs (hills): Digmai, Isp- isor, Aqbel, Aqchop, and Supetau. Ice Age mountain lakes, particularly the Alpine Lake Iskander-Kul, are ideal holiday destinations. 1.2 Economy: Gross Regional Product and its Structural Changes Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the summary index of national industrial output; the same index for a region is Gross Regional Product (GRP). Viewed in comparable prices, the region’s GRP dynamics reflected the general economic decline in the years 1992 to 1996. In 1996, Sogd’s GRP amounted to only 14.1% of the 1991 level, versus 32.5% for Tajiki- stan overall. The GRP as a physical volume of goods and services steadi- ly declined over that period. Notably, it took a long time for the general economic decline to be re- versed and turned into a general economic growth. The year 1997, when Tajikistan ce- mented its peace and national accord, is considered the year when the economy leveled out, although pro- duction grew 1.7% nationwide, and 5.8% in the region. Despite the dev- astating damage inflicted on the re- gion by the incursion of armed mili- tants in November 1998, Sogd post- ed a GRP growth of 5.1% that year, close to the national GDP growth of 5.3% in 1998. Sogd did even better in subsequent years, posting a GRP growth of 17.6% vs. 8.5% nation- wide in 2000; 86.5% vs. 10.8% na- tionwide in 2001; and 11.6% vs. 10.6% nationwide in 2002. During the Soviet era, Sogd was the leading industrialized region of Tajiki- stan. In 1991, when Tajikistan be- came independent, Sogd was home to more than 2/3 of Tajikistan’s in- dustrial enterprises, employing a pro- portionate percentage of industrial personnel and accounting for about the same share of the national indus- trial output. The region produced 37.5% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 1991. The percentage plummeted to 16.3% in 1996, then slowly rose to 21.2% in 2000, and 36.3% in 2002. Conclusions: Sogd’s contribution to the GDP declined in consequence of (1) faster development and commer- cial realization of natural and other resources in the south of the coun- try; and (2) small business develop- ment, growing small factory output, and more goods produced by self- employed sole proprietors. The table below shows aggregate and per capita GRP figures for the Sogd Region in 1991 through 2002 versus the same figures for Tajikistan overall. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 49 49 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 1 Sogd GRP Dynamics Versus Tajikistan’s GDP Notes to the table: 1. The average annual exchange rate used to convert per capita GDP and GRP figures to US $ was 2,37 somoni = US $1; 2. The 1991 GRP of the Sogd Re- gion includes the output of industrial and agricultural goods and commer- cial services rendered by construc- tion, transportation, telecommunica- tions, and consumer services provid- ers. The table above shows that per cap- ita GRP bottomed out in 1998, but has since substantially recovered. The aggregate annual per capita value of goods and services produced in the Sogd Region in 1991 was 1316 somoni (in 2001 prices), or US $555, 42% above the national average. By 1996, the figure dropped to a record low of US $74; it improved to US $108 in 2000, and $216 in 2002, which, however, is only 39% of the 1991 level. The GRP structure by industry changed dramatically, both in indus- try and agriculture. Over the period reviewed, industry’s share in GRP dropped from 64.7% in 1987 and 63.6% in 1990 to 14.8% in 1996, representing a drop of 4.5 times. Later on, as former state-owned fac- tories were privatized and retooled, and a number of joint ventures were launched, industry’s portion of the GRP improved to 40.9% in 2002 (see Graph 1 attached). The pro rata share of agriculture in the GRP of the Sogd Region also changed, having climbed from 18% in 1998 to 48.6% in 2000. 1.3 Market Reform: the Impact of Transitional Processes on Sogd Regional Economy The collapse of the Soviet Union, which made Tajikistan independent, rearranged the geopolitical and eco- nomic map of Central Asia. New borders cut Tajikistan off from its main trade partners: Russia and Ka- zakhstan, disrupting long-standing economic ties and transportation routes between the regions of neigh- boring newly independent states, including Sogd, and erecting artificial barriers for the flows of goods, cap- ital and people. Ties were also sev- ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Tajikistan Sogd Region Years Total, million somoni Per capita Total, million somoni Per capita % share % vs. national average Somoni US $ Somoni US $ 1991 5872 962 390 2202 1316 555 37.5 142 1996 1908 301 127 311 174 74 16.3 137 1999 2119 334 141 415 229 97 19.6 69 2000 2295 362 152 487 256 108 21.2 71 2001 2529 399 168 910 471 199 36.0 118 2002 2799 431 182 1016 513 216 36.3 119 2002, % vs. 1991 47.7 46.5 46.5 46.1 39.0 39.0 - - Page 50 50 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ered at the grassroots level. In Sovi- et Uzbekistan, for instance, goods flows from the three Uzbek regions of the Fergana Valley and the rest of the country went by road and railway via the Sogd Region, while Sogd had access to the mountainous Pamir Region of Tajikistan via the Osh Highway, now in Kyrgyzstan. These roads and railways were always of tremendous importance to the resi- dents of the Fergana Valley, which encompasses 6 regions in three coun- tries, but are even more vital now, being less readily accessible. New transportation links between cross- border regions have been forming very slowly. The Sogd Region found itself in virtual isolation, blocked off from international markets. Widely practiced by customs authorities, corruption and utter disregard for the law facilitate cross-border contraband traffic, but hobble the legitimate busi- ness of companies and self-em- ployed small-time import/export operators sometimes called “shuttle traders.” Another major development affect- ing the economy of the Sogd Re- gion was the abrupt transition from a planned, government regulated economy to a free market with ten- uous government regulation. All new- ly independent states opting for a free-market economy underwent similar socioeconomic turmoil for varying periods of time. In Tajikistan, the transition was complicated and prolonged by the civil war, slow post-war recovery, proximity to the source of instability in Afghanistan, and a mass exodus of qualified engi- neering and managerial human re- sources. The hardships of transition were further aggravated by interre- gional economic disparities, differenc- es in regional specialization, and un- equal opportunity in adapting to new market realities. Three groups of dis- tricts in the Sogd Region proved par- ticularly vulnerable to the adversities of transition. The first group includes the District of Hujand: the cities of Hujand, Ch- kalovsk, Kairakkum, Gafurov, and others, where industry used to be highly concentrated and dedicated to specific products that either ceased to make a profit when pric- es became deregulated, or lost their markets as a result of severance of long-standing ties. One example is the Kairakkum Carpet Factory (cur- rently Kolinho AOOT) that once op- erated facilities producing 11.5 mil- lion square meters of quality carpets for all the 15 republics of the Union as well as 13 Warsaw Pact states. After the loss of these markets, pro- duction plummeted, falling to an all time low of 0.4 million sq. m of car- pets in 2002. The Hujand Silk Factory (currently Abreshim AO) halted production af- ter its products proved unable to compete in a free market. In 1990, the factory manufactured 62.6 mil- lion sq. m of silk fabrics for export to 18 countries. Now the factory no longer produces any silk at all. A number of local defense industries had to close down when govern- ment contracts stopped. Torgmash, for one, which used to manufacture ovens and vats for the Army, is mostly idle these days. Moreover, 1/3 of state-run mining industries in the Sogd Region used to be unprofitable and government- subsidized during the Soviet era. The second group includes some peripheral districts where the eco- nomic situation worsened as trans- portation prices grew faster than the prices of local products, eventually destroying the commercial rationale of economic exchange within the Sogd Region and, especially, with other Tajik regions. Due to high transportation costs, remote districts like Asht, Zafarabad, Penjikent, Aina, Isfara, and Gornaya Matcha, do more import/export business with the neighboring regions of Uzbekistan than the rest of Tajiki- stan. The Asht District, for instance, produces a huge surplus of table salt. In 2002, some 25,000 tons were produced here, 3.5 times more than the district needs, and the surplus was exported to other regions of TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 51 51 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Tajikistan and across the border. While Istaravshan is readily accessi- ble for domestic suppliers, Isfara is too far away for them to make a profit. As a result, Isfara imports from the Osh and Batken Regions of Kyrgyzstan. The third group comprises districts that once received large govern- ment subsidies to invest and subsi- dize production, but lost those in- come streams after the Union fell apart. Among these districts are the particularly remote and inaccessible Aina and Gornaya Matcha. Here, stocks have to be brought in well ahead of time as the only road link- ing these mountainous areas with the rest of the country via the Shahr- istan and Anzob Passes is impass- able from November until May, when goods can only be delivered by air. The beginning of market transition was marred by a profound economic cri- sis that struck all Tajik regions with- out exception in the early 90s, re- shaping Sogd’s economy out of rec- ognition. The crisis took different forms in ev- ery Tajik region. Home to about 2/ 3 of Tajikistan’s industry, Sogd was hit the hardest. As markets were cut off and government contracts stopped, production came to a vir- tual standstill, resulting in sweeping unemployment, and impelling the majority of qualified labor to leave for Russia in search of work. Construction projects were frozen as investment stopped. Cheaper imports killed the domestic consum- er industry, which produced ready- to-wear clothing, shoes, and ho- siery. The once-thriving silk indus- try was eradicated. While preva- lently agricultural districts were less affected by crisis trends, they suf- fered from the shortages of herbi- cides, mineral fertilizers, machinery, technology, and other farming sup- plies. This caused a slump in both land productivity and harvest yields. Cotton yield dropped from 30.2 centners per hectare in 1990 to 18.1 centners in 2002, or 40%; rice, from 34.5 c per hectare to 27.4 c, or 21%; tobacco, from 32.5 c/ha to 19.7 c/ha, or 41%; potatoes, from 130 c/ha to 100 c/ha, or 23%; corn, from 245 c/ ha to 140 c/ha, or 44%; and so on. Liberalization of international trade is a transitional process that has oc- casioned the most dramatic eco- nomic changes in the Sogd Region, accelerating market transformation and enabling the region to benefit from the international division of la- bor. Sogd districts have acquired direct, independent access to inter- national markets to trade and raise foreign investment in order to up- grade their economies. On the oth- er hand, liberalization of internation- al business has affected the districts differently. Districts exporting prod- ucts that command steady interna- tional demand, e.g. cotton fiber, especially its fine-fiber varieties, silk- worm moth cocoons, tobacco, and some others, have reaped the most benefits. These include the districts of Matcha, Zafarabad, Jabbor-Ra- soul, Hojent, Kanibadam, Asht, and Spitamen, which grow regular cot- ton; Aina and Penjikent, which grow tobacco; Isfara, Kanibadam, and Hojent, which grow fruit; the pota- to exporting districts: Gornaya Matcha, Gancha, Ura-Tiube, and Shahristan; and silkworm growing districts: Hojent, Kanibadam, Spita- men, and Jabbor-Rasoul. Districts filled with industries that have failed to compete with the imports, or are strongly dependent on expen- sive imported raw materials, supplies, or components, have found them- selves at a disadvantage. These in- clude Kairakkum, Chkalovsk, and smaller towns: Chorruh-Dairon, Adr- asman, Kansai, and Shurab. The districts attracting the highest percentage of trade/reselling, and financial business have derived max- imum benefits from the opportuni- ties of market transition. Hujand, Ist- aravshan, and Gafurov are the most successful of those. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 52 52 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... II. Interregional Economic Ties of the Sogd Region: Before and After Independence 2.1 Regional Industry Within a System of Interregional Links Goods exported from Sogd to oth- er Tajik regions are those produced in excess of local needs, or the prod- ucts of narrowly specialized local fac- tories, dedicated to the manufacture of few product names or even one only. The manufacture of carpets is con- centrated in Kairakkum; silk fabrics and leather shoes, in Hujand; outdoor wear, in Istaravshan; rubber boots, in Tabashar; paints and varnishes, in Isfara; coal, in Shurab; fruit and veg- etable preserves, in Hujand, Gafu- rov, Kanibadam, Penjikent, and Is- fara. The table below lists 8 consumer product groups making up the bulk of interregional trade flows. Table 2 Industrial Output in Sogd, and Exports to Other Tajik Regions Notes to the table: 1. During the Soviet era, Tajikistan was mandated to export carpets and similar products, silk fabrics, and fruit & vegetable preserves to the rest of the Union and abroad. That’s why their respective shares in interregional turnover were lower: 31.2%, 33.5%, and 19.3% respectively. 2. Other industrial products manufac- tured in the Sogd Region were sup- plied to other regions as required by the state pro rata to regional popu- lation figures. In addition, Sogd ex- ported lighting fixtures (Isfara Facto- ry), and gas appliances (Hujand Fac- tory). 3. In 2002, the Sogd Region ex- ported much fewer industrial prod- ucts to other Tajik regions, includ- ing: fermented tobacco leaf for to- bacco factories, pure alcohol for a distillery in Dushanbe, non-alcoholic beverages and spring water, and fruit and vegetable preserves, juic- es, and marinades for retail distribu- tion. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Years 1990 2002 Output Export Production Export Description Total Â% Total Â% Carpets and similar products, million sq. m 10.9 3.4 31.2 0.4 0.1 Silk fabrics, million sq. m 62.6 21.0 33.5 0.2 - - Outdoor garments, million units 8.3 5.4 65.2 0.1 - - Rubber boots, million pairs 6.3 4.2 66.8 0.1 - - Leather shoes, million pairs 4.2 2.6 62.3 0.1 - - Coal, thousand tons 475 252 53.2 24 - - Paints and varnishes, thousand tons 13 6.0 45,5 0.1 - - Fruit and vegetable preserves, million conventional cans 215 41 19.3 126 19 15.3 Page 53 53 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2.2 Regional Agriculture Within a System of Interregional Links Agricultural produce has played an increasing role in the interregional trade of the Sogd Region, which both uses vegetables, melons, po- tatoes, fruit, berries, grapes and other produce for internal consump- tion, and exports them to other re- gions, primarily to the capital, Dush- anbe. Table 3 Agricultural Exports from Sogd to Other Tajik Regions (thousand tons) Notes to the table: 1. The agricultural output totals in column 2 include all farm formats: state-run, private farms, and private vegetable patches. 2. Internal consumption (col. 3) was tallied based on the findings of a door-to-door poll, conducted by the national statistics authority among 10% of the region’s population to determine per capita consumption of agricultural produce, and Sogd’s per- manent population figures for 2002. 3. According to our calculations, the Sogd Region exported more than 130,000 tons of potatoes, other vegetables, fruits, melons, and grapes worth 79 million somoni or US $25,500 million, in 2002. Conclusions: 1. One of the main potato growing districts is Gornaya Matcha, which turned out 34,000 tons, or 27% of Sogd’s potato harvest in 2002, av- eraging 1920 kg per capita. Pota- toes provide the only income stream for the locals, who are entirely de- pendent on their potato sales. Being aware of this, the government has officially given local farmers full dis- cretion to sell their potato harvest to any buyers, domestic or internation- al, for cash or in exchange for any goods or produce they need. The time and transportation factors are of the essence to the livelihood of the local population and the future of local potato farming in Gornaya Matcha. 2. Onions are the only vegetable that, along with fruits such as apri- cots, peaches, pomegranates, and grapes, are exported to eastern and northern Russia, and are partially ex- empt from customs duty. These ex- ports were included in our interre- gional commodity exchange figures. Imports from other Tajik regions are a crucial supply source for the Sogd market. The following goods were shipped into the Sogd Region ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Output Internal consumption Exports (2 - 3) Average price per ton, thousand somoni Total exports (4x5), million somoni 1 2 3 4 5 6 Potatoes 126.4 59.6 66.8 450 30.1 Vegetables 181.1 152.3 28.8 550 15.8 Fruit 67.2 47.0 20.2 960 19.4 Melons 15.5 10.5 5.0 350 1.8 Grapes 23.1 12.1 11.0 1100 12.1 Total: 413.3 281.5 131.8 - 79.2 Page 54 54 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... from Dushanbe in 1990: household refrigerators, cotton fabrics, non-wo- ven fabrics, hosiery, leather shoes, cigarettes, furniture, candy, pasta, fats, farm animals, and much more. The region also imported cabling prod- ucts, pipe fittings, cement, slate roof- ing, and other industrial supplies. From the Hatlon Region, Sogd im- ported mineral fertilizers, caustic, carbamide, ammonia (all produced by the Vahsh Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant and Yava Chemicals), power trans- formers (Kurgan-Tiube Factory), sub- tropical fruit and derivative products. Sogd imported porcelain tableware from Tursun-Zade, sparkling wines from Shahrinav, wool from Kuliab, and unprocessed gems from Horog. These trade links have since been eradicated, and these goods flows no longer exist. Conclusions: 1. Full liberalization of external trade has equalized domestic and international prices, triggering a dra- matic slump in interregional trade. This has resulted in a situation when, over the past 5 years, international trade has supplied an average of 64.2% of domestic consumer needs in industrial/technical goods (excluding electric power), leaving only 3% to interregional suppliers; the percentages for consumer goods are 32.3% and 12%, re- spectively, which signifies an ex- treme weakness of domestic trade links, and virtual disintegration of the domestic economic environment in Tajikistan. At the same time, the majority of enterprises in all industries have dras- tically downsized production; do- mestic products have been substi- tuted with imports; and able individ- uals are finding it ever harder to find employment domestically. 2. Along with production downsiz- ing and a general commodity mar- ket slump, the accelerated decline of interregional commodity exchange has been driven by very consider- able changes in the value of prod- ucts exchanged. As many domestic products lost their competitive edge domestically, they have been super- seded by imports in interregional exchanges. Hujand and Istaravshan are the main import destinations, from where goods are shipped on to oth- er Tajik regions. 2.3Transportation Problems as an Obstacle to Interregional Trade The curtailment of interregional trade flows was mainly the fault of trans- portation challenges. Shipping rates grew faster than the prices of the goods shipped, significantly reduc- ing demand for transportation ser- vices. Cargo carriage operations in the Sogd Region have dropped dra- matically as a result: A part of the truck pool has been privatized. These vehicles and their owners are currently doing business outside the region, mostly in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Some trucks are idle due to a lack of fuel or shipping engagements. Conclusions: 1. A drop in interregional trade was not necessarily a bad thing. The mar- ket transition put an end to many ir- rational and unsound economic prac- tices imposed on enterprises report- ing to the same ministries. For in- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION 1991 1995 2001 2001 vs. 1991 Goods shipped, million tons 22.8 3.2 1.4 16 times down Cargo flow, million tons/km 405 5,8 19 21 times down Page 55 55 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... stance, silk fabrics made in Dushan- be were shipped to the Hujand Silk Factory for processing and dyeing, then finished fabrics were shipped back to Dushanbe for sale. 2. The most important improvement was that new integration factors ap- peared with transition. For example, manufacturers now have a vested interest in overcoming regional mar- ket boundaries, and exploring new markets. This interest is encouraged by the regional authorities, realizing that expanding production and grow- ing sales boost government reve- nues, family incomes, and reduce unemployment. 3. Regional disintegration processes have continued unabated in Tajikistan since the Soviet Union collapsed. Deterioration in interregional trade and economic ties is the mainspring of spatial economic disintegration in Tajikistan. To halt this process, it is necessary to step up domestic man- ufacture of goods to supersede im- ports. The choice of an import-sub- stitution strategy in economic devel- opment will lay down the ground- work for new economic ties, pro- moting interregional commodity ex- change. III. International Economic Ties of the Sogd Region 3.1 International Trade and its Change Dynamics In an independent Tajikistan, interna- tional trade is the key to socioeco- nomic progress nationwide and in the regions. The domestic market in small coun- tries like Tajikistan tends to depend heavily on international trade, which largely shapes economic reproduc- tion and makes sure the needs of both local manufacturers and individ- uals/homesteads are adequately met by market supply. The Sogd Region is located in such a way that its links to other Tajik regions remain severed for 6 to 8 months every autumn and winter season (when mountain passes are inaccessible), which makes its industries and popu- lation so much more dependent on international trade. The state of import/export trade is largely conditioned by domestic macroeconomic processes. As the GRP improved appreciably and ma- jor industrial enterprises were priva- tized and resumed operation, im- port/export activity picked up in the Sogd Region. On the other hand, the region is too dependent on more advanced CIS economies, especially Russia, and has to import the bulk of its energy resources. This dependency adversely affects import/export trade, causing seri- ous disproportions and develop- mental difficulties. Looking at the import/export dynamics, we can see how the operation of these factors conditioned fluctuations in the import/export turnover, which reached US $309.6 million in 1997, then dropped to US $284.4 million in 1998. In 2002, the Sogd Region posted an import/export turnover of 749.4 million somoni (US $281.7 million at the official average exchange rate of the National Bank of Tajikistan that year), 6.5% up from 2000 and 26.7% higher than 1996, but 11% below the 1997 level. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 56 56 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 4 Import/Export Trade of the Sogd Region, 1996-2002 During the entire period reviewed, the regional trade balance was plagued by a deficit with imports far exceeding exports. Conclusions: 1. International trade is the main source of new technology and pro- duction equipment for the Sogd Re- gion, enabling domestic manufactur- ers to enlarge and diversify their prod- uct portfolios, improve production processes and make their products more competitive. Having launched new, advanced production lines, Zarafshon JV (in 1993-1994), Kab- ul-Tajik Textiles JV (1994-1996), Jav- oni (1996-1997), Obi-Zulol JV, and a few other companies boosted Sogd’s export potential very consid- erably. 2. Import/export has a major role in shaping domestic supply. In the Sogd Region, upwards of 1/3 of foods and 3/4 consumer goods on the market come from extraneous sup- ply sources. 3. Import/export trade can also re- shape domestic consumer needs. In the Sogd Region, the growing inter- national orientation of production has deepened the gap between de- mand, which reflects the level and structure of international commodity supply, and the poor options of meeting that demand with domestic production. Whereas some markets have become competitive, the IT market is still in a fledgling state. The rapid arrival of computers, the Inter- net, and email facilities in schools and colleges has paved the way for elec- tronic commerce. In the Sogd Region, people already search the Web for prospective partners to do business together, advertise, buy, sell, pro- mote different products, and so on. 3.2 Scope and Structure of Exports from the Sogd Region It is interesting to look at Sogd’s in- ternational trade ties with other states in the former Soviet Union (FSU)/Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States (CIS), and the rest of the world (ROW): Europe, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, etc. The table below shows Sogd’s ex- port figures for the FSU and the rest of the world: TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Index Years 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2002, % vs. 1996 2000 Total, US $ million, including: 222.2 284.7 264.9 272.6 281.7 127 106 Export: US $ million 52.4 63.1 64.1 62.5 65.2 124 102 % vs. total 23.6 22.2 24.2 23.0 23.2 - - Import: US $ million 169.8 221.6 200.8 210.1 216.5 127 108 % vs. total 76.4 77.8 75.8 77.0 76.8 - - Page 57 57 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 5 Sogd Exports to FSU and ROW The share of FSU destinations in Sogd exports has been decreasing year on year. In 2002, CIS destinations, including the former Soviet Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, account- ed for 15.5% of Sogd exports ver- sus 29.8% in 2000, and 52.5% in 1996. No trade as such existed be- tween the former Soviet republics; all commodity exchanges went ac- cording to a centrally designed in- ter-republic supply plan, which amounted to very substantial sums. In the years from 1987 through 1991, commodity exchange be- tween Tajikistan and other republics of the Union reached an average of 65% to 72% of the republic’s GDP annually; 80% to 85% of Tajik im- port/export transactions were con- ducted with other republics in the Union. The Sogd Region supplied 35% to 50% of Tajik exports. Traditionally, the Sogd Region exports three types of commodities: 1. Raw materials: cotton fiber, silk- worm cocoons, rare-earth metals, concentrates, and other goods after primary processing; 2. Halfway finished products that have gone through several succes- sive processing cycles, but are not yet ready for use or consumption: undyed cotton and silk fabrics, fer- mented tobacco, unrefined gerani- um oil for perfumes, dried herbs, etc. 3. Fully processed products that are ready for use: between 50 and 60 product items. It is interesting to see how the make- up of the regional export portfolio changed after Tajikistan gained inde- pendence. During the Soviet era, group 1 products (raw materials) made up 70% of regional exports; group 2, 12%; and group 3, 18%. After Tajikistan became independent, these percentages changed to 81%, 8%, and 11%, respectively. The shift in favor of a higher percentage of group one exports (products after primary processing) does not bode well for the economy, signifying high- er dependency on raw materials exports. This trend needs to be re- versed. While the regional authorities right- fully view import-export trade as a way to generate foreign currency, relieve excessive dependency on a few exportable product items, ex- pand export geography, and reori- ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 Export total, including: 52.4 63.5 64.1 62.5 65.2 FSU US $ million 27.5 10.5 19.1 16.9 10.1 % vs. total 52.5 16.5 29.8 27.1 15.5 ROW US $ million 24.9 53.0 45.0 45.6 55.1 % vs. total 47.5 83.5 70.2 72.9 84.5 Page 58 58 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ent foreign trade towards countries outside the FSU, these favorable changes have been progressing very slowly. The share of Sogd’s export destinations outside the FSU was 47.5% in 1996, 72.9% in 2000, and 84.7% in 2002, currently total- ing 146.5 million somoni, or US $55.2 million. Tajikistan mainly exports cot- ton fiber, cotton yarn, denim trou- sers, and a few other commodities to Europe. Table 6 Exports of Cotton Fiber, Cotton Yarn, and other Cotton Products from Sogd to Europe and the US, US $ thousand Country Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total, 5 years Switzerland 9400 26893 18146 16494 7246 70129 UK 194 2231 4087 4844 4501 15837 Germany 924 1456 205 692 317 3614 Austria 6485 7147 4927 4904 6607 30000 Slovakia 72 - 483 762 421 1838 Italy 2254 6236 7907 5032 5731 27210 Portugal - - - 565 693 1258 Belgium - 12206 12248 6365 5674 36503 Spain - 375 579 287 - 1241 US - 1905 2430 887 - 5222 Between 1996 and 2002, the Sogd Region exported US $192.8 million worth of cotton fiber, cotton yarn, fabrics, and other cotton products to nine European countries and the United States, which represents 92.2% of Sogd’s exports of these commodities, totaling US $209.1 million for the five years in question. The top five importers of cotton fi- ber, yarn, and 100% cotton fabrics produced by Tajik-Italian and Tajik- Korean joint ventures using up-to- date textile equipment based in the Sogd Region, are Switzerland, which absorbed US $70.1 million, or 36.4% of Sogd’s aggregate cotton exports to Europe and the US, in 5 years; followed by Belgium with US $36.5 million, or 18.9%; Austria with US $30 million, or 15.6%; Italy with US $27.2 million, or 14.1%; and the UK with US $15.3 million, or 8.2%. Lesser volumes were imported by Germany, Slovakia, Portugal, Spain, and the US. Sogd has recently launched cotton exports to Israel, South Korea, Chi- na, Vietnam, UAE, Iran, and some other countries. Sogd exports to the former Soviet Union include fruit and tomato juice worth between 7 and 10 million somoni (US $2.6-3.8 million) annual- ly; quartz powder (US $500,000 to TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 59 59 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 million); industrial explosives (US $8- 9 million); buses (US $1 million); car- pets (US $500,000), and much more. In addition, Sogd exports a range of agricultural products to the CIS and the Baltic states. Conclusions: The Sogd Region will have to step up the output of these products to be able to boost exports, but in the meantime, there are opportunities for Sogd to further diversify into less customary exports such as vintage wines, Shifo balsam, geranium oil, karakul, fine-fiber cotton, natural silk fabrics, healing herbs, and some oth- er products that require great num- bers of unqualified labor to produce. Untraditional exports are expected to be profitable due to: 1. low production costs; 2. sufficient local labor pool with ad- equate skills and experience; 3. the labor market is saturated, and part-time employment is widespread. 3.3 Imports and Local Distribution Challenges Sogd’s imports have been increas- ing constantly to keep up with the growing needs of homesteads and industries in both consumer and in- dustrial goods of various descrip- tion. In 2002, the region imported goods worth 576.5 million somoni, or US $216.6 million, 8.3% or US $16.5 million up from 2000, and 27.5% or US $46.7 million up from 1996. Table 7 Sogd’s Imports from FSU and ROW Unlike exports, Sogd mainly imports goods from the FSU. In the past 5 years, FSU countries have supplied an average of 90% to 95% of Sogd’s imports, leaving only 5% to 10% to the rest of the world. The Sogd Region currently imports from 12 countries in the FSU, 14 countries in Europe, and 17 coun- tries in the ROW. The top five exporters to Sogd are Uzbekistan, supplying US $169 mil- lion annually, or 84.5% of total im- ports coming into Sogd; Italy with US $10.3 million, or 0.5%; Kazakh- stan with US $8.2 million (0.4%); Russia with US $7.3 million (0.4%); and the UK with US $3.5 million (0.2%). Conclusions: 1. The mix and prices of goods im- ported from the FSU are more in line with the low purchasing power of Sogd consumers, who typically earn up to US $10 a month. 2. In large cities like Tashkent, Bish- kek and Almaty, major wholesalers from China, North Korea, Turkey, and Russia have set up joint ventures with local companies, operating large distribution warehouses where goods are cheaper to purchase and import into the Sogd Region. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Years 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 Total imports, US $ million 169.8 221.6 200.8 210.1 216.5 FSU, US $ million) 161.6 214.6 183.6 193.4 202.2 % vs. total 95.1 96.8 91.4 92.1 93.5 ROW, US $ million 8.2 7.0 17.2 16.7 14.3 % vs. total 4.9 3.2 8.6 7.9 6.5 Page 60 60 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3.4 Cross-Border Trade with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Of particular note are the trade links the Sogd Region has with the cross- border regions of Uzbekistan: Fer- gana, Namangan, Tashkent, Jizak, and Samarkand, as well as the Osh and Batken Regions of Kyrgyzstan. These neighboring regions are cru- cial to Sogd’s economy. The table below shows the volume and mix of Sogd’s import and ex- port from the neighboring regions, excluding electricity and natural gas. Table 8 Sogd’s Cross-Border Trade with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan These figures indicate a negative trade balance for the Sogd Region in its cross-border trade with Uzbeki- stan. Over the five years reviewed, im- ports from these regions, worth a total of US $45.2 million, exceeded exports, worth US $17.1 million, by more than 2.6 times. Import/export from Kyrgyzstan remained more balanced during the same time peri- od. Sogd’s steady exports to the neigh- boring countries include industrial ex- plosives and quartz powder, used in glass manufacture, which together account for 90% to 93% on aver- age of Sogd’s exports to Uzbekistan, and 55% to 60% of the region’s exports to Kyrgyzstan. The Sogd Region has stable export contracts in place for 20 commodity items with Uzbekistan, and 12 items with Kyrgyzstan. The table below shows a break- down of exports from the Sogd Region. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 1996 2000 5 years, 1996-2000 1996 2000 5 years, 1996-2000) Total trade turnover, US $ million 23.0 14.7 62.3 1.3 0.5 5.9 Export 14.2 6.3 17.1 1.2 0.2 3.1 Import 8.8 8.4 45.2 0.1 0.3 2.8 Page 61 61 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 9 Cross-Border Exports from Sogd to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (US $ thousand) Commodity Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 1996 2000 5 years, 1996-2000 1996 2000 5 years, 1996-2000 Quartz powder 500 400 3047 250 126 397 Industrial explosives 8560 5693 38024 110 50 1213 Crude oil 1640 112 865 - - - Gypsum powder 110 68 268 12 3 16 Lead - - - - - 49 Paints and varnishes 80 12 45 - 450 14 Drilling equipment - - 10 - - 30 Furniture - - - - - 40 Buses - - 29 - - - Other 283 75 331 1540 167 990 Notes to the table: 1. The region extracts crude oil, which is then refined at the Fergana Refin- ery in Uzbekistan, but Sogd retains preferential quotas on purchases of gasoline, diesel fuel, and other oil products from the refinery. Sogd produced up to 250,000-300,000 tons of crude oil annually during the Soviet era. 2. Tajikistan does not manufacture oil drilling equipment, yet has export- ed a quantity of such equipment in recent years, apparently taken from Soviet equipment stocks still remain- ing at the warehouses. 3. ZIL-Hujand JV manufactures me- dium-range buses for sale to Uzbeki- stan and Kazakhstan. The Sogd Region imports 33 com- modity items from the cross-bor- der regions of Uzbekistan, worth US $8.4 million annually, and 8 items from Kyrgyzstan, worth US $300,000. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 62 62 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 10 Cross-Border Imports into Sogd from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Excluding Electricity and Gas (US $ thousand) Commodity Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 1996 2000 5 years, 1996-2000 1996 2000 5 years, 1996-2000 Cement 203 377 1821 - - - Gasoline 892 162 3774 54 124 237 Diesel fuel 6656 2416 21503 - - - Lubricants 414 91 1538 - - - Glassware 58 80 374 - - - Nitrogenous fertilizers - 592 3678 - - - Tractors - - 975 - - - Chemical fiber - - 1320 - - - Natural wool - - - 7 22 57 Yarn - 2430 4535 - - - Flour 26 41 85 - 452 562 Cotton seed oil 39 - 185 - - - Other 540 2212 7688 39 304 1814 Notes to the table: 1. From cross-border regions in Uzbekistan Sogd imports mainly die- sel fuel (28.5%), yarn and chemical fiber (34.5%), nitrogenous fertilizers (7.2%), and other goods. Sogd im- ports mainly flour (23%) and gaso- line (9.2%) from the Osh Region of Kyrgyzstan. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 63 63 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2. Typically, trade deals between Sogd and its cross-border partner regions in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are made on an ad hoc basis, and are prone to sizable variation in pric- es and supply mixes. Cross-border trade is strongly affect- ed by market changes, including domestic output, transportation rates, customs duties, and how easy it is to clear imported/exported goods with customs, fiscal authorities, and banks. Although Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have officially agreed to offset a portion of electricity supplied from Uzbekistan to the Sogd Region with power supply from Tajikistan’s Nurek Hydroelectric Power Plant across the border to the Surkhandarya and Kash- kadarya Regions of Uzbekistan, ac- tual payments are made in hard cur- rency, putting a heavy strain on Sogd’s balance of payments. With this in mind, the Sogd regional gov- ernment has been taking steps to cap energy imports and streamline con- sumption. The figures below show how elec- tricity and gas imports to Sogd from Uzbekistan have decreased in recent years: This signifies two contrasting patterns in energy use: firstly, industries tend to abandon the high-cost strategy, which was widespread in the Soviet Union, realizing that it impedes the chances of upgrading production and improving resource management; secondly, market pricing practices are gaining wider circulation in the relations between electric companies and consumers as both come to bet- ter understand the equivalent value exchange principles governing the util- ities market. Conclusions: 1. As the Soviet energy supply sys- tem fell apart, Sogd industries and homesteads alike found themselves desperately short of electricity and natural gas. The situation was ex- acerbated by the continued use of old, high energy-consuming equip- ment by regional industries and oth- er power consumers, which can- celled out the potential benefits of low labor costs and cheap raw materials. Earning salaries around or below 32 somoni a month (US $10), locals are unable to make timely payment for the energy products they consume. Essentially, shortage of energy has emerged as the greatest single im- pediment to economic growth in the Sogd Region. 2. The choice has been made in fa- vor of smaller HEPP construction. Three small HEPPs have been built in 7 years to supply electricity to small rural communities. 3. Cost-conscious use of imported energy; minimizing network losses. Network losses currently add up to as much as 1/5 of imported energy supply. 4. Accelerated construction of the LEP-500 South-North power line; the feasibility study for this project, and pre-construction groundwork, had been completed in Soviet time. 3.5 Market Structure for Domestic and Imported Goods in the Sogd Region It is important to identify the different market segments for domestic and ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002, % Electricity (million kW/hr) 3484 3145 343 2911 83,6 Natural gas (million m3) 169.5 167.2 158.2 123.6 72.9 Page 64 64 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... imported goods, in order to find an optimal import/export proportion, ra- tionalize imports and exports, and de- termine the region’s potential to meet domestic market needs and earn hard currency to purchase the necessary goods abroad (see Graph 2). Imports supply 32.3% of Sogd’s consumer market, so one in every three somoni paid by consumers is paid for an imported product. For consumer goods other than food, imports make up 74.3% of the sup- ply, leaving only 25.7% to domestic products. In the food segment, imports make up 17% of the supply. Key imports include tea and sugar (100% import- ed), flour (72%), confectionery (69%), vegetable oil (33%), seafood preserves (100%), butter and spreads (27%), cereals and pasta (18%), brandy and sparkling wine (72%), beer (23%), and soft bever- ages (13%). The market for imported consumer goods other than food shows similar differences between segments. Many products are not manufactured in suf- ficient quantities domestically, or not at all, and have to be imported from the FSU or farther afield. Sogd imports all its television and radio sets, sports equipment, “cultural” utility products, timber, motorcycles, automobiles, computers, paper and stationery. Other goods are imported as nec- essary to meet local demand, if lo- cal output is insufficient. Conclusions: Sogd imports from the FSU and ROW: to meet the demand for goods not available domesti- cally; to meet local demand for better quality foods, not avail- able in sufficient quantities domestically; to meet the demand of up- per class consumers for pre- mium, organically grown foods. 3.6 Foreign Investment in the Sogd Region Another important aspect of inter- regional relations is extraneous, or foreign, investment. While foreign investment has been limited so far in the Sogd Region, it is on the grow. As sociopolitical and econom- ic climate improved in the region, a better environment was created for an influx of investment dollars. Indeed, foreign investors are in- creasingly sizing up investment op- portunities in Tajikistan’s Sogd Re- gion. The table below shows foreign in- vestment dynamics in Tajikistan and Sogd over the ten years since inde- pendence. Table 11 Foreign Investment in Tajikistan and Sogd, 1991-2001 (US $ million) TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Direct investment Other investment Total Amount % vs. total Amount % vs. total Amount % Tajikistan 248.9 61.8 154.4 38.2 403.3 100 Sogd Region 202.1 94.8 11.3 5.2 213.4 100 Sogd vs. Tajikistan, % 81.2 - 7.3 - 52.9 - Page 65 65 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Notes to the table: 1. More than half (52.9%) of for- eign investment in Tajikistan goes to the Sogd Region. Over the ten years, foreign investors have invested US $403 million in Tajikistan, US $213 million of it in Sogd. 2. The highest percentage of foreign capital has been invested directly: US $249 million nationwide and US $202 million, or 81.2% of the total, in Sogd. Direct investment is usually made in joint ventures (JVs), the num- ber of which has reached 105 na- tionwide, and 34 in Sogd. 3. Other investment, including health- care, education, small and medium- sized enterprise development, aid to farmers, etc. totals US $154 million nationwide, and only US $11 million in Sogd, or 7.3% of total foreign in- vestment in the region. Table 12 Foreign Investment in Tajikistan and Sogd by Provenance: FSU or ROW Index Origin Tajikistan Sogd Region Total Incl. Total Incl. Direct Other Direct Other FSU - US $ million - % vs. total Äàëüíåå çàðóáåæüå -- US $ million - % vs. total 1.8 1.7 0.1 1.6 1.6 - 0.5 0.7 - 0.8 0.8 - 401.5 247.2 154.3 211.8 200.5 11.3 99.5 99.3 100 99.2 99.2 100 Èòîãî: - US $ million - % 400.3 248.9 154.4 213.4 202.1 11.3 100 100 100 100 100 100 Notes to the table: 1. As the majority of newly inde- pendent states in the former Soviet Union share the same economic hard- ships, the entire US $1.8 million in foreign investment originating in the FSU was invested by Russia, which is keen to maintain its interests in certain defense industries remaining from the Soviet Union. 2. The majority (99.2%) of direct investment and 100% of other in- vestment in the Sogd Region was made by investors from countries outside the FSU. 3. Nations having invested in Sogd directly include the UK (US $93.6 million), South Korea (US $53.4 mil- lion), Italy (US $39.5 million), Luxem- bourg (US $31.2 million), the Netherlands (US $ 3.6 million), Switzerland (US $2.4 million), Vietnam (US $2.5 million), Austria (US $1.8 million), and the US (US $8 million). ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 66 66 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Notably the geography of incoming investment flows expanded from only 2 investor nations in 1991 to 27 in 2001. The leading direct investors in Sogd are the 6 European nations listed above, having committed US $176 million, or 87.2% of total ma- jor investment in Sogd, between them over the ten years. 4. Other - indirect - investments come to Tajikistan from: the UK (US $64.6 million), the US (US $55.2 mil- lion), the Philippines (US $13.7 mil- lion), Germany (US $5.4 million), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (US $4.3 million), who have committed a total of US $143.2 million to the Tajik economy, or 92.8% of all sim- ilar investments in the country over the decade. Major indirect investors in the Sogd Region are the UK, Ger- many, the US, and Japan. At the city level, the cities attracting the highest percentage of foreign investment in Sogd are Penjikent with US $101.3 million, including US $91.7 million in direct and US $9.6 million in other investment, adding up to more than 50% of total foreign investment in Sogd to date. The next runners-up are Hujand with US $99.8 million, Ist- aravshan with US $8 million, Kairak- kum with US $2.1 million, and Za- farabad District with US $1.7 million. Conclusions: 1. Foreign investment has enabled the Sogd Region to draw more ex- tensively on its natural resources and labor pool, improve production man- agement, build up export potential, and successfully continue market re- forms. 2. Foreign investment is crucial for those industries that urgently need a shot in the arm to begin manufactur- ing up-to-date, competitive products, especially groceries, consumer goods, services, pharmaceuticals, and other essential commodities. 3. The priority targets for foreign in- vestors in the Sogd Region are: revitalization and retooling of facilities to process, store, ship, and trade in agricultural produce; fuel and energy sectors as- sociated with the construction of hydro and thermal electric power plants, small HEPPs, development and extraction of oil, gas, and rare earth metals; modern infrastructure devel- opment, including transporta- tion, telecommunications, warehouses, business facili- ties, and services. IV. Plurality of Enterprise Formats in Sogd Regional Economy 4.1Privatization, the Groundwork of a Market Economy The private sector was formed through privatization in the Sogd Re- gion. Privatization or other ways of con- veying government property to pri- vate owners, form the groundwork of any market economy. A growing private sector, formed through trans- formation of government property into collective, joint, cooperative, rented, or other property formats, relieves the government from financ- ing economically unviable investment needs and losses, while participation of foreign capital in the privatization process creates new investment opportunities. Privatization of gov- ernment property is the best way to encourage citizens to engage in private enterprise. In the Sogd Region, privatization policies have been aimed to achieve two goals: firstly, to form a class of private owners, the core of private enterprise and, secondly, to de-mo- nopolize the economy, unbundle conglomerates and major enterpris- es, differentiate production and thus create a favorable climate for com- petition. These goals have not yet been achieved in full. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 67 67 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 13 Privatization of Government Property in the Sogd Region Index/year Ãîäû 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total No. of enterprises privatized Tajikistan 39 434 696 1264 1538 648 417 542 6837 Sogd Region 3 147 238 477 395 114 75 111 2110 % vs. total 7.7 33.8 34.2 37.7 25.7 17.6 18.1 20.5 30.8 A total of 6837 enterprises have been privatized in Tajikistan since the priva- tization drive began in 1991, 2110 of them, or 30.8% of the lot, in the Sogd Region. Another 18.1% were priva- tized in Dushanbe; 39.7% in the Hat- lon Region, 2.2% in the Gorno-Bada- khshan Autonomous Region, and 16.2% elsewhere in Tajikistan. The figures in the table above sug- gest that the bulk of enterprises were privatized from 1997 to 2000, when 4146 enterprises, or 60.7% were privatized in 4 years nationwide, and 1224, or 58.2%, in the Sogd Re- gion. Before privatization, small and medi- um-sized enterprises were general- ly in local or municipal ownership, while major ones were owned by the central government. Their respec- tive percentages in the aggregate number of enterprises privatized in 10 years, 1991 to 2001, was as fol- lows: Tajikistan Sogd Region Central government property 1050 enterprises, or 19.4% 184, or 10.1% Municipal property 5400, or 80.6% 1826, or 89.9% Total: 6450, or 100% 2010, or 100% The table below shows the structure of central and local property privati- zation portfolios by industry as they shaped up between 1991 and 2001. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 68 68 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 14 Government Property Privatization by Industry, 1991-2001 Industry/Ownership Central government Local government Tajikistan Incl. Sogd Region Tajikistan Incl. Sogd Region No. % vs. Tajikistan No. % vs. Tajikistan Manufacturing 88 24 27.3 32 13 40.6 Construction 99 22 22.2 204 42 20.6 Transportation 46 1 2.5 36 8 22.2 Retail and catering 323 58 18.0 1810 648 35.8 Utilities and community services 133 22 16.5 1858 792 42.6 Agriculture 61 8 13.1 516 27 5.2 Other 300 49 16.3 944 296 31.3 Total: 1050 184 17.5 5400 1826 33.8 Notes to the table: 1. Similarly to the rest of the country, the retail and catering sectors showed the highest privatization rate among all industries in the Sogd Region: 31.5% for centrally owned establishments, and 33.5% for local government proper- ties; the respective percentages for consumer services and utility provid- ers were 12% and 34.3%. 2. Few major central government- owned enterprises have been priva- tized in the Sogd Region because the majority of these enterprises are in mining or defense, the two industries forbidden by law to be privatized. 3. While the majority of small busi- nesses have passed into private hands, privatization of major properties is underway and gaining momentum; the process has been facilitated by the recent opening of a stock ex- change and real estate exchange. 4.2 Growing Private Sector in Regional Industry It is illuminating to analyze industrial output by ownership format, espe- cially since the multiplicity of owner- ship formats, as a crucible of com- petition, largely determines how ad- vanced a market economy is. In 1990, when the market transition began, the majority of enterprises in the Sogd Region and the rest of Tajiki- stan were owned by the state. Kolkhoz farms, or “collective” farms, were not really collective, but state- owned. Citizens were only allowed to own the limited amount of posses- sions they needed for their own use and consumption. It became obvious that the government’s property mo- nopoly stood in the way of market transition. The Property Act adopted in Tajikistan in 1991 opened the flood- gate for all property formats on an equal footing, including private prop- erty on all production facilities exclud- ing land. The way was now paved for the advent of a private sector. The table below shows how the pub- lic and private sectors have evolved over the years in Tajikistan and the Sogd Region. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 69 69 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 15 Public and Private Sectors in Manufacturing Industries % vs. total Index/Year 1987 1990 1995 1996 2000 2001 2002 Tajikistan 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Public sector 99.0 98.1 96.7 90.4 79.7 71.8 68.4 Private sector 1.0 1.9 3.3 9.6 20.3 28.2 31.6 Sogd Region 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Public sector 99.5 98.4 94.4 89.1 76.6 64.3 59.4 Private sector 0.5 1.6 5.6 11.9 23.4 35.7 40.6 Notes to the table: 1. In 1987-1990, private enterprise was limited to private, home-based tailors, shoemakers, custom manufac- turers of windows and doors, artists, craftsmen, and manufacturers of a few other products for personal use. 2. The private sector, which began growing fast in 1995, reached 31.6% nationwide by 2002, and 40.6% in the Sogd Region, having soared 9.6 times nationwide and 7.3 times in Sogd. Apparently, privati- zation has progressed faster in Sogd than the rest of the country. The current practice is to consider joint stock companies and joint ven- tures derived from government- owned industrial properties, to be government-owned. This is not quite correct, and certainly not since the government has sold off more than 50% of the shares it once owned in manufacturing companies, in the past two years. Private shareholders now own majority stakes in some of those companies, which should, therefore, be considered private. With this up- date in mind, the share of the pri- vate sector is actually 67.1% nation- wide and 78.5% in the Sogd Region (see Graph 3). The respective percentages of the public and private sectors in regional industrial output are different in Sogd from the rest of the country. 1. The high (40.2%) share of private companies in the national industrial output is mainly secured by two in- dustry giants: Tajik Aluminum in Tur- sun-Zade, and Barqi Tochiq energy holding in Dushanbe. 2. In the Sogd Region, it is joint ven- tures that account for a substantial share of regional industrial output: 45.3%, but more than 50% in some years. A relatively advanced indus- trialized region of Tajikistan, Sogd possesses unique natural resources that attract foreign investors, and is home to between 30% and 32% of all JVs operating in Tajikistan, produc- ing 87%-90% of the value of prod- ucts manufactured by all JVs nation- wide. 4.3 Agriculture: Slow Structural Change Growth in agriculture is conditional on its structural reengineering and a more active policy in supporting the more successful rural industries. There is every reason to promote growth in the agricultural sector as: 73.8% of the population live in rural communities, produc- ing 44% of the gross region- al agricultural output; living standards in rural areas are di- rectly dependent on how well agriculture is doing; ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 70 70 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Agriculture provides 2/3 of domestic food supply; the scope of agricultural output is vital to the success of such industries as textiles, cotton refining, tobacco, food, fruit & vegetable canning, and oth- ers, including joint venture businesses; The country earns the bulk of its hard currency by export- ing cotton fiber, silkworm cocoons, leaf tobacco, veg- etables, fruit, and derivative products. With all this in mind, the reform cur- rently underway in Sogd is designed to upgrade agricultural production, foster new business entities and man- agement practices in rural produc- tion. The reform targets primarily private farmers. The table below shows how the number of private farms, and their output, have in- creased between 1996 and 2002. Table 16 Index/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002, % vs. 1996 1. No. of private farms Tajikistan 2386 8023 10223 9293 12344 11939 12105 507,2 Sogd Region 395 460 812 932 1266 1622 2211 560,0 % vs. total 16.6 5.7 8.0 10.0 10.3 13.6 12.3 - 2. Output, million somoni Tajikistan 7.0 27.0 41.1 70.0 103.5 139.8 196.5 28 times Sogd Region 4.6 7.8 10.8 19.1 20.6 67.1 106.2 23 times % vs. total 65.7 28.9 26.2 27.3 19.8 48.0 54.0 - Only 12.3% of private farms oper- ating in Tajikistan are based in the Sogd Region, but they produce up- wards of 54% of the total output of private farms nationwide, which means the farms are bigger in Sogd. Note: There are 187 kolkhoz (collective) farms in the Sogd Re- gion, 37 of them, or 28.2%, re- organized into joint stock com- panies. There are 2211 private farms, and more than 219,000 rural families have vegetable patches. The table below shows gross agri- cultural output by branch and own- ership format in 2002 vs. 2000. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 71 71 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 17 Branch/Index Value, million somoni % vs. total Collective sector Private farms Private patches 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 Total, including: 226.6 493.9 38.1 34.7 9.1 21.5 52.8 43.8 Growing 154.7 383.8 52.6 42.4 13.1 27.2 34.3 30.4 Animal farming 71.9 110.1 7.0 7.8 0.5 1.9 92.5 90.3 If you look at the structural changes in regional agriculture, it is obvious that private farms have increased their presence and output exponen- tially in recent years, from 9.1% of gross regional agricultural output in 2000 to 21.5% in 2002. The most private farms were established after the president of Tajikistan decreed to allot 7,500 hectares of land to farmers. There are more private farms that grow crops (27.2%) than breed animals, because growing re- quires lower investment. The few private farms that exist in the animal breeding sector produce only 1.9% of total output. As a high percent- age of collective farm cattle has been privatized by homesteads, the over- whelming 90.3% of farm produce is supplied by homesteads. In the Sogd Region, private farms supply 37.7% of the gross cotton wool harvest, 19.7% of grain crops (wheat, corn, etc.), 25.1% of pota- toes, 8.2% of other vegetables, and 38.1% of melons (watermelons, can- taloupes, pumpkins, etc.) Note: Pursuant to a recent presi- dential degree, farmers in 4 Tajik regions will be charged a flat, uni- form land tax in 2003 instead of the 7 types of tax levied so far, which is a good incentive to start new farms and increase production. A percentage of collective farm cat- tle has been privatized by home- steads. Most animals are kept on their owners’ estates. Consequent- ly, the bulk (90.3%) of animal farm produce is supplied by homesteads. In the Soviet Union, agriculture was dominated by collective farms: kolkhoz and sovkhoz, which supplied the highest percentage and, in some cases, 100% of agricultural produce. For instance, collective farms sup- plied 100% of cotton wool, tobac- co, silkworm cocoons, geraniums, and healing herbs. Individuals were allowed to own up to 0.5 hectares of land for their vegetable patches, orchards, and cattle, which supplied 1/3 of homesteads’ own needs. Private patches and orchards were tilled mainly by women, children, and seniors, who were not involved in kolkhoz work. 4.4 Trade: Changes in Retail Volume and Structure Families acquire goods and services for personal use through retail out- lets. The retail turnover, or sale of goods to end-consumers, has been growing in Sogd year on year as the table below convincingly demon- strates: ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 72 72 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 18 Retail Turnover in All Outlet Formats (million somoni) Year Tajikistan Sogd Region Total Incl. Total Incl. Private sector % Private sector % 1987 2861 1536 53.7 993 514 51.8 1990 3462 1887 54.5 1215 635 52.3 1992 18.8 9.3 49.5 7.9 4.1 51.8 1996 130.7 97.0 93.5 40.4 37.8 93.6 1997 194.7 187.4 96.3 88.6 86.2 97.3 1998 435.9 426.4 97.8 157.2 153.8 97.8 1999 567.8 557.0 98.1 186.9 182.9 97.8 2000 558.2 543.9 97.8 183.2 176.9 96.6 2001 777.7 759.9 97.6 283.7 273.6 96.4 2002 1054.6 1031.4 97.8 380.7 370.7 97.4 Notes to the table: 1. In the Soviet Union during the years immediately preceding its de- mise (1987-1990), there were, es- sentially, three retail formats in the Sogd Region: state-run stores in cit- ies and towns (47.7% in 1990); co- operative outlets in rural areas (48.3%), and kolkhoz outlets (4%). The turnovers of consumer goods (other than food) at outdoor mar- kets («Sunday bazaars») were not monitored or accounted for since vendors were officially allowed to sell used items only. Meanwhile, ac- cording to sample surveys conduct- ed around that time, “unorganized” markets posted very substantial sales figures reaching 1/5 of the aggre- gate retail turnover of non-food com- modities in the region. 2. In 1987 through 1990, the prev- alent non-governmental retail format were cooperative stores, but most rural stores and warehouses were destroyed and looted during the 1992-1996 civil war. The share of cooperative outlets in the total retail turnover consequently plummeted to only 2.3% in 2002. 3. Unorganized food and non-food markets are the favorite place to shop with local families, small firms, and public institutions in the Sogd Region, accounting for 89.2% of the aggregate retail turnover in the re- gion. 4. A percentage of goods is retailed through “commercial” stores (as op- posed to state-run stores where pric- es were regulated by the govern- ment), a retail format that appeared in the late 80s as a precursor of mar- ket reform. In 1990, “commercial” stores sold only 1.2% of the aggre- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 73 73 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... gate turnover; the figure was 2.7% in 1996, and currently stands at around 5%. “Commercial” stores mainly carry imported goods, quality domestic goods, and various “elite” or premi- um products for the affluent classes. Graph 4 in the Annex shows how, by retail format, turnover figures changed in the Sogd Region. Structurally, the retail turnover of goods has changed dramatically in Tajikistan and the Sogd Region since the country gained independence. Table 19 Groceries vs. Other Goods as a Percentage of Turnover r a e Y r a e Y r a e Y r a e Y r a e Y x e d n I x e d n I x e d n I x e d n I x e d n I n a tsi k ij a T n a tsi k ij a T n a tsi k ij a T n a tsi k ij a T n a tsi k ij a T n o i g e R d g o S n o i g e R d g o S n o i g e R d g o S n o i g e R d g o S n o i g e R d g o S l a t o T l a t o T l a t o T l a t o T l a t o T s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G r e h t O r e h t O r e h t O r e h t O r e h t O s d o o g l a t o T l a t o T l a t o T l a t o T l a t o T s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G s e ir e c o r G r e h t O r e h t O r e h t O r e h t O r e h t O s d o o g 0 9 9 1 0 0 1 3 . 4 4 7 . 5 5 0 0 1 1 . 9 3 9 . 0 6 6 9 9 1 0 0 1 2 . 5 5 8 . 4 4 0 0 1 2 . 8 5 8 . 1 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 5 . 9 5 5 . 0 4 0 0 1 8 . 4 6 2 . 5 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 5 . 7 5 5 . 2 4 0 0 1 3 . 3 6 7 . 6 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 . 6 5 9 . 3 4 0 0 1 6 . 2 6 4 . 7 3 Notes to the table: 1. Market turnover structure is con- sidered progressive if the percent- age share of non-food commodities is growing. As disposable incomes increase, families begin spending more on quality clothing and foot- wear, as well as various goods for comfort and leisure (the Engels Law). 2. The retail turnover structure in Tajikistan shows a negative trend with grocery spending increasing, and non-food spending dropping, which is indicative of plummeting living stan- dards after the collapse of the Sovi- et Union. In 1990, consumers spent 55.7% of their budgets on non-food purchases; in 1996, non-food spend- ing was down 10.9% to 44.8%. It is obvious that during the civil war and post-war recovery, refugee repatri- ation, etc. people spent most of their available funds on groceries: flour, sugar, tea, butter, and other indis- pensable foods. 3. The trend was even more pro- nounced in Sogd, where non-food retail sales dropped from 60.9% in 1990 to 41.8% in 1996, or 19.1 per- centage points. The share of non- food sales as a percentage of retail turnover continued to decline until 2002, when it bottomed out at 40.5% nationwide and 35.2% in the Sogd Region. Conclusions: 1. In the past two years, grocery spending has begun to decline in fa- vor of non-food spending both in Sogd and nationwide, which appears to be a logical trend indicating a siz- able improvement of living standards. On the other hand, Tajikistan and the region will need another few years to reach the level of 1990, the year when the market transition com- menced. 2. The surge in retail grocery sales in Sogd until 1996 was probably caused by bulk purchasing to deliver food to families and friends in the war- stricken Dushanbe and further south. The structure of grocery sales in 2002 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 74 74 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... was very different from 1990 (see Graph 5). 1. The aggregate percentage share of three product groups: flour, in- cluding pasta, cereals, and bread; vegetable oil; and potatoes increased during the period reviewed, from 26.4% to 41.2%. The share of fruits, especially grapes, climbed slightly from 2.5% to 3.7%. 2. The aggregate percentage share of meats, meat products, milk, eggs, cheese and fats dropped consider- ably, from 28.7% to 22.5%; sugar and sugar products (candy, jams, etc.) dropped from 10.7% to 7.1%; alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverag- es, from 15.9% to 4.4%; and veg- etables, from 2.4% to 2.2%. 3. The retail turnover structure in Sogd, which had changed markedly between 1990 and 2002, indicates a lack of consumption balance typi- cal for regions with low per capita monetary incomes. The turnover of non-food commod- ities also sustained major structural alterations associated with cultural and lifestyle changes (see Graph 6). 1. The percentage share of clothing and footwear in the non-food retail turnover dropped from 47.7% in 1990 to 39.7% in 2002; perfumes and toiletries, from 6.9% to 2.4%; and automobiles, from 6.1% to 2.6%. Sales of construction supplies naturally declined from 4.1% to 3.7% as urban and rural housing construc- tion stopped; sales of jewelry dropped due to lack of consumer confidence in the quality and work- manship of gems and precious met- als. 2. The percentage shares of such non-food commodities as petrochem- icals (1.4% to 3.7%), medical sup- plies (0.5% to 2%), and tobacco products (1.5% to 2%) increased as the state lifted its monopoly and re- strictions, and prices went up for these products. 3. The share of other goods went up from 12.2% in 1990 to 24.7% in 2002, or nearly doubled as the sup- ply of “other goods” was expanded from 13 to 37 product groups, the largest of them being “lifestyle” sup- plies, bicycles, motorbikes, electric supplies, arts/crafts, matches, spare parts for long-life products, and so on. V. Emergence of Market Institutions 5.1 The Rise and Fall of Cooperatives Cooperatives were buds of private enterprise born in the depths of the Soviet system. Unlike state-run busi- nesses, they were allowed to set their own prices and offer any goods or services that happened to be in demand, but most importantly, they had the discretion to use their profits as they saw fit. All these perquisites inspired a swift proliferation of co- operative businesses in all industries, and increased the retail presence of cooperative goods. The table below showcases the rise and fall of coop- erative businesses. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 75 75 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 20 Cooperative Businesses in the Sogd Region s p o - o c f o . o N s p o - o c f o . o N s p o - o c f o . o N s p o - o c f o . o N s p o - o c f o . o N ) d n a s u o h t( s e e y o l p m e f o . o N ) d n a s u o h t( s e e y o l p m e f o . o N ) d n a s u o h t( s e e y o l p m e f o . o N ) d n a s u o h t( s e e y o l p m e f o . o N ) d n a s u o h t( s e e y o l p m e f o . o N s e l a S s e l a S s e l a S s e l a S s e l a S 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 0 9 9 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 : s e vit a r e p o o C g ni d ulc ni ,la t o t 5 8 3 6 5 4 3 3 . 1 8 . 0 1 3 . 0 8 . 5 1 8 . 4 9 0 . 7 3 1 g nir u t c a f u n a M 9 1 5 1 1 6 0 4 . 0 3 . 3 4 0 . 0 2 . 5 2 . 3 3 1 . 7 9 g nille s e R d o o f d n a e g a r e v e b & 1 1 9 2 8 8 1 . 0 3 . 0 6 0 . 0 1 . 2 2 . 5 5 . 0 1 r e m u s n o C s e civ r e s 7 2 8 0 1 4 7 1 . 0 5 . 2 2 0 . 0 8 . 1 1 . 6 1 2 . 2 n oit c u rts n o C 2 3 9 5 2 1 . 0 4 . 2 6 0 . 0 5 . 1 1 . 7 1 1 . 0 1 e r u tlu cir g A 5 5 3 3 8 0 . 0 5 . 0 4 0 . 0 9 . 1 5 . 2 0 . 1 s p o - o c r e h t O 1 2 3 8 1 8 5 3 . 0 8 . 1 8 0 . 0 3 . 3 1 . 0 2 1 . 6 1 The year the government gave a go- ahead to cooperatives or, more pre- cisely, between July and December 1987, 85 cooperatives were estab- lished in the Sogd Region, 27 of them doing business in consumer servic- es, 19 in consumer goods manufac- turing, and 11 in retail and food & beverage services. Then coopera- tives came to agriculture. Unlike Soviet state-run organizations, cooperatives did their marketing and sought to meet real consumer needs. No wonder they soon cornered the marketplace and won consumer loy- alty. There were 563 cooperatives in the Sogd Region in 1990, repre- senting an increase of 6.3 times in three years. The number of manu- facturing cooperatives had soared 6 times; consumer services co-ops, 4.2 times; and retail and food & bev- erage co-ops, 2.6 times. Coopera- tives multiplied the fastest in construc- tion (45 times) and agriculture (7 times). At that point, cooperatives em- ployed some 11,000 in the region, or 8.3 times more than in 1987. Sales proceeds on cooperative-man- ufactured goods and services had climbed 6 times to Rbl 94.8 million. The largest percentage shares in co- operative sales belonged to manu- facturing (35%), construction (19%), and consumer services (17%) coop- eratives in 1990. It is a mystery what happened to the cooperative movement in the years that followed. By 2002, their number was down to 34, or 16.5 times, and cooperative employee numbers had dropped 36 times. Conclusions: 1. Some cooperatives in Dushanbe and farther south were destroyed during the civil war. As these sad tidings came from the south cooper- atives began wrapping up business in Sogd. 2. Once the prices and international trade were liberalized, most coop- eratives found themselves unable to compete with imports from Uzbeki- stan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Iran, and Turkey. 3. Some cooperatives were reorga- nized into limited liability partnerships or limited companies, the business ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 76 76 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... formats that have proved particular- ly successful in the majority of mar- ket economies. 4. As the government shifted its fi- nancial focus to private farms, rural cooperatives, numbering 103 in 1998, dissolved. The 3 rural coop- eratives still in business in 2002 are used as a testing ground for differ- ent agricultural improvements. 5.2 Small Enterprise: Private Firms and Sole Entrepreneurship The laws of Tajikistan provide two options for small enterprise: 1. Establishment of a corporate enti- ty in any available legal and organi- zations format. 2. Sole entrepreneurship: individu- als carrying on their business as sole entrepreneurs without incorporating a company are required to obtain an appropriate patent from the gov- ernment, and pay a non-recurring tax. The choice is made in favor of incor- porating a firm or doing business as a sole entrepreneur based on the nature of the desired business activ- ity. Table 21 Small Enterprise in the Sogd Region r a e Y / t a m r o F r a e Y / t a m r o F r a e Y / t a m r o F r a e Y / t a m r o F r a e Y / t a m r o F 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 .s v % , 1 0 0 2 .s v % , 1 0 0 2 .s v % , 1 0 0 2 .s v % , 1 0 0 2 .s v % , 1 0 0 2 6 9 9 1 -ikija T n a ts d g o S T S T S T S T S e t a r o p r o c f o . o N . 1 ) d n a s u o h t( s eitit n e 6 . 2 7 . 0 1 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 2 1 . 1 2 . 1 5 . 0 8 3 5 2 la u d ivi d nI . 2I s r u e n e r p e rt n e ) s t n e t a p d n a s u o h t( 8 5 6 4 0 3 6 1 1 8 6 0 7 2 5 2 5 1 3 7 1 Small enterprise peaked in 1996, when the number of small business- es exceeded 3,000 nationwide and 2,000 in Sogd. Meanwhile, small businesses were operating in an un- certain, unstable environment. On the one hand, small business had built up the potential for a major break- through that could enable it to satu- rate the domestic market and even go international; on the other hand, there were numerous obstacles and hurdles impeding this aspiration to grow. Those impediments included political and economic instability; in- effectual legal and regulatory frame- work; lack of start-up capital and unavailability of credit; limited choice of available technology; pressure from local authorities (endless inspec- tions, extortion, etc.) and criminal groups. Taken together, all these factors ef- fectively arrested the development of the small enterprise format involv- ing the incorporation of a firm. Start- ing in 1996, the small business bank- ruptcy rate far exceeded new busi- ness starts, resulting in a general slump in their numbers from 3,100 in 1996 to 1,200 in 2001, or 2.5 times. The trend was even stronger in Sogd, where the number of small business- es dropped from 2,000 to 500, or 4 times, during the same time peri- od. Small business employee head count dropped from 31,000 in 1996 to 11,700 in 2001 nationwide, and from 18,400 to 4,700 in Sogd. Notably, in 1996, the government offered a simplified patent applica- tion procedure for individual entre- preneurs, boosting the small enter- prise format involving no incorpora- tion. In 1996, the government issued TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 77 77 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 46,000 patents to sole entrepre- neurs nationwide, and 30,000 in Sogd, 2.4 and 2.3 times more, re- spectively, than the year before. Sole entrepreneurship bloomed in 1998, when 116,000 patents were issued nationwide to engage in 78 types of business, and 68,000 pat- ents in Sogd. In subsequent years, as small enter- prise stabilized in general, the num- ber of sole enterprise patents issued also leveled out at around 50,000- 70,000 nationwide and 35,000 to 50,000 in the Sogd Region. Small business has been increasingly dominated by privately owned firms. The table below shows basic oper- ating statistics for privately owned small businesses in the Sogd Region. Table 22 Basic Small Business Statistics in the Sogd Region 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 6 9 9 1 7 9 9 1 7 9 9 1 7 9 9 1 7 9 9 1 7 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 8 9 9 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 s m rif e t a vir p f o . o N . 1 6 6 2 5 6 1 0 7 1 1 6 1 1 5 1 4 9 4 9 4 4 g nir u t c a f u n a M : g ni d ulc nI 9 5 5 2 6 2 4 2 2 2 7 0 1 4 0 1 n oit c u rts n o C 0 4 3 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 6 3 6 2 s e civ r e s e g a r e v e b & d o o f ,lia t e R 0 0 1 0 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 0 2 2 0 9 1 s e e y ol p m e f o . o N . 2 7 1 8 1 7 6 9 1 2 0 1 8 7 2 1 4 0 0 1 9 1 5 4 5 6 5 4 g nir u t c a f u n a M 2 7 4 0 4 2 7 3 2 1 5 3 5 3 2 1 2 2 1 6 5 2 1 n oit c u rts n o C 5 2 2 3 0 1 2 0 1 9 9 8 7 5 6 3 5 4 3 s e civ r e s e g a r e v e b & d o o f ,lia t e R 0 2 6 5 3 3 2 3 3 6 4 4 5 1 4 1 1 6 1 8 9 5 1 in o m o s d n a s u o h t , s ela S . 3 0 . 8 4 2 9 . 1 5 3 3 . 4 8 7 1 9 . 0 8 5 2 0 . 1 9 9 2 9 . 9 7 4 5 1 8 . 8 4 5 6 1 g nir u t c a f u n a M :.lc nI 8 . 0 3 1 4 . 8 9 1 8 . 2 7 8 . 9 7 3 0 . 5 6 1 4 . 2 2 2 3 7 . 4 8 9 4 n oit c u rts n o C 5 . 4 7 . 5 1 . 7 5 0 . 8 3 1 1 . 7 6 1 3 . 2 5 5 7 . 4 5 6 s e civ r e s e g a r e v e b & d o o f ,lia t e R 4 . 3 9 9 . 8 2 1 9 . 3 5 4 1 9 . 7 1 9 1 0 . 2 2 2 1 8 . 4 6 6 9 0 . 7 3 1 9 businesses dropped in all major in- dustries: 63% from 59 to 22 in man- ufacturing; 67.5% from 40 to 13 in construction; 23% from 100 to 77 in retail and food & beverage servic- es. The head count of employees and the output of products and ser- vices by small private businesses de- creased accordingly. Notes to the table: 1. The number of private businesses dropped 44%, from 266 to 151, between 1996 and 2000, while their employee numbers dropped 45%, from 1,800 to 1,000. 2. Over the period reviewed (1996- 2000), the number of small private 3. The trend has been reversed in the past two years, 2001 and 2002 after (1) the Tajik president met with entrepreneurs to resolve a number of crucial issues that had hampered enterprise for years whereupon gov- ernment support was made avail- able, bureaucratic hurdles were re- moved for new business registration, ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 78 78 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... the taxation system was simplified, the patent issuance process was streamlined, and so on; and (2) the president decreed the maintenance of so-called “Audit Logs” for small businesses, both corporate and indi- vidual. According to the decree, reg- ulators may only audit a small busi- ness or a sole entrepreneur once a year, and the findings of every audit are to be recorded in the Audit Log. These incentives immediately led to a dramatic rise in new small business starts, both corporate and individual. In the past two years alone, the num- ber of small businesses soared 4 times, reaching 449 in 2002: 5 times to 104 in manufacturing; 2.6 times to 26 in construction; 2.4 times to 190 in retail and food & beverage services. As the number of small private businesses in- creased, their sales of goods and ser- vices also rocketed 5.5 times. Steady operations were launched by 75 small privately owned workshops, mini- plants and factories manufacturing var- ious consumer goods, more than 20 mobile and full-service construction companies, 150 major stores, super- markets, malls and restaurants, all of which have obtained the necessary registration with fiscal authorities. Small private businesses established in 2001 and 2002 are generally more fit to operate in a market environment than their predecessors. Conclusions: 1. Small enterprise has a huge po- tential in the Sogd Region. Its fast- paced growth is the key to a sweep- ing social restructuring precedent to a full transition of the entire econo- my and population to market-based economics. Small business promises thousands of new jobs and rapid GRP growth in the region. 2. Small businesses have a tendency to grow and become major compa- nies. A number of small businesses established in Sogd in the 1990s, have reinvented themselves as ma- jor, widely specialized companies. These include Bars, Nur, Amon, Lal, Istaravshan Technocenter, Imcon, and Hunar, to name a few. 3. Small, patent-based individual en- terprise propagates a large substra- tum of small owners earning a de- cent living and ensuring high living standards for their families. This helps ease social tensions and fill the mar- ket with domestic goods and servic- es. VI. The Center and the Region: Decentralization of Economic Administration is Imperative 6.1 Administrative Practices: Bodies with Identical Responsibilities and the “Tug-of-War” Method The Soviet system whereby eco- nomic administration was industry- focused, has survived with only marginal changes. It is typical for this administration system to consolidate enormous economic powers and dis- cretions within central government ministries, which manage the entire economy. The role of local adminis- trative bodies is very limited while the Jamoats are left entirely outside the economic system. Every enterprise, a key economic player, finds itself reporting to two governmental bodies, the relevant ministry and the local Hukumat. This administration system has always sacrificed regional interests in favor of the industry concerned, and continues to do so while weak local authorities stand and watch. Conflicts of interests could be reconciled, and ideal solu- tions for regional development could only be found if locals authorities had more power. The standoff between ministries and Hukumats in economic matters has been reconciled to an extent by the Local Government Au- thority Act of Tajikistan. However, the law is frequently ignored, entailing two sets of consequences: 1. When spending appropriations are made in the national budget, a re- gion may receive a larger or smaller amount of funds irrespective of its contribution to government revenue. Misinterpretation of this practice, perceived as unfair distribution of government funds, may cause an adverse social reaction. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 79 79 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2. As the democratic process gains momentum, the remit of local self- government is broadened, and the competence and responsibility of lo- cal authorities rises as they increas- ingly perceive themselves as own- ers of their land, and patriotic senti- ment is fostered in local communi- ties. Research results indicate an impera- tive need for new, better laws on local state bodies and local self-gov- ernment that would ensure decen- tralized economic administration. Decentralization must secure the pro- tection of local interests, rising social awareness in local communities, and relocation of local area-focused de- cision-making centers to the bottom administrative level (village Jamoats and Mahalla Councils). The bottom- level governmental body is the city or district Hukumat, which manages the local budget, communal proper- ty, and utilities, and administers local logistical, social, cultural, environmen- tal, and other matters according to the powers vested in the Hukumats by law. The Graph in Figure 1 (see attached) shows how powers are divided be- tween the center and the regions in the existing scheme of economic administration. Notes to the Graph showing the existing regional economic ad- ministration system: 1. The ministries used as an example represent major industries producing around 90% of Sogd’s GRP. 2. In the existing regional administra- tion system, the vital role is reserved for regional agencies managing spe- cific branches of industry and agri- culture, established as the local body of the relevant ministry through which the ministry implements its technological and investment policy, awards government contracts, co- ordinates the international business of affiliated enterprises, secures credit facilities and issues guarantees, etc. 3. Regional, municipal, and district Hukumats are vested with the pow- er to implement central government policies and edicts. Special units called “Industry Committees” (for industry) or “Departments” (for agriculture), which are part of the Hukumats, make sure the Hukumats perform this duty, as well as carry out steps to improve and develop production, protect the environment, and secure regional interests. 4. In this parallel administration sys- tem, many identical duties are per- formed by both regional agencies of the ministry, and local Hukumat agen- cies. Sometimes government deci- sions are misinterpreted or distorted as they travel from top to bottom, and the decisions fail to work prop- erly. Both the ministries and the Hu- kumats sometimes abuse their pow- ers, resulting in general administra- tive inefficiencies. 5. There is a missing link in this eco- nomic administration chain: local self- government authorities: Mahalla Councils in cities and towns, and vil- lage Jamoats. Government decisions sent to affili- ated enterprises via the relevant min- istry or Hukumat committee never reach the Jamoat or Mahalla Council on whose territory the enterprise operates. 6.2 The Role of Jamoats in the Regional Economy Under the Constitution of indepen- dent Tajikistan, Jamoats are repre- sentative local authorities in small towns and villages. Jamoats were formed to replace village councils pursuant to the Tajik law On Self- Government Authorities in Rural Communities, passed on December 1, 1994. As of the beginning of 2003, there were 20 small-town Jamoats and 93 rural Jamoats in the Sogd Region. The town of Kairakkum has the largest number of small-town Jamoats: 6; the Matcha and Zafarabad Districts have 3 each; Isfara has 2; the town of Chkalovsk, as well as Aina, Asht, Gancha, Jabbor-Rasoul, and Spita- men Districts have one Jamoat each. The Penjikent District has 14 village ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 80 80 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Jamoats; Hojent has 11; Istaravshan, 10; Isfara, 9; Asht, 8; Aina and Gan- cha, 7 each; Kanibadam and Spita- men, 6 each; Jabbor-Rasoul, 5; Matcha, 4; and Shahristan, Zafara- bad, and Gornaya Matcha have 2 Jamoats each. The average population within a sin- gle Jamoat jurisdiction varies from 5,300 in the Isfara District and 8,100 in Gornaya Matcha to 20,500 in the Kanibadam District and 22,200 in the Hojent District. The seven districts have an average population figure of between 11,000 and 15,000 per Jamoat. The Jamoats as local self-government authorities, have the following duties: to debate and pass Jamoat activity plans and budgets to fund the activities necessary to ensure the normal liveli- hood of homesteads within the Jamoat jurisdiction; to create favorable condi- tions for the start of new small businesses, cooperatives, workshops, and other busi- ness entities needed to sup- ply the local market with de- sired goods and services; to raise funds from home- steads, local businesses and organizations irrespective of ownership (with their consent) as contributions towards so- cial infrastructure improve- ments within the Jamoat ter- ritory; other duties typically per- formed by local self-govern- ment authorities. Conclusions: To be able to perform all the duties in their charge, Jamoats need more funding than they cur- rently have, divorced as they are from the regional economic system. Consequently, further drive towards greater decentralization of econom- ic administration will be associated with the need to admit the Jamoats as an integral part of the system in the capacity of bottom-level gov- ernment authorities operating onsite. 1. Annual Report of the Republic of Tajikistan. Dushanbe, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002 2. International Economic Ties of the Republic of Tajikistan in 2001. Dush- anbe 3. Regions of Tajikistan in 2001. Dus- hanbe 4. Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Sogd Region. Hujand, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 ....................................................................................................................................... References 5. Industrial Output of the Sogd Re- gion in Natural Volume by District. Annual bulletin 6. CIS Economy: 10 Years of Re- forms and Integration-Based Devel- opment. Moscow, 2001 7. Socioeconomic Development Pro- gram for the Sogd Region, 2001- 2005. Hujand, 2001 8. 1999 Report on Human Resourc- es Development in Tajikistan. Dush- anbe, 2000 9. Granberg, A.G. Fundamentals of Regional Economics. Moscow, 2001 10. The Economy of Tajikistan: Growth Strategies. Issue #2, 2000, and #1, 2001 11. Findings of the research conduct- ed by the author between 1996 and 2003. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 81 81 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... VII. Attachments: tables, graphs, maps, and charts Annex 1 Sogd’s Gross Regional Product and its Structure by Industry. * .ã 7 8 9 1 * .ã 7 8 9 1 * .ã 7 8 9 1 * .ã 7 8 9 1 * .ã 7 8 9 1 ) * .ã 0 9 9 1 * .ã 0 9 9 1 * .ã 0 9 9 1 * .ã 0 9 9 1 * .ã 0 9 9 1 ) * * .ã 6 9 9 1 * * .ã 6 9 9 1 * * .ã 6 9 9 1 * * .ã 6 9 9 1 * * .ã 6 9 9 1 ) * * .ã 9 9 9 1 * * .ã 9 9 9 1 * * .ã 9 9 9 1 * * .ã 9 9 9 1 * * .ã 9 9 9 1 ) * * .ã 0 0 0 2 * * .ã 0 0 0 2 * * .ã 0 0 0 2 * * .ã 0 0 0 2 * * .ã 0 0 0 2 ) * * .ã 1 0 0 2 * * .ã 1 0 0 2 * * .ã 1 0 0 2 * * .ã 1 0 0 2 * * .ã 1 0 0 2 ) * * .ã 2 0 0 2 * * .ã 2 0 0 2 * * .ã 2 0 0 2 * * .ã 2 0 0 2 * * .ã 2 0 0 2 ) l b R l b R l b R l b R l b R m m % l b R l b R l b R l b R l b R m m % m Mm Mm Mm Mm M i n o m o s % m Mm Mm Mm Mm M - o m o s i n % m Mm Mm Mm Mm M i n o m o s % m Mm Mm Mm Mm M - o m o s i n % m Mm Mm Mm Mm M i n o m o s % : g ni d ulc ni ,la t o T 0 8 6 2 0 0 1 5 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 1 5 1 4 0 0 1 7 8 4 0 0 1 0 1 9 0 0 1 6 1 0 1 0 0 1 g nir u t c a f u n a M 5 3 7 1 7 . 4 6 0 2 9 1 6 . 3 6 6 4 8 . 4 1 2 9 1 0 . 6 4 8 0 2 7 . 2 4 5 8 3 3 . 2 4 6 1 4 9 . 0 4 e r u tlu cir g A 2 0 5 7 . 8 1 2 4 5 0 . 8 1 2 0 2 0 . 5 6 8 9 1 8 . 7 4 7 2 2 6 . 6 4 6 4 4 9 . 8 4 4 9 4 6 . 8 4 n oit c u rts n o C 3 7 1 4 . 6 3 8 1 1 . 6 8 1 8 . 5 4 0 . 1 1 2 3 . 4 4 2 6 . 2 9 2 7 . 2 s e civ r e s laic r e m m o C 8 9 7 . 3 8 4 1 9 . 4 3 1 2 . 4 7 9 . 1 6 1 2 . 3 4 3 8 . 3 3 5 2 . 5 d o o f d n a lia t e R s e civ r e s e g a r e v e b & 5 2 1 7 . 4 2 6 1 4 . 5 0 2 4 . 6 0 1 4 . 2 1 1 3 . 2 2 1 3 . 1 4 1 4 . 1 s eirts u d ni r e h t O 7 4 8 . 1 0 6 0 . 2 2 1 8 . 3 4 9 . 0 4 9 . 0 9 1 . 1 1 1 2 . 1 x) 1987 and 1990 GRP is shown in Soviet rubles xx) Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Republic of Tajikistan. 2002, pages 11-16; Annual Bulletin of the Sogd Region. 2001, pages 6 & 7. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 82 82 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 48,6 2,7 5,2 1,4 1,2 40,9 69,6 18 6,1 4,9 5,4 2 Graph 1: Sogd GRP by Industry (%) Manufacturing Construction Retail and food & beverage services Agriculture Commercial services Other industries TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Graph 2 Consumer Market Segments for Domestic and Imported Commodities in the Sogd Region Non-food market Consumer market Food market - Domestic goods - Imports 32,3% 17% 68,7% 83% 74,3% 25,7% Page 83 83 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 47.7 48.3 1.2 2.8 6,4 8,2 2,7 82,7 3.6 2.3 4.9 89.2 1990 1996 Graph 4: Percentage Shares of Ownership Formats in Aggregate Turnover (%) 2002 State-run outlets Cooperative outlets ‘Commercial’ outlets ‘Unorganized’ markets ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Graph 3: Industrial Output by Ownership Format 2002 81,6 7,9 4,8 0,8 4,9 32.9 15,9 40,2 0,4 10,6 69,9 5,6 9,5 2,8 13,2 21,5 17,3 14,8 1,1 45,3 1996 2002 1996 (%) Joint ventures Collective Joint stock compames Private Public Page 84 84 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 18.2 10.5 4.4 10.7 20.2 1.8 2.4 2.5 15.9 13.4 16.8 5.5 13.6 7.1 22.6 4.9 2.2 3.7 4.4 19.2 Graph 5: Domestic Food Market Segments in the Sogd Region (%) Meat and sausage products Milk, eggs, cheese, fats, vegetable oil, sugar, and sugar products Flour, cereals, baked products Potatoes Vegetables Fruits, grapes and other Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages Other 47.7 6.9 16.5 4.1 6.1 1.4 3.1 1.5 0.5 12.2 39.7 2.4 17.3 3.7 2.6 3.7 1.9 2 2 24.7 Graph 6: Non-Food Market Segments in the Sogd Region (%) 1990 2002 Oil products Jewelry Tobacco products Medical supplies Other Clothing and footwear Perfumes and toiletries Furniture and household supplies Construction supplies Automobiles TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 85 85 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Fig. 1 Existing Administration System in Industry and Agriculture Government of Tajikistan Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 1 Decision 1 Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 2 Decision 2 Ministry of the Industry Concerned Sogd Regional Hukumat Industrial Committee Agricultural Committee Ministry of the Agricultural Branch Concerned Regional Industrial Agency Regional Agricultural Agency City Hukumat Industry Department District Hukumat Agriculture Department Enterprises State-run, private, collective, joint stock, etc. Municipal Mahalla Councils Agricultural Section Small-Town Jamoats Village Jamoats Enterprises Kolkhoz, sovkhoz, private farms, etc. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE Page 86 86 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Regionalism and its perception by major political and social powers of Tajikistan. ....................................................................................................................................... Saodat Olimova, «Shark» center Introduction This document is a final report aiming at studying the regionalism phenom- enon in the Republic of Tajikistan. The goal of the study was to shape re- gionalism as a social factor, its mech- anisms of replication, structure and factors rationalizing its viability in Tajik society, as well as the vision of re- gionalism by various social and polit- ical groupings of the society. One of the main research objectives was to map all possible ways to mitigate this problem in the country. The empirical base of the research is based on the progress of work of two focus groups and focused inter- views (N = 20). The respondents of each group were preliminary select- ed from elite layers of Tajikistan, i.e. parliament members, political lead- ers, supreme government (ministers, vice-ministers, heads of governmen- tal agencies and President Office), as well as well-known journalists and academicians (historians, ethnologists and conflictologists). A number of interviews were conducted in Qa- bodiyon, Khatlon, Shughnon, Isfara and Sughd regions. Some material from previous public opinion inter- views by «Shark» center in 1996- 2002 was applied as well. In August 2002, under the research framework another two focus group discussions were held in Dushanbe. Focus groups consisted of ten people, each of which were represented by the fol- lowing categories: Young men - students of the Tajik National University, 20- 24 years old. Young women - students of the Russian-Tajik Slavonic Uni- versity, 18-22 years old. Shaping of the problem of regionalism. How political and social powers define regionalism? Our research has confirmed that the majority of interviewees believe that regionalism is a significant problem in political, social, economic and cultur- al life of Tajikistan. The research shows that opinions on this issue are rather dissimilar. However, general- ly, regionalism can be divided into two major factors: a) Abrasive relationship between ethno-regional groups b) Abrasive interrelation between center and regions. Regionalism as an interrelation of ethno-regional groups. The dominant number of respondents considers regionalism from the per- spective of ethno-regional groups. Quote. Region - it is principally an ethno-regional group that in- habits one region and its repre- sentatives living in other regions than the territory of their origin. Unquote. (Political party leader). The ethno-regional groups may be described as communities or group- ings originating from the same place and united by a common dialect or sometimes language (i.e. inhabitants of Shughnon, Rushan and etc.) and common identity. Answer of young men - Quote. Re- gionalism - is a compartition of people of one nation by regions and separate groupings. For ex- ample, we are Tajiks and live in one country, but are still divided into regions, like, Pomiri, Kulo- bi, etc. Unquote. All respondents admitted that Tajiks practice a sustainable self-identity by regions of origin and geographic frames of regions and its people are different. Inside every large region, TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 87 87 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... like: northern Tajikistan, Kulob, Qur- gon-Teppa, Karategin valley, Hissor valley, the latter often called Dush- anbe and suburbs, and finally Bada- khshon there are many small valleys, oases and districts. Thereafter, in accordance with their place of birth and regional origin respondents dis- tinguish small communities in their own region and much larger regions in the areas far from their own territory. For instance, people from the north of Tajikistan differentiate the regions of Tajikistan as follows: Khujand, Uro- Teppa, Zarafshon, Isfara, Maschoh (all of them are north Tajikistan), then goes Kulob, Dushanbe and Badakhs- hon. Kulobi respondents listed sepa- rately Khovaling, Baljuvon, Dangha- ra, Kulob, but the northern part was named as one, integrated region. The research has shown that people have no relevant perception of regions that could be accepted by all ethno- regional groups. Many adult respon- dents were proposing to consider districts as regions. In principal, original Tajiks represent a conglomerate of large and small ethno-regional groups of manifold origin. Herein, the ethnic identity of the older population is almost unrec- ognizable, therefore Uzbeks, Tajiks and other nations living in Kulob call themselves Kulobi and correspond- ingly Tajiks, Uzbeks, Arabs and Turk- mens that live in Qabodiyon call themselves Qabodiyoni. Answer of young men - Quote. Be- ing overseas we are proud of our united nation. Upon return to Tajikistan we immediately split into regions, upon return to districts we split into villages. Even in vil- lages we try to split into streets. Unquote. Usually, the self-identification of orig- inal people of Tajikistan has a com- plex nature. For example, in Porsh- nyov village of Shughnon (GBAO) people distinguish themselves by their mother village i.e., Tishori, Pa- shori, Midenshori, etc. At Khorog level they call themselves Porshin- yovi, meantime, further out they prefer to call themselves Shughnoni. Finally in Dushanbe they are Pomiri. Out of Tajikistan they are comfort- able to be Tajiks in accordance with passport. This is true for all Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups populating Tajikistan, including so called intelli- gentsia. Answer of young men - Quote. Re- gionalism is a compartition by re- gions, districts and even villages. One would support his mother- land and its people. Unquote. As per National Poll of Public Opin- ion IFES - 96, in Tajikistan 64% of respondents account themselves Tajik, 22% - Uzbek, 5% - Russian, 2.5% - Khujandi and 2.5% Pomiri, 1% each - Kulobi and Qurghon-Tep- pagi and the rest 3% - others. Obviously, despite the fact that all nations of Tajikistan have a good sense of ethnic origin more then 6% of respondents, Tajiks or Uzbeks defined their nation by regional origin. In January 1999, the same question was asked during the Public opinion review. 64% of Dushanbe dwellers accounted themselves Tajik, 2.6% were called Kulobi and Leninoboti (Sughdi), 1.3% - Karategini and 1.7% Pomiri. Thus, about 8% of adults (18 and older) of Dushanbe are ignoring their ethnic identity and determine themselves by regional nationality. REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 88 88 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Table 1. National composition of Dushanbe population. y til a n o it a N y til a n o it a N y til a n o it a N y til a n o it a N y til a n o it a N e g a t n e c r e P e g a t n e c r e P e g a t n e c r e P e g a t n e c r e P e g a t n e c r e P kija T - 1 % 8 . 3 6 ) k e b z U - 2 % 8 . 8 n ais s u R - 3 % 1 . 3 1 i b olu K - 4 % 6 . 2 it o b o nin e L - 5 % 4 . 2 i d n aju h K - 6 % 2 . 0 ini g e t a r a K - 7 % 3 . 1 iri m o P - 8 % 7 . 1 r e h t O - 9 % 0 . 6 r e h t O - 9 % 0 0 1 Source: Report on Public Opinion Review of Dushanbe electorate, «Shark» center, Dushanbe, 1999. Evaluation of the degree of impor- tance of self-identification is a way to complexity. Thus, in 1999 ethnic- ity (nationality) was important only for 34.3% of respondents, but 12.6% of respondents considered regional nationality as a most impor- tant factor. In this regard, one can state that regional identity is a signif- icant element of identity for the Tajik population. A somewhat different self-identifica- tion style is accustomed by youth. For them ethnicity is a key factor. Young people deny regional identi- ty, calling it an engine of civil war. Quote. Adults do not understand the difference between regional- ism and nationalism. The war was inevitable since our people could not distinguish and differentiate regionalism from nationalism. Our country had to suffer social and economic losses. Unquote. (Young men). Quote. For us, young women and future mothers it is highly impor- tant to get married. Today it is a hard job. If a girl will select a hus- band from another district, her parents will be against it. This problem is very frequent. Un- quote. (Young women). Regionalism is more about interrela- tion of ethnic groups, than its natural existence. Quote. Regionalism is a compe- tition and confrontation of local societies. Unquote. (Parliament member). Quote. «The case when regional interests are above national is called regionalism. No matter where one works he/she thinks not about public and state inter- ests or at least organization, but about their ethno-regional groups. Regionalism is a compe- tition and confrontation of re- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 89 89 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... gions. Inside each region the sit- uation is unchanged - districts, villages, mahallas. We do not have a formed sense of single nation and national consolidation. We do not think on national, but on local level». Unquote. (Scien- tist/Conflictologist). Unclear perception of regions goes well with manifold senses and defini- tions of regionalism. Research shows that perception of regionalism most- ly depends on social status and posi- tion of the respondent. Governmental and managerial per- sonnel and political leaders are posi- tive that regionalism is a system for organization and realization of pow- er in Tajikistan. As per research, the major elements of this system are as follows: 1. Socio-political structure of Tajiki- stan’s society forms a conglomerate of ethno-regional groups, structured in hierarchy, which elements repre- sent dynamic equilibrium. It creates a constant competition and opposi- tion between groups, resulting in sup- port of balance among regional forc- es. Misbalance of which induces large shocks in the political life of Tajikistan sometimes wrapped up by military acts. Quote. Competition and opposi- tion of regions is well spread in many aspects of our life. For in- stance, in Sughd province Khu- jand and Uro-Teppa experience continuous opposition. Whereas, in Khatlon province the dominant power is held by Baljuvoni peo- ple. Currently, Kulob is affront- ed; in the past Danghara was a sort of rimland under Kulob’s um- brella. Meantime, other small «counties» like Muminobod, Shuroobod, etc. are hurt as well. Unquote. (Political party mem- ber). The features of traditional society are very strong in the political life of Tajiki- stan. As an individual in Tajikistan one can be independent in private or spir- itual life, but must be completely and always a part of his/her community, which in turn is a part of some eth- no-regional group. Here, a person is not just a citizen with his/her rights and responsibilities; he/she is an in- tegral member of some community. Consequently, every political opin- ion belongs to one’s ethno-regional group. They become some social organisms of the political scene of Tajikistan lead by regional elite rep- resentatives, sometimes named as clans by our respondents. Quote. - Regionalism is a collective name for organization of local clans and its elite in charge of some territo- ry, its life and problems, protec- tion of its interests through pro- motion and placement of its rep- resentatives in governmental structures. - Clan usually means a successful take-over of power and influence by people of one territory. Un- quote. (One of PIRT leaders). 2. Clans do base on territorial unity, but do not form it. Clan’s nationality does not dictate the dwelling-place. That is why very often, local com- munities are heterogeneous. It is also normal to identify the regional na- tionality of immigrants of third gen- eration (likewise, Buhori, Farghoni, Samarqandi, Khujandi and other eth- no-groups of Dushanbe). One clan or coalition of relative clans under the umbrella of a hierarchal and well-or- ganized clan scheme leads the polit- ical life of country, region, and dis- trict. This principle is practiced both at central and local level, such as ja- moats. Quote. Governance of clan is subject to promotion and place- ment of its representatives. Un- quote. (Leader of political par- ty). 3. Recruitment of elite (political, eco- nomic, military and intellectual) is done by regional indication at every level. This is true both for regional and cen- tral governmental elite. Quote. Every chief is trying to fill in vacancies with the thankful and trustful: a) relatives, and b) coun- REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 90 90 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... trymen, that will guarantee his/ her future support. Unquote. (Se- nior Ministry staff). 4. Clans or elites, both central and regional, are defended by their own ethno-regional groups through the elite and non-elite ethno-regional re- cruitment system, practiced in all or- ganizations, institutions, enterprises, private companies, etc. As a result we build a very common Eastern scenario, where every eth- no-regional group or sub-ethnos oc- cupy their own niche in the coun- try’s economy and policy. This sys- tem was gradually demolished dur- ing the Soviet era. But the Soviet mechanism was collapsed as a result of the break in of a new govern- mental elite, when due to civil war the positions of all clans and ethno- regional groups were changed. Cur- rently, taking into account a new re- cruitment scheme based on an eth- no-regional basis, this system is com- ing back, but often with new ethno- regional groups in power. For in- stance, before the fiscal system was in the hands of Sughdi and Gharmi people, today, it is in hands of Kulo- bi people. 5. The governing group of clans holds the central power in its hands, meaning governmental ministries and agencies. An integral part of their governance is the control and regu- lation of customs and tax systems and correspondingly the control of the business sector. However, the key instruments of governance are the legal system and military forces. That is why the law enforcement structures and its commanding elite are being fully recruited by the gov- erning ethno-regional group. Obvi- ously, the commanders of military units are closely related to the cen- tral government, moreover, they represent the same ethno-regional group. Quote. I do not know how to de- scribe upcoming presidential elections. Change of high gov- ernmental officials is not possible unless the commanders cease to serve the private interests of some individuals. Unquote. (President office staff). The role of law enforcement bodies becomes highly important because: the central Government elite is try- ing to monopolize the power and the regions are trying to promote and place more of their own representa- tives. Herein, as far as the region, it is harder to bring it under control. Here are some tools to cope with this problem: a) location of militia in more or less independent regions, for example, in Sughd province ev- ery district center has its own militia unit; b) President is practicing an as- signment and full control of his en- voys in regions. Fast reshuffle of re- gional chiefs (heads of local admin- istrative units) is practiced to em- power this system. Quote. Regions do not influence the governance of the country. Today, the governing south is pulling itself together to prevent the north coming into power, constantly reshuffling the Heads of Sughd province. It is obviously unfair and creates natural oppo- sition in the province. Taking into account that Sughd province is the biggest one and contributes the biggest share of GDP and state income. Unquote. (Party member). Establishment of a «governmental party» - The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) is lead by the ruling ethno-regional group. This party is uniting the chiefs of ministries and governmental agencies all over the country; meantime the lowest units of this party are established in every governmental agency, organization and even companies and their chiefs automatically lead this lowest party unit. Quote. Why is the PDPT allowed to create units in organizations and enterprises automatically leading them, while we, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, do not have this right? Unquote. (Party member). Use of ideology - promotion of «Vahdat» governmental ideology TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 91 91 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... based on ethno-nationalism. In accor- dance with the laws adopted after independence one ideology cannot dominate in Tajikistan and pluralism should be a core principle of politi- cal, cultural, and socio-economic life of the country. Despite this, the leader of the state in his speeches and books («Tajiks in the Mirror of History», by E. Rahmonov), as well as other governmental officials in their statements and mottos in press clear- ly say otherwise about the new ide- ology called «Vahdat» (translated as the Accord). The key rationale of this ideology is the declaration of accord and solidarity of ethnic Tajiks despite the differences in political views, so- cial and cultural statuses. The key idea of this accord is the ethnic commun- ion and the role of ethnic ancestor of all Tajiks is given to the ruling eth- nic group. The research works of contemporary Tajik historians and publicists form a new political my- thology where “genuine” Tajiks are represented by the ruling Kulobi eth- no-group, which find their roots back in ancient Bactria and became a lin- eal descendant of Arians. Nationalism in post-Soviet Tajikistan enjoyed a fast development not only in respect of the need to retrieve some new foundations for national statehood, but also as a new meth- od of collective survival in the transi- tion period. Nationalism is replicat- ing the principles of geographic con- trol by “blood relatives”. Underde- velopment of individual conscious is fueling nationalism, which becomes a collective-defensive tool against the realities of open market. This re- quires higher mobility and individual freedom. Use of supplementary control in- struments. For example, cotton mafia is headed by a coalition of governing ethno-regional groups - Kulobi and Hissori control the pro- duction and processing of cotton, owning most cotton refineries: ac- cording to regulatory and law papers agricultural producers are attached to cotton refineries and have no right to independently sell cotton. Quote. The Center’s logo is «Plant the cotton, die, but plant it». Futures contracts are stran- gling us. For three years we have not been paid for produced cot- ton. We cannot fight with them taking into account that they are relatives of high officials. We can’t sell our cotton due to pro- hibition. But, we need to survive. We can do nothing and live our days in slavery. Unquote. (Chief of farm of Khatlon province). Stage II Journalists and scientists have a con- trasting perception of regionalism. It seems that they feel regionalism and realize its consequence, but cannot reveal the acting mechanism of re- gionalism. They pay more attention to cultural diversity of regions of Tajikistan. This makes a big difference between humanitarian intelligentsia from politicians and administrators, which fully denies the existence of substantial difference in culture, tra- ditions and customs and dialects among all ethno-regional groups. Moreover, governors and politicians believe that different levels of de- velopment of every region condi- tion the existent dissimilarity. Quote. There are no big dissimi- larities in the types of cultures of Tajiks. There is a difference at the cultural level. Consideration of distinct regions of Khatlon will show that poor, undeveloped Muminoboti people will look like representatives of some other culture in comparison with rich and modern Khujandi. In reality, they are quite similar; it is more about low income and opportu- nities. That is it. Unquote. (Par- liament member). People of culture, science and jour- nalism decidedly deny this point of view. They think that ethno-regional groups have their own culture and psycho-type. Quote: Provincial people are dif- ferent. Diverse culture, dialect, music, customs and traditions and finally, mentality. Gharmi were REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 92 92 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... always diligent and initiative. Ku- lobi - open and simple, but quite lazy and inactive. Sughdi hate to host guests. Southern Tajiks are very hospitable. North loves «shashmaqom» (classic Tajik mu- sic). Southern people have no sense of it and sing their own «falak» (type of traditional vocal music). Kulobi women love red dresses and in the North wear green and purple colors. Still, we are so different. Unquote. (Jour- nalist). Perception of regionalism through the eyes of young generation. The young generation also binds re- gionalism with ethno-regional groups, which they think, occupy one territory, have their own culture, tra- ditions and customs and dialect. Girls were more active in this issue: Quote. - Regionalism is a presence of well-determined territories occu- pied by people united by their own customs and traditions. - Regionalism is distinguished by the dialect. - Regionalism distinguishes peo- ple by their territory, customs and traditions. Unquote. Young men (more than women) were putting more emphasis on the importance of regional solidarity and the sense of regional patriotism in their life. Quote. Regionalism is a protec- tion of place of birth and honor of each human being. Unquote. (Young men). Both men and women consider re- gionalism a normal thing. Regional solidarity is a natural sense, to be owned by every person. Quote. I want to describe some human attitude. For example, the chairman of some enterprise and you are from same region. If you ask for help he must support you. This is an advantage. To my opin- ion, regionalism is a natural feel- ing for every human being. Un- quote. (Young men). The work of the focus-group discus- sions attests that for the young gen- eration regionalism is a norm of life to be faced countrywide. Quote. At a University test a Pro- fessor will inquire about your re- gional nationality before making final mark, an overestimation will be natural if you are both from one region. Unquote. (Young man). Our study testified that civil war caused internal consolidation of eth- no-regional groups in areas inhabited by various regional nationalities; new, closed ethno-regional communities with their housing blocks, mosques, schools or school classes. Quote: Before placing their chil- dren to school class many par- ents inquire about the teacher’s «regionality». Mothers do not want to place their children at classes where the teacher is from some other region. Anyhow, if parents are from Sughd province they are trying to find their coun- trymen, parents from Kulob will try to select a teacher from Ku- lob. Teachers show different atti- tudes towards their people. Thereby, adults initially oppose children. Before the war, parents were looking for professional teachers, but now for relatives or countrymen. Unquote. (Young women). More often regionalism is seen when looking for a job. In parallel, with massive unemployment, people have to face supplementary obsta- cles set by institutions based on their internal environment. As per our re- spondents, one of the most impor- tant factors in getting a job is to have relatives or good friends (from same area). The traditional structure of Tajik soci- ety has a distinctive style of employ- ment. Until today, Tajik employers preferred to base on old, but very strong relative, matrilineal ties (here TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 93 93 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... called «avlod» - clan) when making decisions of employment. A nation- al poll held by the International Foun- dation for Election Systems in 1996 reported that 68.3% of Tajiks con- sider themselves a part of some clan (avlod). A consolidated number of avlods had predecessors buried at the home territory of the mother from one ethno-regional group. Strong family and regional ties and mutual support make it easier to find a job for low class members of local groups. Quote. Any governmental official prefers to build a team of trust- worthy people from his own re- gion. For instance, if I was ap- pointed as the Chairman of Khu- kumat I would also build my team on an ethno-regional basis. This helps at work. I can punish and encourage him/her and give any task and be sure that it will be executed anyway. Unquote. (Young women). Another traditional element of re- gionalism is patronage. This style of relations in modern Tajik city substan- tially affects professional mobility and predetermines the future of the young generation of Tajikistan. Quote. I cannot explain to you or express myself, but everyone has a «ceiling». Unquote. (Young men). Young men more than women be- lieve that regionalism means compe- tition and rivalry. Quote. Tajiks are separated in regions consisting of 100-200 areas. Every region is competing with other regions. Each region is dissatisfied and annoyed with another region. «What are they thinking of themselves? They pretend that power is in their hands?» they say. One region is blaming and abusing another region, more and more detaching each other. Unquote. (Young men). The young generation points to the relation between regionalism and the political formation of Tajik society. It is obviously felt that there is a con- tinuous conflict of regional elites re- sulting in the balance of elite groups. Youngsters understand that each group is holding its own niche in a clan pyramid and that there is a rul- ing regional group, which regulates other regions and the country in gen- eral. Quote. Regionalism - creation of special conditions and environ- ment, so as to let people of one region take advantage of other regions. Unquote. (Young wom- en). Regional solidarity moderates the creation of closed juvenile regional groupings taking into account that young people are more inclined to fall into groups. Respondents say that in the student environment there is continuous opposition between men of different regions. Often this op- position leads to physical fights be- tween youth groupings of different regional nationalities. The engine of regionalism. Almost all respondents expressed an opinion that regionalism is being sup- ported by the Government at ev- ery level. After the collapse of the Soviet Union regionalism became an instrument of governance. Quote: Regionalism is surging at governmental level. At low levels there is no acute sense of region- alism. The higher the level of Government the stronger the re- gional ties and regional solidari- ty. Unquote. (Scientist/Conflic- tologist). Talking about regionalism, one should mention that regional ancestry is not the only way of getting into the rul- ing elite. There is a quota system of regional representation of every re- gion in the government. This system was partially used in the Soviet era. Name quoting was implemented through a system of personnel ap- pointments in state and party agen- cies by ethnic-regional representa- tion. Therewith, from 1930 until 1992, the Government of Tajikistan was ruled by representatives of the REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 94 94 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... former Leninibod region (now Sughd), and Russians. The second- ary posts were occupied by Samar- qandi, Buhori and by the inhabitants of other regions of Tajikistan. For instance, from 1930 until the collapse of the USSR the Heads of Commu- nist Parties were: B. Ghafurov, T. Uljaboev, J. Rasulov, R. Nabiev and K. Makhkamov. All of them are from the Leninibod region. At city and dis- trict levels the first secretaries of the Communist Party’s Committees were Leninobodi Tajiks, second sec- retaries - Russians and third secretar- ies again Leninobodi Tajiks and sel- dom others. The Heads of Supreme Council (Par- liament) starting from 1920 were usually the representatives of Gharm region (Karategin valley) or GBAO (for i.e. Nusratullo Mahsum from Gharm, Shirinsho Shotemur from GBAO, Sh. Shogadoev from Garm, N. Dodhudoev from GBAO, Rahma- tov from Gharm, M. Holov from Gharm and G. Pallaev from GBAO. The Heads of Government were al- ways Leninobodi Tajiks, except for two cases: in 1950-60s N. Dodhu- doev from GBAO was the Head of the Council of Ministers and at the end of the 1980s, Mirzoev from Kulob became the Head of the Coun- cil of Ministers. Ministry of Interior, KGB and Prose- cutor Office senior people were al- ways from Russia. The Komsomol Committee - first people were always from Leninobod and seldom from Kulob area. At the city and district administrations there was a rule: the chairman of a city or district must be from another district or region. For instance, for many years the Chairman of Isfara city was from Konibodom, and vice versa, however, there was an exception: the Head of Khujand was always from Khujand city itself. In Qurghon-Tep- pa, the major posts were taken by Gharmi and Leninobodi, in Kulob by Russians and Leninobodi. However, J. Rasulov, former Chair- man of Communist Party, changed this system. He abolished the mo- nopoly of Leninobodi’s rule in the government and started to recruit people from all ethno-regional groups. More and more often first secretaries of the Communist Party were represented by Gharmi, Hissori and less often by Kulobi. In accor- dance with regulations, the first sec- retary’s term of assignment was not more than two years, with some rare extensions. However, long-term pro- longations were not possible. This newly introduced system was hin- dering the formation of regional clans and groupings. The traditions of regional represen- tation remain at present, for exam- ple the Prime Minister is usually a representative of the economic elite of the most developed, industrial region of Sughd (Prime-ministers of Tajikistan after independence: A. Abdullojonov, J. Karimov, A. Sa- madov, Ya. Azimov, O. Oqilov), Speaker of the Lower chamber of Majlisi Oli (Parliament) S. Hairulloev is from Gharm (as it was in Soviet times the Head of Parliament is a representative of Gharm or GBAO. However, these are all vestiges of the old system of regional represen- tation in modern Tajikistan. However, as a rule the Prime Minis- ter should be the representative of the economic elite of the most de- veloped region - Sughd province. After seeing the CVs of governmen- tal officials it is clear that still there are free places and promotions due to advantageous marriages and mer- its earned by «outsiders» towards ruling ethno-regional elite. This fact is attested by the occasional promo- tion of officials from other ethno-re- gional groups. As said before, these people have family ties or some merits with ruling region. Many respondents stated that region- alism is almost unknown among farm- ers and workers of Tajikistan. Quote: Simple people do not need regionalism. It is for people that fight for high positions, in parallel using their regional or family ties. Unquote. (President office member). There was an opinion that the elite TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 95 95 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... often uses marginals and the under- class through their mobilization under regional solidarity logos. Quote. The source of regional- ism is the elite, supported and trusted by the social underclass of their region. In a positive out- come they will forget about re- gionalism. Unquote. (President office member). Regionalism was always an efficient instrument of political mobilization in Tajikistan. Political leaders firstly rely on their ethno-regional supporters. That is why any oppositional move- ment widely uses regionalism in its political aspirations and struggle. Officials noted that in Tajikistan re- gionalism is often a key instrument in cabinet and political games. Quote. Regionalism is a comfort- able instrument of governance and manipulation of people. Be- fore we also had limits of region- al representation, but today they carry slightly different functions, of which the biggest one is ma- nipulation of people and career intrigues. It is always simple to write off misperformance to the account of regionalism. Failures can be always explained by re- gional sabotage. Unquote. (Tax committee member). Young people have also stated that regionalism is fostered by elite. How- ever, a number of focus group mem- bers have mentioned that regional- ism is an integral of traditional politi- cal culture of the Tajik nation, inten- sively used by local elites after inde- pendence. Quote. Seems like regionalism is fostered by all people, but effi- ciently used by the Government for their own sake. The society itself created this system and the Government is successfully using it. The Government is regulating and directing the river flow. Here, people obey and follow seniors. Obviously, to live in the society and oppose the Government is hard, like swimming against the river flow. Unquote. (Young women). Moreover, youngsters accept that there are also «third players» in in- terregional games. Some of them suspected that external players are using regionalism to manage events in Tajikistan. Quote. We are not sure who is supporting and using regionalism in our country. Maybe it is some external power. Unquote. (Young women). The academic circles, particularly hu- manitarian intellectuals, stay some- what detached. They suspect that the moving forces of regionalism are some political movements that pro- mote separatist logos, as well as Is- lam propagandists, which are trying to use regionalism for their benefit. Some officials also acknowledged that Moslem clergy, particularly, Sufi Ishans foster regionalism. Since Ishans are an integral part of the regional elite all over Tajikistan and keep high positions they orderly support re- gional consciousness. Despite the declaration of Islamic integrity most political movements of the Islamic party of Tajikistan have apparent re- gional characters. Quote: Regionalism is stimulating both the ideological and the Is- lamic factor. Do not forget, that there is a large number of regional Islamic parties in Afghanistan. Unquote. (Scientist/Historian). Scientists assume that people with average education and low-income level, mostly villagers and farmers, are supporting regionalism. These are people with acute regional conscious- ness. State leaders, high governmental officials and a scientist/conflictologist, which participated in our poll, have emphasized that militarization is an influential strengthener of regionalism. This factor was not conspicuous for the society though. The Tajik militia represented by two opposing camps was formed on the base of partisan brigades and recruit- ment of combatants was based on family and regional background. As a result, right before the Peace REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 96 96 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Agreement of 1997, the Tajik army (both national and oppositional) was grounded on family and regional bri- gades. Currently, its commanders are trying their best to keep and fos- ter regional brigades. They under- stand that regional support is the guarantee of their power. Financial disability of Tajikistan makes regional support an advantageous and an es- sential factor to backup the combat- ivity of military brigades taking into account that regional elites and busi- nessmen render financial and in-kind assistance to «their» brigades. Quote. Militants are supporting regionalism, precisely, those combatants that came into pow- er during the war among regions. Its commanders are keeping the power only due to regional soli- darity and assistance. Unquote. (Scientist/Conflictologist). Regionalism incidence. Politics and governance. All respondents named power and state governance as the most ac- tive zone of regionalism. Quote. Regionalism is all about governance. Unquote. (President office member). Many people think that regionalism is an integrated part of the political process in general. Quote. - Tajik regionalism is most- ly conspicuous in the political process - in elections, personnel policy making, as well as allot- ment of zones of influence. (Po- litical party leader). - Regionalism is an ancient stone. It is usually related to politics and politicians. Unquote. (Young men). Economy. In the transition period, new collisions started to occur between politics and economy. The ability to convert ad- ministrative potential into financial capital in the period of state proper- ty re-allotment has created new motivations for empowerment of regionalism in Tajik society. Quote. Regionalism is more seen in governance, as well as in pres- tigious and rich organizations. In time of allotment of resources and control administrators are trying to build a team of «brothers». This manner was also used in the Sovi- et system, but that Government was trying to prevent regionalism and clanism. Today the situation has changed. Sughd province is out of power. Relatives and «brothers» of the President hold key positions - Kulobi. It is a root of regional nationality of our gov- ernment and state in general. Regionalism is less observed in small, low-income enterprises, where one can hardly get any- thing. Unquote. (Party member). Increase of the number of govern- mental officials of one ruling region is surging an opportunity to re-distrib- ute the state treasury during privati- zation, in parallel strengthening the capacity and power of their ethno- regional group. Quote. In our country being close to government means being by resources. Our business society is intermixed with politics; precise- ly it cannot survive without politi- cal «roofs». That is why an increase in the num- ber of «their people» in the gov- ernmental structures means an in- crease of access to the «privati- zation pie» by ruling ethno-re- gional group. Obviously, the elite takes the best products and sim- ple people are left with remain- ders. Unquote. (President Office member). The governmental leaders well real- ize all risks related to such regional privatization of state property, par- ticularly the risk of occupation of large industrial objects by ruling ethno-re- gional groups and the obvious surge of contradiction between regional elites. Quote. What are the parallels of privatization and democratization in our context? It is appropriation of former state property by pri- vate persons with an obvious TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 97 97 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... despoliation. It is quite unfair and dangerous. We are not like Rus- sia and we do not have their un- limited resources. We are con- strained in resources, economic potential and each industrial ob- ject is highly important for its own region. Unquote. (President Of- fice member). Concentration of power in the hands of a small number of top elite, which converts administrative resources into financial capital is provoking leaders of both central and regional elites to re-distribute power to their own hands. Meantime, regional elites are in charge of military brigades that could be used as an influential politi- cal instrument. So if, some regional elites, in control of substantial finan- cial, political and military capital are not happy with the apportionment of power they can gather a momen- tum and to try to turn the power to their own respect. Elections. Political parties. Some regional elites are using political parties as an instrument of struggle. All political parties of Tajikistan have regional background, sometimes open, like NDPT or a hiden one, like «Ittihod» and «Adolathoh». Others prefer to use ordinary nomenclature methods for getting the balance of political powers, such as political bar- gain and back-door negotiations, and of course powerful pressure. Quote. - Regionalism is strong in Parties. The Socialist Party of Tajikistan is supported by people of Aini, Penjikent, Uro-Teppa (the «Adolathoh» party - recently pro- hibited), Shahristan and Konibo- dom. The Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan is supported by Rasht valley, Kofarnihon and Qurghon- Teppa. More then others the Communist Party of Tajikistan is supported by GBAO, by some districts of Republican Subordi- nation and Sughd province. (Par- ty member). - All people are trying to vote for the person from their own re- gion. Of course, after selection, the People’s Deputy will help and support those people that gave their vote to him. Unquote. (Young men). Criminal sphere. Our research attested that regional- ism is widely used in the criminal world, including drug trafficking. The criminal groupings are formed on an ethno-regional basis. The solidarity of criminal groups is interrelated with regional loyalty; together they lay foundations for the establishment of criminal mafia clans. This is especially true in the drug business. There were a lot of cases when a drug dealer would involve his family, relatives and countrymen into drug trafficking. Thereby, such a drug trafficking group becomes a family business, which starts to use its “long hands” with family solidarity and loyalty. As an example, the clan of Cholov broth- ers, who used to be both the com- manders of the People’s Front bri- gades and later commanders of Governmental militaries (Qurbon Cholov, former commander of Bor- der Brigade of the Ministry of Secu- rity of Tajikistan) and strong narco- barons of Kulob. Regionalism is also well spread in the criminal economy. Since the major share of business is in the shadow economy, the crimi- nal circles are controlling business through the establishment of «roofs» based on regional character. Illicit Tajik business is also active out of Tajiki- stan. Quote. We have visited Moscow. Tajiks live there as well. On Cherkizovskiy market Tajiks also practice regionalism. Vanji, Ko- farnihoni and others - all of them work under their regional «roof». «Roof» here means protection of client. For example, if I am from «X» region, my countrymen will help me. I will have to pay money or to somehow reimburse it. Un- quote. (Young men). Regionalism grows roots for illicit fi- nancial organizations, which make remittances from and to Tajikistan. Usually, these organizations are work- ing without any guarantees and the main factor of credibility is clanship. REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 98 98 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Youth and regionalism. The survey confirmed that adults experience regionalism in politics and economy, namely, in power and dis- tribution of capital. Apparently, re- gionalism touches less in ordinary life, communication and culture. Howev- er, regionalism is penetrating into the lives of all young people. In ten years of reforms the power of regionalism substantially increased. Young peo- ple grow into adults, they socialize and observe regionalism every- where. They go to school and make friends by ethno-regional factors. The biggest affect of regionalism for youngsters is concentrated during education, employment and mar- riage. Education. Professional niches occupied by one or another regional groups, dictating them to select their occupation and form their life plans. Quote. Before entering the Uni- versity, we inquire about the Chancellor’s regional nationality or during semester exams we in- quire about Professor’s «region- ality». We are happy if the Pro- fessor is from our region. It means I can easily enter the University and pass all the exams. It is all in my pocket from now on. Always there is the chance to pass an exam for nothing. Because, they will assess your origin, but not your knowledge. Unquote. (Young women). Employment. Quote. - If you are from Kulob, doors are open everywhere. With wrong geography it is easy to find a hundred reasons not to employ you (Young women). - I was an accountant in one or- ganization for a year and there were no problems at all. In a year we got our new director from Kulob and after about a month he started personnel clearance. I was called to his office. «Where are you from?», he asked. «From Hissor», I replied. «Why couldn’t you find a job in Hissor? Go and work there», he finished. I was forced to resign. (Young wom- en). - That is a reality of Tajikistan. For instance, I have got an education and I want to work. «What is your region?» the first question of em- ployer. He will not evaluate your skills first. Unquote. (Young men). Entering marriage. Many ethno-regional groups of Tajiki- stan preserve ethnic monogamy. Besides, the status of ethno-regional groups in regional hierarchy depends on well-arranged marriages (the po- sition of marriage partner and mar- riage contract). In the Soviet period, these marriage traditions were grad- ually disappearing. At present, tradi- tional types of arranged marriages are being revived. Quote. - Nowadays parents look for regional marriages. For ex- ample, I want to take girl from another region. When I send my matchmaker to her house, her parents will refuse me taking into the account my originality. Bada- khshoni man will not marry Sugh- di woman, meantime Sughdi man cannot marry Khatloni woman. (Young men). - For instance, one guy fell in love with a girl, though he knew that she was from another region. He went to ask for her hand in mar- riage, but never got it. Her fa- ther never gave permission. This story happened in our region. (Young men) - We have a neighbor from Sughd province. She fell in love with a Kulobi guy. There were strong feelings on his side as well, but the girl’s parents do not want this wedding, because he is from Khatlon. They think that he will leave her anyway and marry a woman from his region. They have different traditions and that she will never be happy with him. Unquote. (Young men). TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 99 99 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Welfare and Social Services. The collapse of systems of social service, education, healthcare and social protection has made people reliant mainly on family, relatives and their ethno-regional groups. Quote. - Let’s say there is a fu- neral or a wedding, only coun- tryman will come to support it. Social backing from your own region is already a good thing. (Young men). - When I fall sick, the doctor will be from my region. He will charge less and treat better. Unquote. (Young men). Reasons of Regionalism All respondents thought that geo- graphical obstacles were the reasons for the formation of separate origi- nal regions in RT, (mountains, rivers, prairies, etc.). These marked off val- leys and oases from each other and facilitated the establishment of rela- tively isolated regions. Historic rationale: in the past many regions of Tajikistan were part of dif- ferent states. For example, Sughd province was a part of Bukhoro Emir- ate and Kukond Khanate. Small in- dependent counties inhabited south and central parts of Tajikistan, as well as GBAO. Only in the second half of the XVIII century did some of them join Bukhoro Emirate. Badakhshon counties were concurred by Afghan Emir - Abdurakhmon Khan and were passed to Russia as a result of the big Russian-British game in the Mid- dle East. Despite all concurs and con- stant feudal wars which were chang- ing the political map, during the cen- turies the administrative map stayed unchanged up to the invasion by Russian Empire. It testifies that re- gions remained pretty much the same for centuries, from time to time rejoining newly established countries as administrative-territorial units or independent countries. This fact is a big concern for a government that is trying to form one united state. Quote. The reason there is re- gionalism is due to the nonexist- ence of a unified state in the past. There is no one sense of common territory, no universal center. We do not have a base for consoli- dation and no national conscious- ness. Unquote. (President office member). A number of scientists and officials from the South of Tajikistan believe that regionalism is a part of Soviet power, which was governing the country through representatives of the North of Tajikistan. The elite from the North was used to control the whole country. Quote. During Soviet rule gover- nance was done by one region - Sughd province. Other regions were dissatisfied. This situation was decelerating national consolida- tion. Unquote. (Scientist/ Con- flictologist). This group also believes that region- alism is about unequal development of regions, especially in the econo- my. All respondents accept that region- alism has grown during the post-So- viet period. Quote. Because of Civil war, which was a conflict of regions for power. Unquote. (Parliament member). Apparently during inter-Tajik conflict shaded by ethno-regional measure- ments, we could observe a forma- tion of the most acute aggravation of conflict and post conflict period. The internal consolidation of ethno- regional groups has taken place. In 1997 one could see the obvious for- mation of sub-ethnic territories with their own system of governance, culture and economy. These territo- ries were inclined to self-isolation and inter-conflict. Disintegration was a real risk. This tendency was broken down by the Peace Agreement of June 27, 1997. Along with building peace, empowerment of nationhood and law and order the relations be- tween territories and regions be- came better. However, there were new factors that facilitated regional- ism in the political, economic, social REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 100 100 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... and cultural lives of Tajikistan. These are the major ones: State incapacity. All administrators agree that Tajik governance is very weak, quite un- regulated and uncontrolled; the state machine is ineffective and regional- ism has replaced it. Quote. There is no school of state service, no professional official- dom, no traditions of bureaucra- cy that are guarding state inter- ests, regardless of place of birth or family ties. Most Government officials do not know their terms of references, which is why they are often busy with private things. Unquote. (Member of President office). Some officials believe that state weaknesses are due to poor strate- gic planning, lack of common goals, unclear future and plans. The gover- nance is done inefficiently. Private needs and interests are put above public and in the context of Tajikistan these are also the interests of eth- no-regional groups. Quote. There is no common goal and strategic planning. Unquote. (Member of President’s office). In transition period the state started to forget about social services. To- day it renders only a small number of social services. Healthcare and education are not free anymore and social protection is almost nonexist- ent. Social incapacity of the govern- ment has weakened its performance. Clan interests are at the cutting edge. Ethno regional groups that support and protect their own members, making them more and more influ- ential, hold the social services. Quote. The reason for regional- ism is an unavailability of state thinking and security in future, people are not sure about their destiny. Unquote. (Member of the Ministry of Finance). Almost all respondents believe that the reason for regionalism are low culture and education of people and governmental officials. Quote: The reasons for regional- ism are: Low culture of administra- tion and culture in gener- al, as well as poor educa- tion of new administrators. (Party member) Poor education and un- awareness, especially po- litical and legal. Low ac- cess to information and in- capacity of intelligence. Unquote. (Member of President office). A number of interviews carried out in Isfara district among young entre- preneurs confirmed that the reason for regionalism is a current strict au- thoritarian regime, which is based on appointments rather than on free elections. This notion confirms that regional elite, which hold political power in central government, has the benefit of an absolute dominance in all spheres of life of the country, in- cluding the economy, defense and security. The ruling elite is not de- pendent on people due to their sys- tem of appointments to all official posts. As for elective posts, like the president, members of the lower chamber of the parliament and heads of local governments, the ruling elite has all the administrative tools for “arrangement” of elections, falsifica- tion, manipulations and pressure dur- ing the election period. That is why the ruling elite is making every ef- fort to hold the power in hand and not to let other ethno-regional groups have their share. The ruling regional elite gets the super price and tries its best to keep it. Personal loyalty to one ethno-regional group and eth- no-regional solidarity are the main instruments of management. Assessment of Regionalism by various social and age groups. The survey showed that evaluation of regionalism depends on a person’s ethno-origin and age. The represen- tatives of the ruling ethno-regional group believe that regionalism is sometimes useful. They say that re- gionalism is facilitating formation of TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 101 101 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... political clans that can guarantee ef- fective governance. Quote. Regionalism is empower- ing the social political system and development. Formation of new political clans is good and facili- tates sustainability of the society. Actually, regionalism is not an important political factor in Tajiki- stan. Unquote. (Member of Pres- ident office). Many respondents noted the posi- tive influence of local patriotism as a part of regionalism. Quote. The positive side of re- gionalism - people are conscious of their region, support it at their official positions. It is their small motherland. Unquote. (Member of President office). Almost all young people that partic- ipated in our research emphasized that regional solidarity gives them support and provides opportunities and resources in every life situation. They say that young people without their ethno-regional ties or people from weak and indistinct regions are almost deprived from their social re- sources. If they are intelligent and talented they are employed by an NGO that is less affected by region- alism than state organizations or busi- ness. Representatives of regional elites see regionalism as an opportu- nity to protect the interest of their regions. Quote. At present regionalism is a protection of interests of taken territory, in the context of Tajiki- stan. Unquote. (Member of Khu- kumat of Qabodiyon district). Regionalism is very much condemned by career officials and representa- tives of old bureaucracy. They be- lieve that regionalism is collapsing state structures and governance. In- tellectual elite - scientists, journalists, also condemn regionalism. Apparently, dual perception of re- gionalism, by politicians and adminis- trators from a ruling ethno-regional group is closely related to their prac- tice. They see and realize the nega- tive influence of regionalism on the life of state and society, so they im- plement it at work. Our young gen- eration has got a dual position; from one side - regionalism for them is an inevitable factor, from other side - they more than others feel the neg- ative consequence of regionalism. Regionalism, community organiza- tions and traditional social institutions helped people to survive during and after the civil war, but on the other hand they conduced people to stay within their regional and community groups. Factional conscious and soli- darity are opposing individualism, which is the effect of market re- forms. The development of market economy and democratization are fueling the change of paradigm and development of individualism. These changes are prevailing among the young generation, where one could observe a big conflict between the traditional-collective and individualis- tic systems. The collision and deteri- oration of the system of social val- ues is the major source of intergen- erational conflicts. A number of young pro-European people are against group solidarity and loyalty, but they all use the benefits of the regional support. Therewith, the majority of focus groups concluded that regionalism is helping them in some way, but more endamages; moreover it has damage on the so- ciety in general. Stage II. Regionalism as an interrelation between center and regions. In ten years of independence it be- came obvious that political powers of the country are built on regional basis, rather than political preferenc- es. In absentia of civil society, re- gional political elites become the in- dependent political powers that thirst for full control of power. Regional elites could be the strong foothold structures of an authoritarian regime, if this elite that controls the central governmental units could gain a na- tionwide status. It never happened until now and the current dominative elite is of a regional character. Mean- time, all other regional groups are trying to implement their own policy REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 102 102 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... to secure their interests and forming nain political position, opinion and tac- tics. In reply, the central government is depressing regions, trying to keep away from decision-making. Quote. Having many regions is not a problem. The problem is their alienation and competition. Cen- ter-oriented and centrifugal state trends depend on development speed of regions, as well as the economic and cultural policy of the country. Unquote. (Scientist/ Historian). Thereby, regionalism should not be considered detachedly from territo- ries. The governors draw a clear parallel between regionalism and ter- ritories and administrative-territorial apportionment of the country: Quote. Regionalism is a group of persons in control of certain ad- ministrative-territorial area of their origin. Meantime, appointment of administrative staff at any level is executed on a regional basis. Regionalism is integrating inter- ests of both ethno-regional group and territory. Unquote. (Tax committee member). Miscommunication between center and regions is an attribute of differ- ent understanding and establishment of power in center and regions. The situation grows more complicated with sector administration (ministries and agencies). In reality, governance in Tajikistan is executed at the cross- way of relations among regional elites, sector administration and re- gional response. Quote. Differences and contra- dictions among regions are ex- plained by regional diversity, contrast in their capacity and in- terests and of course competition between regional elites. Unquote. (Party member). Complexity and contradiction in such type of governance is well observed in opinions of elites and bureaucracy on place and role of regions in the life of the country. Are there any interests of GBAO, Sughd and Khatlon provinces and Districts of Republican Subordination? If yes, what are they about? The answer on this question was al- most equal. Representatives of re- gions, particularly members of Qa- bodiyon Khukumat, businessmen of Isfara and members of Porshnyov jamoat, as well as, representatives of ruling region have replied «yes». Quote: Regions/territories that have administrative-territorial sta- tus (province) have their common interests, especially economic and social. Unquote. (President office member). Representatives of ruling elite and top governors completely deny the ex- istence of special regional interests. Quote. Regions do not have spe- cial regional interests. There are common national interests of Tajikistan: unemployment, im- provement of economic and so- cial sectors. This could be solved through effective sector manage- ment. However, our Ministries and agencies prefer to do more pa- per and administrative work, though there are many important technical tasks to be solved. Un- quote. (Tax committee member). The state decision-making process is done by a small number of people, not regulated by anyone. There were samples of such decision-making, for instance: resolution on partial delimi- tation of Tajik-Chinese state border that have affected the interests of GBAO. Quote. Regions have no influence over internal and foreign policies of the country. Decisions are made by a small number of indi- viduals. A couple of people, which will never account for re- gional opinions. Unquote. (Pres- ident office member). A number of officials are concerned that ignorance of regional interests and corresponding contradictions and conflicts are dangerous for the coun- try. Quote. Interests of regions and country in general are sometimes different. But, it is not a dreadful TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 103 103 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... thing. It is worse when there is a conflict of interests between re- gions and top governors and some governors lobby the inter- ests of their regions, meantime harming other regions or the whole country. Unquote. (Presi- dent office member). This kind of conflict must be con- trolled by the government, particu- larly by governmental officials in charge of regional politics and inter- relation with regions. Quote. At the level of President all interests of regions shall be rep- resented at Registry office, Of- fice of the State adviser on per- sonnel policy and Committee on State affairs of Majlisi Namoyan- dagon. At present, Zokir Vazirov, Vice-Prime Minister, regulates the issues on regional policies. Un- quote. (Parliament member). However, all respondents agreed that existent bodies are not perform- ing accordingly. Quote. Special envoy and repre- sentative of GBAO, as well as Peo- ple’s deputies of GBAO districts are based in Dushanbe. There are Advisers on regional policy in President office. So what? They do not protect anyone. Unquote. (Scientist/Conflictologist). All elite representatives accepted that regional interests are hardly ac- counted for in the center. Relation- ships with the regions are built on an informal basis, i.e. through direct or indirect pressure, political intrigues, inter-elite negotiations, bargains and mediation. Actions for demonstra- tions of power by regions or intimi- dation by government, particularly by ruling ethno-regional group are widely used. The problem of partic- ipatory approach of territories and governments and provision of bal- ance of group interests is one of the most complex one for Tajikistan. It is important both at the level of center vis-a-vis region and at low-level units of territorial management. For ex- ample, in GBAO like in other regions of Tajikistan there is a clan, family and ethnic fight for power. At present, the key administrative posts are in the hands of Shugnan people. They dominate in most regional or- ganizations and agencies, located in Khorog city. Meantime these clans are distinguished by Dormurukhti, Shokhdari, Suchani, Khorugi, Porsh- niyovi, etc. We were informed that present lo- cal administration facilitates no bal- ance of interests of ethnic groups. It was obviously seen during elections to Majlisi Oli, when regional adminis- tration was openly supporting their placemen from Khorog clan. This fact accumulates dissatisfaction of re- gions, which are not represented in management. Does the government control the economic life of regions or they are free to act independently? Is economic life centralized? Stage III. Do regions have any degree of independence? All respondents acknowledged that administrative regions, namely prov- inces are not independent. The cen- tral government is treating them like ordinary administrative subdivisions with a very limited delegation of power. However, almost all inter- viewees realize the necessity and importance of the development of regions and accounting of their local interests. Quote. Regions are extremely de- pendent. Ideally, we should take into account the interests of re- gions and keep a medium degree of self-sufficiency. It is better to sustain a middle line between cen- tralization and decentralization. Unquote. (President office mem- ber). Almost all respondents pointed to an incapacity of regions in terms of im- plied powers and decision-making. Quote. The regions are quite de- pendent. It is implied that they have to make decisions them- selves. For that, they need to be more independent and not to be REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 104 104 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... too much afraid of the conse- quence of such decisions. Un- quote. (Tax committee member). In line with low application of implied powers our regions do not have enough responsibility. The major power and responsibility is focused in districts. Quote. The regions are depen- dent. Though, they should have independence. At present, it is all dictated by the Center. Unquote. (Senior staff of the Ministry of Fi- nance). This situation is suggesting abolishing regions and delegating all powers to districts more centralizing the gov- ernance. Curiously, these suggestions were made only by respondents of the ruling ethno-regional group. The reason: the ruling ethno-regional group is trying to eliminate every possible chance for consolidation of other ethno-regional groups in re- gions/provinces, as these groups are potential candidates for governance. These concerns reasoning a very low degree of delegation of powers to regional administrations, though our experience attests that regional ad- ministration is a good instrument for management of different, unequally developed and separated districts of Tajikistan. At present, the real pow- er is implemented by the Central Government, district administrations, whereas, the Khukumats of provinc- es are sort of liaison offices for rec- onciliation of interests of the center, regions and ethno-regional groups. It is quite hard to evaluate the eco- nomic self-sufficiency of regions. After massive privatization the cen- ter was supposed to lose its industri- al leverage. As of January 1, 2002 some 24.4% of enterprises were in state property (Source: Socio-eco- nomic development report of the Republic of Tajikistan, Statistical mag- azine, 2003, page 103). However, this has never happened and the state is still the main investor of the country. It signifies that our economic sector is still substantially centralized and does not depend on regional administrations (meaning Khukumats of provinces). Quote. In principal, the center shall be in charge of strategic is- sues and regions should have more opportunities to develop their economies. However, we should be realistic in the sense that Gov- ernment must control regions. Unquote. (President office mem- ber). In accepting that regions do not have an opportunity to form their econo- my our officials realized that mean- time the state cannot control the economy of regions as well. The rea- son for this is incapacity of the gov- ernment to prepare one real eco- nomic development strategy. Non- existence of common values and goals, as well as a unique coordina- tive state economic policy, the in- terests of regional elites are at the cutting edge and regionalism is used for re-allotment of state resources to the benefit of the ruling ethno- regional group. Quote. I cannot say that center is controlling regions; there is no decent control. Center has no development strategy and con- trol scheme. All investments are made into sectors that were im- portant in Soviet times. Invest- ments are done inertly, so as just to continue support and to pre- vent final collapse. There is no preventive strategy, but there is an inert input of money into old priority sectors. This government should prepare a development strategy paper. Until it is pre- pared money and resources will continue to flow into pockets. (Ministry of Finance member). It is a time of pocket interests, not to the benefit of state though. Un- quote. (Senior staff of the Minis- try of Finance). Administrators do recognize that the prevailing tendency of centralization is facing a number of obstacles, of which absence of a reliable system for collection and processing of in- formation. Neither the ruling elite nor Central Government has a clear pic- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 105 105 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ture on development of regions. Deterioration of statistical service, collapse of science and incapacity of mass media create a vacuum of in- formation, both for elite and ordinary people. Quote. Dushanbe is not fully reg- ulating economic life of regions. In order to control them fully we should have maximally evident in- formation on regions, which we are not possessing at the moment. Unquote. (Staff of the Tax Com- mittee). The most evident part of the rela- tion between center and regions is budget policy. Regional administra- tions have limited budgets and lack- ing opportunities to manage the re- sources of their region. Quote. Regional independence doesn’t go out of budget allo- cated by the center. They don’t and will never have political in- dependence. Unquote. (Presi- dent office member). Budget formation - the main battle place of ethno-regional groups. This battle is concentrating all interests and ambitions of ethno-regional groups, as well as contradictions between regions from one side and regions and center from another side. Quote.- The major contradictions between regional groups are seen during distribution of bud- get and election period. (Politi- cal party leader). - In practice, regional budget is in competence of the Ministry of Finance. During the development of regional budgets the Ministry of Finance is taking into consid- eration the opinion of regional financial departments and the opinion of Deputy chairmen of Khukumats on economic matters. In process of budget formation they participate in discussion ses- sions in the Ministry of Finance and protect the position of their region. But, the final word is for the Government of Tajikistan. In case regions are interested in budget improvements, they are trying to lobby it through the Min- istry of Economy that is in charge of budget resolutions. They are using corruption. However, sometimes these resolutions are never implemented, for example, the Ministry of Finance does not have enough funds. Very seldom is the center making some excep- tions. Unquote. (Member of the Ministry of Finance). Youth opinion. Curiously, young people both wom- en and especially men acknowledge that regions should not be indepen- dent and it is necessary to even more centralize governance. We imagine that it is related to Soviet traditions of centralized governance and to a strong habit to rely on cen- tral government as the only protec- tor and counter-pressure, even in cases of abuse of power by gov- ernmental officials. Young people are often insufficient and lack initiative, which often creates nos- talgia for «iron hand and order». Quote. No, I think regions should not be independent and center must govern them. Of course, they will be against it. At present, the chairmen of Khukumats are boss- es and they apply their own con- stitution. Unquote. (Young men). For the past years regions and dis- tricts have formed social communi- ties of a mobilized, authoritarian type, which fully replicate the political man- agement of the central government. The young generation is observing this local baronage and assumes that such feudality and anarchy can be curbed only by a strong, centralized power. This opinion is a result of an involution of the society after the in- dependence of Tajikistan. The wrong consequences of the war are: col- lapse of the legal system and legal rights of citizens, poor respect of the law, devaluation of human life; in addition, people become accus- tomed to atrocity and consider it natural. Our young generation has grown up and was socializing in the period of war and instability and that REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 106 106 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... is why they consider the power games as a normal social behavior. The market reforms are bringing in a spirit of competition, individual activ- ism and freedoms, which go in line with post-conflict deterioration of the legal system and order stimulating the escalation of power games among young people. Therefore, the young generation considers it natu- ral when clans and their leaders fight, win and oppress each other with the help of their ethno-regional groups. The majorities of youngsters do not believe in elections and call them “bluff and falsification”. They think that people make a herd, which re- quires a good herdsman, and that is why they do not really see the re- gionalism as a tool of regional ex- pansion and territorial dominance. Shaping of preferable organization of political life and power model for RT. The research has attested that polit- ical views and preferences primarily depend on ethno-regional origin and less on the official position of respon- dents. Officials and politicians of rul- ing ethno-regional group are more interested in centralization and its empowerment. Quote. Centralization is vital to- day. After some ten years we can shift to decentralization. Unquote. (Party member). A lot of administrators realize that all failures of the Government, of which inefficient political and economic re- forms, detrimental social policy and regional discrimination are invoking a deep dissatisfaction of people. This state of affairs may tend them not to vote for present government in future. The most dangerous com- petitors are other ethno-regional groups, since they are the major players in the political process of the country. That is a reason, why this Government is against free elections of local governments. Quote. In reality, our Govern- ment has left society adrift. The interrelation of the Government and society can be simply called - anarchy. This is the result of the civil war and collapse of power system. For 10 years of indepen- dence our Government got used to not to pay for work. The state land is distributed in an unfair manner. bThis attitude is deep- ening people’s distrust and re- gionalism. How to act in such cir- cumstances? It is better to rather appoint than vote, because elec- tions will not be faithful. In such elections the regional elites will take all power. So, how should the central government commu- nicate with them? Power and as- signment are natural partners. Unquote. (President office mem- ber). Authoritative assignment of represen- tatives of ruling ethno-regional group to various posts in regions and dis- tricts generates complex problems. Quote. - There were cases of mas- sive civil conflicts in those regions where assignments of outsiders took place. New conflicts and contradictions occur between lo- cal regional-clan elites and out- side liegemen. It is necessary to develop a decent program. We do not have a State adviser on internal policies. There is no longer an adequate analytical service. We need a system for collection of information and as- signment of proper liegemen in regions. We should also have an efficient, concrete process of adaptation. - Besides, our Government should pay attention to local elections. They are not considered serious- ly at the moment. What is Majlisi Oli? Its operations bring no ben- efit to regions. It is a simple bu- reaucratic body. Unquote. (Pres- ident office member). An authoritative assignment of liege- men by the ruling ethno-regional group is fostering regionalism and corruption in provinces deteriorating its economic and social situation due to poor management. It also esca- lates unexpected oppositional moods. Young men pointed out that TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 107 107 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... such authoritative assignment of re- gional representatives on behalf of ruling ethno-regional group is stimu- lating corruption as this representa- tive conceive it his duty to despoil this region and pass a share to the central government. Quote. The center is assigning its loyal people. Regions deliver portions to Center and ask for support and promotions. Un- quote. (Young men). In this regard, sometimes among rul- ing elite, here and there occur sug- gestions on introduction of free elec- tions at district and city level. How- ever, the top governors never ac- cept these suggestions. Quote. If regions will have free elections we will never be able to control them. Unquote. (Party member). At present, such an authoritative as- signment system is contradicting with the Constitution and invokes its colli- sions that are not solved yet. Quote. Something has to be done about these assignments. Today, it is all about violations of the Constitution. The Chair- man of the district must be the member of District Majlis of Peo- ple’s Deputies. For instance, the Center wants to appoint a new Chairman that has nothing to do with District Majlis. But, in accor- dance with the Constitution he cannot become a Chairman of the district, unless he is a Peo- ple’s Deputy of local Majlis. Now, there is a new term - Act- ing Chairman of District. After his appointment they wait until one of People’s Deputies of Majlis dies or leaves the region and official- ly appoint the Acting Chairman to the post of Chairman. You may imagine that there is a constant reshuffle of Chairmen. Unquote. (Parliament member). Our poll of public opinion and inter- views in regions confirmed that peo- ple vote for free elections in every governmental level in regions. Quote. Princelings rule every- where, but it is better that Heads of regional administrations are elected rather than appointed. They have to be responsible for their acts to their electorate and the law. Unquote. (Scientist/His- torian). Conclusions on Stage II. The facts of the research have gen- eralized two major conclusions: Tajiki- stan is on the way to form a state that will represent an amalgam of elements of Soviet planning-distribu- tive system, revived elements of traditional-archaistic state and new democratic institutions and relations. In accordance with the Constitution, Tajikistan sustains a multiparty, par- liamentary democracy separated in legislative, executive and judicial sys- tem of power. The President is both the Chief of State and the Chief Ex- ecutive. However, instead of objec- tively operational democratic institu- tions we have off-institutional politi- cal mechanisms. The state is based on three systems of dependency: Administrative-territorial sub- ordination: provinces, cities and districts, jamoats, mahal- las and villages. Ethno-regional groups head- ed by clans. Sector management: minis- tries and agencies. Two of which are formal and one, ethno-regional - informal. First two systems are closely interrelated, but not concurrent. They are based on territory and land. From one side, ethno-regional groups are close to their land, home of clan leaders (of- ten seniors of leading «avlods» of the region) and graveyard of their predecessors. The legacy and conti- nuity of a family are ruling these re- lations, however the clans do not form administrative-territorial unities. Clans do form territorial unities that act and manage the behavior of peo- ple of this unity, no matter of loca- tion. REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 108 108 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... From other side, the political hierar- chy of the President/Sovereign rep- resents different levels of adminis- trative-territorial divisions of compe- tence: province, city, district, jamo- at, etc. Thus, the territorial structure is a foothold of the political-adminis- trative cabinet of the state. This struc- ture is centralized, hierarchal and is based on administrative division of territory and personal relationship. At the same time, the regional-clan struc- ture carries on. This structure is part- ly based on the fact that regional elites are often landlords. The political will of the President and personal relationships (patron-client) guarantee the territorial state orga- nization, which may be described, as a net consisting of: a) horizontal clan structure - regional leaders, not necessarily administrative officials; b) hierarchic vertical structure - officials, reported directly to the President (Chairmen and management of prov- inces and districts). In Tajikistan, the real governance is executed at the crossroad of these systems. Sometimes, the clan and state systems are interrelated, but sometimes they compete with each other. That is why central govern- ment is blocking the independence of regions. This sector system was very important at the time of the Soviet Union, but now it is gradually losing its influence. Stage III. The effects of regionalism on social, political and economic life. The consequences of regionalism: Distrust, rivalry and animosity among ethno-regional groups. Dominance of one clan and ethno-regional group is invok- ing the discontent of others and provoking a struggle for the «super prize». Quote. Danghara is in power now and other clans are dissatisfied with it. The dominance of one clan over others and ambitions of clan leaders create hate and com- petition between regional groups. The sense of hate is penetrating the country. Unquote. (Political party leader). There is no unity among re- gional elites. This fact is dra- matically balking the progress of national ideology. There is no feeling of integrity and in- tegration aiming at determi- nation of national goals and priorities and realization of national interests. Incertitude, distrust and neg- ative attitude of Tajik citizens towards the Government. Quote. The personnel policy is a combination of dissatisfaction and suspicions. People are suspect- ing each other and secondary staff is discontented with senior man- agement. This is true all over the country. Unquote. (Parliament member). Poor management in gov- ernmental layers, in econo- my, in social sphere and cul- ture. Quote. Low professionalism and incompetence of managers at all levels and governmental bodies. Unquote. (President office mem- ber). Repression of economic growth, stagnation in devel- opment of regions and low efficiency of investments Quote. Imprudent preparation of strategies for development of re- gions. Every clan is dreaming of how to get more and more for their regions, though there is no appropriate environment or con- ditions for feasibility of invest- ments. Everyone is pulling the blanket to his back. Unquote. (President office member). Stagnation of development due to brain escape of pro- fessionals. Intensification of brain escapes due to lack of jobs for «irrelevant» special- izations. Quote. - Experienced doctors, economists and lawyers are in search of jobs, meantime their TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 109 109 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... potential jobs are occupied by unqualified workers, and young doctors that do not have any ex- perience. They are employed because they are from Kulob. (Young men). - The competition among regional elites is surging social tensions and may finally cause social outbursts taking into account present pov- erty state. (Party member). - Government is not responsible for its decisions and it is all around us. (President office member). Unquote. Stage IV. Mapping of potential solutions to overcome regionalism. If regionalism is a named problem, how it can be solved? Political actors are separated by eth- no-regional origin and official posts. The representatives of regions are suggesting introducing free elections for regional governments. As per them, it will motivate more respon- sibility in regions. From the other side, citizens will select professional and capable people, efficient man- agers, and not just the representa- tives of their ethno-regional groups. Free elections will break the clan system of management in Tajikistan. Quote. Every governor must be elected, starting from the Presi- dent and ending with the head of the smallest village. Authoritative assignments must be minimized. Regionalism will pass away auto- matically. People will select man- agers by their qualifications. Un- quote. (Tax committee member). As per some governmental officials, elections are necessary in order to banish the feeling of inconstancy, at present prevailing in the society. Quote. At present, everyone wants to get as much as possible. That is why our society must cre- ate some control mechanisms, which will limit the power. Now, every chairman is a king of his district. There is no mechanism of influence on power by public, and no public control of power. (Senior Ministry member). In spite of regional origin, many ad- ministrators and politicians empha- sized the necessity to implement a real self-administration. Quote. Now, it is a right time to introduce adjustments to the Con- stitution. It is necessary to expand the responsibilities and compe- tence of self-administration, es- pecially at the level of jamoats, districts and even provinces. Be- fore jamoats were keeping bank accounts and budget. Today dis- trict Khukumats are ruling the ja- moats. It is time to solve the prob- lem. We need to improve and develop self-administration and give more powers to mahallas. Finally, we were reduced to the situation when mahallas are not governmental, but their heads are appointed by the center. We need to adopt a new law on local administration. The local govern- ments, including the Chairmen of provinces should be elected. In general, the election process should be re-structured. It is also necessary to organize some le- gal training for governmental of- ficials, especially for high-rank- ing managers. Unquote. (Presi- dent office member). A number of central government officials, particularly the representa- tives of the old bureaucratic school suggest the strengthening of: state- hood and centralization, regulatory bodies, struggle against regionalism and training of governors and man- agers, especially of a high rank. Quote. - Effective reform of gov- ernment is required. It should cov- er both state governance and lo- cal administration. Some work is done under the framework of state reforms of administration, started back in October 2001. Some du- plicate state bodies were already abolished and a number of high professionals were invited from regional governments to center. All this shows that there are chang- es, but quite minor ones. REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 110 110 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... - For example a new Department for State Service under the Presi- dent and Academy for State Ser- vice were organized, but all of it is on paper only. However, it would be more efficient to orga- nize some short-term courses for officials, both in center and re- gions, including Ministries and agencies. Since we are left with- out professional bureaucrats we need to bring up new profession- als. It seems to me that regional- ism is immortal in this part of the world, but it is possible to miti- gate it applying fine personnel policy. Unquote. (President of- fice member). Representatives of political parties think that it is necessary to develop a multiparty approach. Firstly, they say that integration of people by political preferences will release them from the influence of ethno-regional elites and will decrease the affect of regionalism. Secondly, development of parties and a multiparty approach will gradually create a political sys- tem, where legal institutions will fade out the influence of informal off-insti- tutional structures. Quote. Empowerment of multipar- ty approach will reduce regional- ism. However, parties should rep- resent some regional interests as well. Unquote. (Party member). Young generation and representa- tives of political parties consider de- mocratization and development of mass media as important instruments to cope with regionalism. Quote. - Our Government de- clares that Tajikistan is an inde- pendent and democratic coun- try. But, in reality it is not. There is no democracy here. Laws are inactive. We should replicate Russian experience of free elec- tions of President and glasnost. If we would act as in other civilized countries and apply free elec- tions, even for election of City Mayor, regionalism will fade away. - It is required to develop mass media. People should have chances to speak out. This is a way out. Unquote. (Young men). Young people see a way out of re- gionalism in development of national consciousness, formation of ethnic identity that will dominate over oth- er elements of identity. Curiously, young people think that ethnicity should dominate over citizenship. Quote. The resolution of this problem is as follows, regardless of location and country the an- swer to the question «Where are you from and what is your nation- ality?» should be, «We are Tajiks from Tajikistan». Regionalism is taking its beginning from families. Parents must give good education to their children. Meantime, schoolteachers must give quality education. Unquote. (Young men). One of the ways to solve the prob- lem of regionalism suggested by young people is to eliminate tradi- tional, arranged, ethnic-regional mar- riages, which escalate endogamy and hierarchy of groups. They have suggested forming a Commission or Committee, to which young people can complain in the case of parents of marriage partners refusing due to ethno-regional origin. Quote. Another instrument to cope with regionalism is to foster and encourage family relations between different regions. Un- quote. (Young men). Young respondents expressed an opinion that in order to cope with regionalism it is necessary to refer to Islamic leaders to make propagan- da of Islamic integrity. Quote. Every group has its lead- er, Mullah and Ishan. They can help to solve this problem in the form of discussions with local communities and describe its neg- ative impact. If they would more often exhort people to integrate and say «Let’s solve this problem together!» it would be solved fast- er. Islam is forbidding regional- ism. The para «Lo ilo illa-l-loh» means, «We are all one nation». Unquote. (Young men). TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 111 111 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Young people are certain that im- plementation of agitation and cultur- al events, like discussion clubs, sem- inars, festivals and other actions can serve an instrument for mitigation of regionalism. Quote. We need to create some working groups, which will visit local communities, schools and universities and hold workshops and round tables among youth on aspects of regionalism. Unquote. (Young men). Young women think that it is good to create agitation brigades, hold contests and competitions of come- dians for young people from differ- ent regions of Tajikistan in order to acquaint each other with the customs and traditions of our regions. The interrelation between the center and regions: suggested model. In accordance with the research the most preferred model of this inter- relation is self-sufficiency under the direction, coordination and control of the Central Government. Quote. Regions should basically develop themselves. Center must determine common goals and objectives and coordinate the activities of regions. This kind of approach is sometimes used for sector management and orders, occasionally to satisfy needs of some officials. (Tax Committee member). Regions should independently deter- mine and set their economic policy. Meantime, the Center shall direct and coordinate their activities. Regions must independently form this policy, as proposals should come from the lowest level. Unquote. (GBAO rep- resentative). Young people, more than their el- ders, prefer larger centralization. Quote. All regions prefer to be more or less independent, but the Center should manage them. (Young men). And yet, the most loyal devotees of centralization are politicians and governors from the ruling ethno-re- gional groups. They are sure that Tajikistan is not ready for free elec- tions, decentralization and self-admin- istration. Quote. - The unitary state is an efficient and comfortable form of management. The local govern- ments at provinces should be abol- ished. We do not need them. (Party member). - In prospect, decentralization is required. But, at present central- ization is more appropriate. (President office member). - In ten years time we will need to introduce a real self-administra- tion, including municipal admin- istration based on free elections. When the system of such region- al administration will be intro- duced and well-managed there won’t be any need for authorita- tive assignments. Unquote. (Par- ty member). Parliament members, officials and regional representatives are con- cerned that Tajikistan has no sufficient legislature that would regulate rela- tions between Center and regions. Tajik Constitution and laws are full of contradictions. Quote. A great work should be done for the formation of a legis- lative base for interrelation of center and regions. Unquote. (Parliament member). Senior governors from the Center and regional representatives accept- ed the importance of legislative seg- regation of powers at all governmen- tal levels. Quote. Very precise systems of segregation of powers should be set at all administrative levels. At present, politics is extremely lack- ing in this. Unquote. (GBAO rep- resentative). Nearly all respondents noted that there is no legal mechanism of rec- onciliation of interests between Cen- ter and regions. This process is go- ing in informal spheres through the REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 112 112 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... traditional technique of peace build- ing, (negotiations, bargains, intrigues and mediation). Quote. We need a mechanism for reconciliation of interests of re- gions and Center. Unquote. (Member of Qabodiyon Khuku- mat). Only representatives of humanitari- an intelligentsia and GBAO represen- tatives pointed to the necessity of restoring the system of regional rep- resentation in Central government. Quote. It is necessary to rebuild the regional balance of represen- tation of regions in Central Gov- ernment. Unquote. (Scientist/ Conflictologist). The majority of respondents agreed that Parliament is the best place for reconciliation of interests and posi- tions of the Center and regions. Quote. The interests of regions could be reconciled at the level of Parliament. If elections would be carried out in an honest and fair manner the People’s Depu- ties will guarantee protection and reconciliation of interests of re- gions (between each other) and the Center. Unquote. (Tax Com- mittee member). Members of Political parties stated that the establishment of a real mul- tiparty political system in Tajikistan, including active work of parliamen- tary party factions would be a good instrument for optimization of rela- tions between Center and regions. Who are the major actors at the scene of regionalism that can find or force a decision on this problem? A collective opinion of respondents was as follows: the key actors that can solve the problem of regional- ism are President, Parliament and other senior governors (supreme management of the country). President and Parliament. Quote. - The Governmental bod- ies in leadership of the President should combat regionalism. A President cannot be a leader of any party. He cannot express the interests of one ethno-regional group. As per Tajik Constitution he is a guarantor of rights and freedoms. It is quite the contrary here. (Party member). - Who can fight regionalism? Pres- ident, Majlisi Oli and local Gov- ernments. The President must reg- ulate personnel policy. Majlisi Oli is a legislative body that can ini- tiate and adopt the laws aiming at restriction of regionalism. Lo- cal Governments are executors. The mediation between them is inactive, that is why most laws are just on paper. (Parliament mem- ber). - Parliament members should rec- oncile and protect regional inter- ests. This is not true any more in Tajikistan. Unquote. (Scientist/ Historian). Parties Quote. Parties can positively in- fluence the easing of the prob- lem, especially during pre-elec- tion campaign. Parties’ represen- tatives could contribute a lot through the Governmental bod- ies in which they are being elect- ed. (President office member). For political parties and movements it is necessary to acquire national meaning. Nowadays, there are three such parties - NDPT, KPT, PIRT. They should reverse the situation and switch from regional-clan to political- regional entities. Unquote. (President office member). Society in general Young people think that the prob- lem of regionalism can be solved only by the society, if it can recognize the influence of regionalism in future. Quote. - In my opinion all our problems that appear today we should solve by ourselves, inde- pendently and without outside intervention. (Young women). - We should form a party to op- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 113 113 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... pose regionalism and to agitate people in the regions in order to join together and to handle a problem inside the region or re- public. Unquote. (Young wom- en). The major part in the process of solv- ing the problem of regionalism can be played by the following groups of people: Chairmen of districts. Regional representatives emphasized that among the main actors who rep- resent interests of the regions are chairmen of districts. However, they are in an ambiguous position now, from one side they are placemen of the President and report directly to him, from the other side they are governing bodies of the districts, that consist of influential autonomous pow- ers that cannot be controlled by state administration. Quote. Chairmen of Khukumats have a two-edged policy; they are scared of constant reshuffle of personnel. Moreover, the Chairman must gather back all bribes, which he spent buying his position. Unquote. (Member of district Khukumat). Many people expressed the opinion that handling the problem of region- alism is impossible without regional integrative elites, which include eco- nomic, military and intellectual elites. Quote. In reality, intelligentsia, People’s Deputies and powerful regional military commanders, managers of big industrial enter- prises and businessmen protect the interests of regions. Unquote. (Member of party). High level administrators consider that the resolve of regionalism is impossi- ble without the formation of a na- tional elite, which will be the only party that could provide the solution to the problem. Quote. Nowadays, there are few people who care about national interests. National elite should be formed and represent the power which will assure the solution of regionalism problem. Unquote. (Sukhrob). From the point of view of young people, combatants can play the main role as well. Quote. - Combatants, power and weapons protect the regional in- terests. (Young women). Businessmen. - Entrepreneurs also put forward the interests of their regions. One of their objectives is to develop the economy of their region. (Member of Ministry) - Businessmen can also express the interests of their regions. They ex- port treasures of their regions, such as gold, cotton, precious stones etc., they are making mon- ey and money opens doors. (Young women). - Businessmen are against region- alism, because they are working for themselves and consequently trying to hire valuable experts, regardless of place of birth. Un- quote. (Young men) Art intelligentsia. Quote. - It is possible that an ed- ucated part of the population could mitigate this problem. Po- litical parties exist only on paper. Laws passed by the Parliament are not functioning. (Scientist/Histo- rian). - It would be good if writers and poets would organize some mo- bile groups that could travel in regions or theatres and conduct topic meetings and discussions. For instance, visit of Sughd the- atre to Gharm, and from Gharm to Kulob. It would be beneficial to have cultural gatherings more frequently. Unquote. (Young men). Mass Media. Quote. Mass Media is also play- ing one of the major roles in solv- ing the issue of regionalism. For instance, the popular «TV- Sub- kh» program, which is broadcast to the whole republic. So, this REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 114 114 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... program can help to suspend people from regionalism. Un- quote. (Young men). Education System. Quote. It is necessary to make a negative propaganda of region- alism to children and young peo- ple in schools and universities. On the given problem some discus- sions, seminars and conferences should be conducted. Unquote. (Young men). What and how to change to make the solution possible? It is necessary to: build a market economy. The majority of respondents consid- er that implementation of economic reforms, establishment of market economy and in prospective - for- mation of internal common market in RT will lighten the problem of region- alism. Quote. It is necessary to form one common market. (Scientist/Con- flictologist). Improvement of the life standard will destroy regionalism. Econom- ic reforms conduce to decrease regionalism. Market makes peo- ple come closer. Unquote. (Par- ty Member). Combating poverty and developing socio-economic situation. Young people think that massive un- employment and poverty detach people from each other, facilitates ethno-regional solidarity and pre- serves clan power. That is why it is vital to improve socio-economic sit- uation in country and reduce pover- ty. Quote. - If I had been the chair- man, I would give jobs to peo- ple. (Young women). - No money, no job, the conse- quence is that person will search for the guiltiest and will accuse other regions. Unquote. (Young women). Formation of state ideology of ethno-nationalism. Youth, especially young men and representatives of high-rank govern- mental officials deem that the solu- tion of the problem of regionalism is in formation of ethno-national con- sciousness. Quote. - The only way out of regionalism is national accord and nationalism. If Tajik people will unite and recognize them- selves as one community, the problem will be resolved. (Young men). - We need nationalism that will unite all citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan. Unquote. (Member of Presidential Office). Strengthening of the Government. Restoring the control system and governance. Quote. - We need a strong Gov- ernment that will erect above the regions and will subordinate them under the national interests. (Pres- ident office member). - We should not forget about Governmental officials. We should feed wolfs to save sheep. If the salary of Governmental of- ficials equals to USD 7-10, there is no use in battling corruption and regionalism. With this salary an official is dependent not on government, but on his head or protector, who will find him the»gravy train» or at least will close eyes on illegal acts. Un- quote. (Member of Tax Commit- tee of RT). Restoring of law and order in the country. Incapacity of law and order is the major reason for surging clans and regionalism. There is a necessity to restore legality in society and the legal conscience of citizens, empha- sized all respondents. Quote. - We have some decent laws, but they have to start to work. For example, the law on governmental services envisages conducting competitive examina- tions, to evaluate the profession- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 115 115 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... al level before recruitment. (Par- ty Leader). - The legislative power is not only about passing the laws and reso- lutions. The legislation should be applied in practice. Unquote. (Parliament member). Conduction of honest and fair elections. Quote. It is necessary to make the election process absolutely real, but not fictional. People will elect those candidates that will repre- sent their interests. It will guaran- tee that People’s Deputies will really represent their regions. Only than, there will be sense in development of new law on self- administration. Unquote. (Par- liament member). It is time to build a civil society. The young generation believes that more open mass media will help to apply public control over the government. This will allow young people outside the ruling ethno-regional elite to have access to good career opportunities. Free mass media will foster informa- tion openness in the society, coun- teract the isolation and closed status of ethno-regional groups, encourage dialogue between different ethnic groups and the formation of the uni- versal national conscious. Another part of young people be- lieves that the increase in the num- ber of NGOs and capacity building will also improve the situation. They say that young, talented and active young people can realize their po- tential through NGOs, which are not touched by the regionalism yet. Existence of external threats. Quote. A foreign enemy can in- tegrate Tajiks. Alliance against external enemy will help to com- bat contradictions of regionalism. Unquote. (President office mem- ber). What is the role of external actors? Who are external actors? International organizations are exter- nal actors, respondents say. They can introduce international experience in solution of reciprocal problems, give recommendations and force the Government to take into consider- ation the opinions of international or- ganizations and institutions. And yet, there was an opinion that international organization can do noth- ing, because it is also corrupt and infected by regionalism through its local staff. Quote. - Every international or- ganization is surrounded by its own mafia, which in turn has eth- no-regional character. (Head of NGO). International organizations are just strengthening regionalism. They are focusing their attention on regional- ism factor. Quote. - If international organi- zations are intending to help, it would be better if they helped to solve economic problems. But in principle, they are all corrupt. They are squeezing theirs projects through our government officials. (President office member). - International organizations should not aggravate regionalism as it is done now. For this it is necessary to eliminate corrup- tion. Control, targeting and trans- parency in extension of grants are essential. The number of projects that are directed at development of civil society should be in- creased. Unquote. (Member of NGO). Many respondents deem that assis- tance of international organizations in the handling of the problem of re- gionalism can be focused on support of civil society. Quote. Conducting various fo- rums with NGOs, support of re- gional NGOs, promotion of the projects focused on interaction of NGOs from several regions, and support of mass media - all these will help to find the solution for regionalism. Unquote. (Political party leader). REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 116 116 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Young people assume that in princi- ple we should reject external assis- tance. Quote. - It would be better if we could do without external forc- es. (Young men). - I think that foreigners cannot help us. (Young men). International organizations should not interfere in the life of regions. (Young women). Conclusion The interaction between the center and regions is determining the struc- ture of the government, plays the major role in the achievement of domestic political stability, resolves the task of reduction of tension in the society that is going through the difficulties of the transitional period. The problem of regionalism and co- operation between centrifugal and center-oriented powers in the gov- ernment is of a paramount impor- tance for Tajikistan. This problem has got an affinity between each other and is divided into: a) interrelation of ethno-regional groups and b) inter- relation among the regions and be- tween the Center and the regions. The regionalism processes in various political and social circles and differ- ent regions of Tajikistan have a di- verse nature. The Soviet style of a strongly centralized management is joined by local political traditions, which is the reason why regionalism is perceived negatively. The region- alism acquires a negative color, signi- fies separatism and a threat of disso- lution of the state. The Soviet author- itarian regime was repressing region- al identity and political independence of regions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the newly established state named the Republic of Tajiki- stan had no experience in democrat- ic federalism, but in parallel had a state with a clan-regional system of man- agement. Regional contradictions, poor ties between the regions and the government in political, econom- ic, social and cultural spheres are the major bottlenecks on the way of de- velopment of Tajikistan. So, what is regionalism? It should be acknowledged that for the past decade of independence Tajikistan was able to form a state, which bases on authentically local tra- ditions. The role of the Soviet state- hood and new democratic institutions is significant, but not crucial for the development of the society and the state. The state is founded on a threefold system of supervision: 1. Administrative-territorial supervi- sion: regions, cities, districts, jamo- ats, mahallas and rural settlements. 2. Ethno-regional groups and their leading clans. 3. Sector management: ministries and agencies. At present, the most efficient ones are the first two. The core base of both systems is land. The foundation of the socio-political chart of Tajikistan is a conglomerate of ethno-regional groups, which form a hierarchic system of a dynamic balance. The ethno-regional groups are represented by a complex of communities inhabiting same geo- graphic location (region), often these inhabitants have a special dialect or even language and subculture. These so-called social organisms are head- ed by regional elites or better called clans. The members of these ethno- regional groups can live outside their region, but still feel its subordination. An individual has a right to his pri- vate and spiritual life, but in political life he/she is always part of a com- munity, which in turn is a part of some ethno-regional group. He/she is not just a citizen with rights and respon- sibilities, but a representative of some community. One clan or coali- tions of relative clans, which form a hierarchic system of clans, direct the political life of a country, province, region and district. This principle is being implemented at all levels, like central government, administrative- territorial organizations, including the local communities (jamoats). The ethno-regional elite, which takes TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 117 117 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... over the power, enjoys the bene- fits in all spheres of life, including state administration, politics, economy, defense and security. Since Tajikistan is practicing the system of nomina- tion to almost all posts the ruling elite has little dependence on people. The only elective posts are president, members of Majlisi Namoyandagon (Lower Chamber of Parliament) and heads of jamoats. The ruling elite has got all the administrative tools for organization of elections (including falsifications, manipulations and sup- pression). That is why the ruling elite is making every effort in order to keep the central power closed for the representatives of other ethno- regional groups. The recruitment of officials (in politics, economy, military and even intellectual) is done on re- gional basis. This is true both at cen- tral and regional levels, including even organization, enterprises, private companies, etc. The foundation of state management is the personal loyalty to some ethno-regional group, ethno-regional solidarity, ac- cord and unity of clans. The president is not only the leader of the country, but also a leader of some ethno-regional group, which won in the inter-clan battle and won the main prize, really. From this point of view, he is a head of the system of clans and ethno-regional groups. The people of Tajikistan accept this state of affairs. The various levels of administrative-territorial divisions present the political hierarchy start- ed from a sovereign-president, such as: province, city, district, jamoat and others. Hence, the territorial structure is a ground for political-ad- ministrative machine. This structure is highly centralized and hierarchical. It is based on administrative-territo- rial divisions and personal ties and relations. The real governance of Tajikistan is done through adminis- trative-territorial and clan spectrum. The central government is carefully balancing the relations with clans from other ethno-regional groups in or- der to reach a certain degree of stability. The government, howev- er, tries to reduce the independence of administrative-territorial units to avoid the strengthening of clan groups. Thus, regionalism in Tajikistan is a sys- tem of power, which is based on collectivism and community solidari- ty of traditional pre-industrial society. This system is quite unstable. The centralization of power in hands of some small elite oligarchs is provok- ing the leaders of the ruling and oth- er ethno-regional groups to re-dis- tribute the power to their on advan- tage. This process keeps the major- ity of people away from the pro- cess of decision-making and fuels the instability of state power and social control correspondingly. The ruling elite is strengthening its military units in order to indemnify itself from neg- ative developments. It is worth ac- knowledging that there is a close relation between regionalism and militarization of the country. What causes regionalism? Geographic isolation of re- gions due to diverse natural obstacles, like mountains and rivers. Historic facts: annexation of regions into different states; due to that the regions had different histories, they formed contrasting political and cultural traditions and were attracted to manifold external political, economic and cultural centers. USSR control instruments were authoritarian and were not giving any chances for self-management; on the oth- er hand during the Soviet era the governance was imple- mented through northern Tajiks that were more ad- vanced and owned an ancient and cultural ethnicity. Unequal development of re- gions (especially economic). Civil war caused disintegra- tion, strengthening of ethno- regional solidarity, increase of the role of traditional social REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 118 118 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... institutions, which became a way of survival (namely: av- lod, mahalla, etc.). Governmental incapacity - the Soviet command-admin- istrative control was substitut- ed by the state with no polit- ical will, but with a strong clan system. There is no strategic planning or universal goals. Personal interests are over public and ethno-regional in- terests are of a crucial value. Political traditions of Tajiks also foster regionalism. Post-Soviet involution of po- litical, economic and social spheres of Tajik society en- courages revival of ancient forms of political and social life. Perception of regionalism by various social and age groups. The regionalism is positively per- ceived by: a) Politicians and officials from the ruling ethno-regional group, saying that regionalism is helping to keep the power. b) One part of young people be- lieves that regional solidarity is a good support, which opens wide oppor- tunities and resources. c) The representatives of regional elites consider the regionalism as a tool for protection of their regional interests. The regionalism is negatively per- ceived by: a) Career officials - they believe that regionalism is deteriorating state structures and jeopardizes the gov- ernance in general. b) Representatives of intellectual elite - scientists, journalists, etc. c) One part of young people be- lieves that regionalism is closing op- portunities in many fields, for i.e. self- actualization, career development and individual achievements. Regionalism - interrelation between the center and administrative-territorial units. The territory control is a very com- plex problem for Tajikistan. Con- straints in interrelation of regions of Tajikistan: Dushanbe has never been a real center for all regions of Tajiki- stan. Regions were always a part of political process of Tajikistan. The economic relations between regions had a complex nature. There is no common market. Tajikistan had nev- er formed a single economic body. Sughd province was ruled by Mos- cow directly, both during Soviet times and first years of independence. The constitution of the country en- visages that Tajikistan is a unitary state. The issue of centralization is quite controversial to this fact. Tajiki- stan is a small country with more or less homogenous population. Nev- ertheless, existence of various re- gions always reminds us about de- centralization, regardless of the opin- ion of the center. On the other side, strongly bureaucratic cabinet, urgen- cy of shocking economic reforms (that could be implemented only by the strong central government) and finally importance of peace process are partly justifying strong central- ization of Tajikistan. This is relevant not only between the center and the regions, but also at the lowest terri- torial management level. In addition, the territory interests of the regions are not considered, the right for re- gional identity is not being watched, and there is only bargain and fragile balance of ethno-regional groups. Taking into account that the regions were always participating in the po- litical process of Tajikistan the attempt of the government to leave regions with no chance of independence is provoking a confrontation of region- al elites. This situation is getting worth taking into account that Dushanbe never had the status of a real center for all regions of Tajikistan. For in- stance, for Sughd region Moscow was the center during the Soviet times. This was related to the fact that Sughd region used to be one of the areas of industrial importance to TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 119 119 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... the Soviet Union. The economic ties with the regions of Tajikistan were also uneven. In soviet era Tajikistan was not considered as one econom- ic entity. Regional economic dispro- portions were always used by Sovi- et power. After the independence and the civil war the road and trans- port sector lost a lot, which in turn increased the isolation of regions. There is no market system in the Republic. The representatives of re- gional elites acknowledged that the regional interests are not considered by the center. The interrelation between the cen- ter and regions is built on informal basis, through direct or indirect pres- sure, political intrigues, inter-elite ne- gotiations, bargains and mediation. The worst situation is observed in provinces (oblasts). The range of their powers, rights and responsibilities is limited and implemented mostly on district level. Reason: the ruling elite is trying to reduce to nothing any chance for regional consolidation, because this could be growing pow- er for future take over of the power in the country. However, since the regions have no capacity to build their own economy, the central gov- ernment also lost its potential to con- trol the economy of regions. This is because this government failed to build the universal economic objec- tives and development strategy. Nonexistence of a coordinative state economic policy and common val- ues are fuelling the increase of the role of interests of regional elites, which are using regionalism as a tool for re-distribution of state resourc- es. How to overcome the regionalism? The opinion of respondents (main points). A) Through strengthening of the gov- ernment, further centralization, sup- pression of regional elites, formation of one universal elite, formation of a strong bureaucratic school, intensifi- cation of the state control, develop- ment of market institutions, devel- opment of market economy with a strong regulatory hand of the gov- ernment (Officials). B) Development of market econo- my, liberalization of entrepreneurship, democratization (to be started with fair elections at all governmental lev- els), support of parties and devel- opment of civil society, support of independent mass media as a tool for civil control. (Party functionaries and intellectuals). C) Further centralization. Develop- ment of national consciousness. The nationalism will repress the regional- ism. The Islamic integrity can help to fight the regionalism (Young people). D) Legislative segregation of pow- ers at all levels of the government, formation of legislation that will reg- ulate the relations between the cen- ter and the regions, fair elections, decentralization, promotion of self- management (Parliament members and representatives of regions). E) Restart of the system of regional representation in highest levels of the government (Humanitarian intelligen- tsia, representatives of GBAO). The project respondents acknowl- edged that the strife against region- alism must be started from the sov- ereign powers; only the President can initiate this movement. The issue of centralization is controversial. In accordance with its constitution, Tajiki- stan is a unitary state. Tajikistan is a small country with a quite homoge- neous population (80% of its popu- lation are Tajiks). However, the pres- ence of a number of different re- gions is making the issue of decen- tralization topical. In reality, the re- gions are trying to run decentralizing policies and not to depend on the center’s preferences. On the other hand, application of market reforms will cause short-tern dislocations, which can be overcome only by a strong and centralized government. More important is to sustain the peace process, which partially acquits the aspirations to centralization prac- ticed by almost all officials and politi- cians interviewed under the project. REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. Page 120 120 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... From Ambivalence to Ambiguity? Some Paradigms of Policy Making in Tajikistan ....................................................................................................................................... Stephane A. DUDOIGNON CNRS/Marc Bloch University, Strasbourg «Ensemble nous oeuvrons pour la posterite de nos deux magnifiques nations. Vive la probablement future Republique d’Iran !» SAN-ANTONIO, Ma langue au chah (Paris: Fleuve Noir, 1970), 60. 1 On French Iranologists and one of their odd- est habits, viz their taste for complicated tran- scription systems, that we have tried to avoid in the present study: Ma langue au chah, 99. 2 Cf. Edward W. SAID, Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rst of the World (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981 [2nd ed. New York: Vin- tage, 1997]), in particular the chapter about Iran, 81-133. The announcement, ten years in ad- vance, of the proclamation of a re- public in Iran, by Frederic Dard (1921- 2000), alias Commissaire San Anto- nio - a French, Swiss-based (from 1966 onwards), «He used to say af- ter this date: «I committed swisside» (je me suis suisside)», liberal best-seller thriller writer who never hesitated to mock «serious» human sciences1 - is a thing not easy to find in the polito- logical literature of the time. A San Antonio may have been lacking to Tajikistan, if we refer to the much pre- dicted dislocation of the Soviet Union, but much unexpected proclamation of Tajik independence in 1991. San Antonio’s absence, the lack of his joy- ful derision may feel even more acute- ly - relatively speaking, indeed - whence the future of Tajikistan seems to many more unpredictable than ever in almost two decades. Why, will object our reader, did we take the risk of beginning the present study with an idle quotation, and a pointless parallel between the unex- pected Tajik independence and the unpredicted proclamation, twelve years before, of the «Republic of Iran»? The author did so with the in- tention of suggesting some answers to one of the questions which were the most oftenly asked to him during his long stay in Tajikistan, during the spring and summer 2003, partly for CIMERA: «Doesn’t the overall sit- uation in Tajikistan today - i.e., in the first years of the 21st century C.E. - remind you that of Iran in the decade which preceded the Is- lamic Revolution?» Such was one of the most recurrent questions the author was asked by colleagues and various observers between April and August, 2003. Such a popularity of comparison with Iran among interna- tional researchers working on Tajiki- stan, and the strength of the para- digm of an Islamic revolution, and of «Islam» in general as a common de- nominator of everything potentially hostile to the West,2 have provided us a sort of common theme for our study. This theme should at least al- low us to underline, beside the un- predictability of political evolutions in Dushanbe, fundamental differences of all kinds between the Iranian and the Tajik cases. The most striking of these numerous discrepancies between these two different - if not antinomic as we shall see - cases concerns the respective size and populations of both coun- TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION . . . . Page 121 121 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 «Nahzat» is the Tajik common denomination (Hizb-i Nahzat-i Islami: Party of the Islamic Re- newal) of the Islamic Party of Renewal (IPR) of Tajikistan; it will be currently used for more commodity in the present paper. The term nahzat (not to be mistaken for nazhat: «volup- tuous pleasure») makes reference to the intel- lectual renewal of the early 20th century in the Arabic and Islamic world (see N. TOMICHE, «Nah1/2a,» The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. [Leiden - New York: E. J. Brill, t. 7, 1993]: 900- 903); such a global reference should suffice to differentiate the Nahzat from more radical orga- nizations which claim to be followers of the Muslim Brothers or Islamist political movements posterior to WWII: the former shows guided by an overall project of modernising Islam, whence the latter’s project remains limited to an Islamization of modernity. 4 At the congress of the Nahzat devoted to the Reconciliation Day (Dushanbe, 25 June 2003), the party’s historical leader Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri (b. 1947) devoted the second half of his discourse to a violent accusation of President Rahmonov’s police, and to a severe warning to the government. (Full text: Sayyid Abdulloh NURI, «Vahdati milli az e’timodi hamdigari sar- chashma megirad [National Unity Takes Its Source in Mutual Respect],» Najot [the party’s weekly newspaper] 27 (2003/7/4): 1-3). 5 On the situation of this groups of interest in Tajikistan at this moment, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, «Tajikistan: Leninabad, Crackdown in the North,» HRW 10/2 (April 1998): 20 p. tries, and the ability of each to re- sist, or to oppose pressures from abroad. If most observers of Tajiki- stan do stress indeed the unpredict- ability of the evolution of the politi- cal situation there, they explain it for a significant part by the decisive role of a multiplicity of external factors, each of which could suffice to de- cide the overall future of the coun- try (e.g., DJALILI & KELLNER 2003, 275 ff.). (Among them, those most oftenly mentionned are: the evo- lution of the political situation in Afghanistan; the unpredictable destiny of the anti-terrosist coali- tion set up in the aftermath of Sep- tember 11, 2001; the unstable attitude of Russia and the Russians toward 450,000 to 1,5 million - according to official or unofficial statistics - Tajik economic immi- grants in the Russian Federation; the possibility, sometimes ex- posed in the Russian medias and echoed in the American ones, of a rapprochement between the armed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and some of the former Tajik warlords of the civil war period; the continuous ex- pansion of drugs traffics; the po- litical dissatisfaction of the impor- tant Uzbek minority of Tajikistan, and the popularity among its ranks of the an Islamist party of Near- Eartern origin, the Hizb at-Tahr- ir, which in Central Asia has been playing the card of Uzbek minor- ities outside Uzbekistan, etc.) In terms of periodization we are probably still in Dushanbe in a phase which has been opened in 1994 with the launching of negociations be- tween the Rahmonov government and the armed opposition, then po- sitioned mainly in Afghanistan, both parties being then put under the fierce pressure of the Taliban threat. The situation, although pacified since the late 1990s, remains shaky in spite of collusions of interests between the former foes. This overall frailty has been recently illus- trated by general nervousness dur- ing the weeks preceding the Refer- endum of June 23, 2003 and by mutual threats that we have been listening before and since that date in the mouth of leaders of the two main opposite camps - the presiden- tial faction and the Nahzat.3 (See in- fra our comments on the arresta- tion of one of the Nahzat’s lead- ers in the Soghd region, Sham- siddin Shamsiddinov [alias Ishan Shams al-Din Khan], in early June 2003).4 It is reinforced by the ex- clusion from the peace process of quite many protagonists of the polit- ical arena, like the representatives of the formerly powerful «Leninaba- di» (i.e., northern) faction of the Tajik Communist Party and state, whose dissatisfaction had caused the failed coup by Colonel Khudoyberdiev in Khujand in November 1998 - the main political crisis in Tajikistan since the very signature of the peace agreement.5 Despite the difficulty, and the risky character of pronostics, provisional perspectives for the decade to come will be sketched in the present pages. They are based mostly on an analysis of the logics of the Tajik FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 122 122 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... political system as it has been working, in the framework of a specific and provisional balance of forces, since the signature of the General Peace Agreement between the Rahmonov government and the then United Tajik Opposition on June 27, 1997, up till the very recent developments of the Tajik political scenery. It does not take into ac- count the possible impact of most of the above-mentionned external factors, but focuses on the inner pa- rameters of political culture, and the balance of forces inside the hetero- geneous leading class of Tajikistan. *** Before proceeding to the main body of our study, it is perhaps worth mentionning that there is a second reason at least to open it through the Iranian tropism, for practical pur- pose concerning the work of donor states and their organizations in Tajiki- stan. If Iran has been showing for more than two centuries a general attitude of ambiguity towards ev- erything coming from the West,6 in Tajikistan’s official circles the domi- nant and characteristic posture to- wards Western innovations, espe- cially those brought about by those programmes of technical assistance which have been flowing to this coun- try during the last six years, seems to be that of ambivalence - an atti- tude characterized by a special ability to integrate alien ideologi- cal motos, and to play simulta- neously in different, sometimes openly contradictory registers of discourse, if not of thought.7 Such dispositions can be easily traced, to a lesser extent, in other Central Asian countries; they may be partly explained by a long ex- perience and a rich imaginary of foreign domination (in which cur- rent Western donors have re- cently taken a place occupied beforehand by the Soviet pow- er), partly by a dependence on foreign assistance which, among Central Asian countries, remains more specific to Tajikistan. Bringing this country’s political leaders from current ambivalence to future am- biguity may perhaps be considered a goal to attain for people involved in technical assistance in fields such as that of political and economic re- forms. In the shorter term, the ambivalence of the recipients, coupled with a par- ticular ability at instrumentalizing assistance from abroad for goals which may have nothing in com- mon with durable development, may be considered a key aspect of any cooperation programme, al- though this dimension is generally very much underestimated by the protagonists of humanitary activity and technical assistance (e.g., RYF- MAN 2002). As to recent political events in Tajikistan, like the tensions after the arrestations of members of the Nahzat during the weeks pre- ceding the Referendum of June 2003, one should never forget that the OSCE as well as other interna- tional organizations established in Dushanbe, and implicated then in the resolution of the conflict between the Islamist party and the Tajik presiden- cy, are now considered locally a full- right protagonist of the political are- na. All discourses and actions by Tajik political actors, at least since since 1997 should be replaced in the con- text of communication strategies aimed at the strongest possible in- volvement. 1. The Political Substratum Few attention has been paid, in these pages, to official political practice and discourse, especially those relative to diplomacy and cooperation with donor countries. What we have been trying to do during four months and a half in Tajikistan has been to cast light on some of the societal and mental structures which un- derline these practices and dis- courses: the balance of antagonistic 6 For a synthetic overview, see for instance DIGARD, HOURCADE, RICHARD, 353-355. 7 For a very recent illustration about the divi- sion of collective memory, see Sabine TREBIN- JAC, «Le savoir musical des Ouighours: s’il s’agissait d’ambivalence de la memoire?», in Stephane A. Dudoignon, ed., Devout Societies vs. Impious States? Transmitting Islamic Learn- ing in Russia, Central Asia, and China through the Twentieth Century (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), in print. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 123 123 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... forces, the active cultural models (or lack of cultural models ...), the strategies (or lack of strategy ...) of political leaders and thinkers, whom we have tried to identify, and finally an overall set of unformal prac- tices and negociations common to the political class of Tajikistan, but usually hidden to outside observers and, it goes without saying, poorly documented in official literature. For this, we have notably tried to study some of the main political ques- tions of the time - in particular that of relations between the central state and the regions - in the terms in which they were dealt with during this year by various local protagonists, with sensitive variations depending on the identity of their own respective in- terlocutors. These questions have been studied according to a great variety of protagonists, from the grassroots level8 to that of political strategists, with a special attention to the particular manner in which these two levels are mutually articu- lated - or not - in Tajikistan. So do- ing, we have always tried to mea- sure the relativity of what was said to us as to one of the possible inter- locutors. For that, we have given ourselves the time necessary to check and compare all the assertions which were being made to us, or publicly expressed in different medi- as, in order not to appear as the mere bearer of any of the protagonists’ words, nor the mere messenger of such or such Tajik institution to such or such donor institution, nor the pro- ponent of a necessarily gentle and creative «society» against a neces- sarily evil and immobile «state». This has allowed us to cast light on political demands, thoughts, and prac- tices which remain dominated, since the end of the Soviet period - even among members of the Nahzat - by economic preoccupations of an un- questionable technicity (DUDOI- GNON 1994; 1998). (We will no- tably evoke the manner in which the question of decentralization is closely associated, in the mind of our various interlocutors, with those, no less actual, of privati- zation, and with the reform of the tax system with a redistribution of the tax resources at the local lev- el). The present report begins with considerations on the political substra- tum of Tajikistan at the turn of the 21st century ([A] the overall bal- ance of forces; [B] the contem- porary logics of localized politi- cal clientelisms, through that of the Nahzat; [C] the political per- sonnel. It continues with an attempt at analysing some key paradigms of policy making in Tajikistan today: [A] the constant reelaboration, since the last decades of the soviet pe- riod, of what we have been call- ing the «quota system,» for the integration of various, sometimes antagonistic figures and forces into the state apparatus and gov- ernment organs; [B] some para- doxical effects of foreign techni- cal assistance; [C] the adoption of Perestroika-style legislations deprived of measures of applica- tion, or including mutually con- tradictory articles). Last we will try to sketch some tracks for fur- ther country studies ([A] the non- reform of regional power and lo- cal communities; [B] a growing Islamo-Christian animosity - to be replaced in the context of a local instrumentation of international organizations of all kinds estab- lished in Tajikistan; [C] and a case of multiple: regional, national, economic and political cleavage, that of the Uzbeks of Tajikistan). 1.1 The balance of forces The logics of the protagonists in the political arena of Tajikistan can- not be understood without tak- ing into account the clear con- science that each of them has of its respective weigh, possibilities and limitations at present. The bal- ance of forces, marked by an over- 8 This approach has necessitated very numer- ous informal meetings, sometimes in difficult conditions (I went as far as interrupting a med- ical congress in Khujand for questioning the director of the town hospital), which added to long periods of illness in May and June, explain the long delay with which the present report has finally been submitted to CIMERA’s direc- tion. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 124 124 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... whelming domination of President Rahmonov’s Popular-Democratic Par- ty (PDP) and network, is a heritage of the civil war and the peace agree- ment of June, 1997. The hegemo- ny of the PDP has been largely rein- forced during the last years, due to massive assistance to the Tajik gov- ernment from the international com- munity after the lauching of the anti- terrorist coalition in the aftermath of 11 September, 2001 and Tajikistan’s demonstrations of loyalty to the co- alition at least until the beginning of the US-British intervention in Iraq in Spring, 2003. Since 1997, multipartism has been gradually introduced again in the po- litical life of Tajikistan, although one can hardly speak of the existence of a real political opposition or alterna- tive in the country. During the past six years, the higher personnel of former oppositional forces of the Perestroika and civil war periods - the Nahzat and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan - has been partly integrated into the state structures, whether political or economic. As to newly founded parties (the So- cialist Party and the Social-Dem- ocratic Party), they used to ap- pear until these very last months as mere think-tanks. Beside their purely elitist character, their absense of mass support, and their amor- phous infrastructure (well seen by ABDULLAEV 2003, 5), these new parties remain devoided of the es- sential tool of a political organization in Tajikistan: the disposition of armed forces or the possibility to mobilize them in a quick time - such a resource remains specific to the PDP and, to a much lesser extent, to the Nahzat.9 A common denomination of all the political organizations of Tajikistan is a total lack of stable and identifiable electoral basis, as well as a lack of strategy for enlarging it. (The en- larged benevolent activity which has shown so decisive in the po- litical fortune of the now govern- ing reformist Islamist party AKP in Turkey seems to be totally ab- sent from the activity of the Nahzat, which shows mainly pre- occupated in the maintenance of existing ties with its traditional sub- stratum from the «Tajik highlands (Kuhistoni tojik)10» and the Tajik highlanders’ migrant communities of the Wakhsh cotton valley - a significant part of which compos- es now the Tajik migrant manpow- er in Russia.)11 The present political power still comes out largely from the «Kulabi» faction which has long been considered the main victor of the civil war in De- cember 1992.12 During this period, however, President Rahmonov has managed to partly restore some au- thority of the state, and to get rid of the main warlords who had permit- ted the victory of the «Red» south- ern milicias in the civil war. (See the very recent arrestation in Mos- cow, on the request of the Tajik authorities, of the former warlord Yoqub Salimov, the first Minister of the Interior of the Rahmonov presidency, then ambassador of the Tajik Republic in Ankara, and finally the chief of the much lu- crative Direction of Customs of Tajikistan, before his fatal partic- ipation in the failed coup by Colonel Mahmud Khudoyberdiev in Khujand, in November 1998, which had forced Salimov and his family into exile.)13 President Rah- monov has also managed to put an end to the rivality of great families and their factions of the late Soviet period (the Khudonazarov’s, Osimi’s, Karimov’s, etc.) for the control of 9 Conversations with Muhiddin Kabiri and Parviz Mullojonov, Dushanbe, June-July 2003. 10 In the Nahzat this denomination designates the higher part of Gharm (now Darband) Valley, the Higher Zerafshan Valley and Higher Mast- Choh area, migrants of Lower Mast-Choh in the Soghd region, and for some part the Khowaling hilly area in Khatlon. 11 See a short biography of Shamsiddin Sham- siddinov, in SATTORI 2003, 87. 12 The term «Kulabization» has been widely in use among the political elite of Tajikistan during the last ten years; e.g., conversation with Dr. Iskandar Asadulloev, a former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies for the Presidency of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, early May 2003. 13 Comments in Asia Plus (2003/7/3): 1; Nerui sukhan 22 (2003/7/3): 1; 26 (2003/7/31): 2; for further comments: Marat MAMADSHOEV (in- terviewer), «Gaffor Mirzoev: Prezident ne kho- tel teryat’ Yakuba ... [Ghaffor Mirzoev: The President Did Not Want to Lose Yaqub],» Asia Plus (2003/7/10): 1 & 5. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 125 125 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... the Central Committee, then of the Presidency of the Republic.14 In the same time however, inescapable reversals of alliances have also oc- curred, sometimes spectacular, which on the long term could under- mine the power of the President: some of Emomali Rahmonov’s former allies have turned against him, as can be seen for instance through the present opposition of leading imams of the Khatlon region, his former supporters from the very beginning, whence some of his ma- jor political partners in the former «Red» coalition, such as the ambi- tious Mayor of Dushanbe Mamad- said Ubaydullaev (b. 1952), already appear as potential rivals inside the state and party apparatus.15 The Kulabi faction, however, has been opened in the meantime to most deserving officers from vari- ous geographical backgrounds, most with a Soviet-style professional and political pedigree: as well as the former Prime-Secretary Qahhor Mah- kamov (in charge from 1985 to 1991) and most of the local leaders of the last decades of the Soviet period, the main pillars of the re- gime are still ingeneers specialists of metallurgy and electricity, cot- ton production or mine industry, added with a transition through the Komsomol and, for some priv- ileged ones, a stronger political education in the Tashkent Party School. (See the biography of the Qurghon-Teppa-born agronomist Abdulmajid Dostiev, vice-presi- dent to Rahmonov in 1992-4, now a vice-president of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, and one of the main strategists of the regime since its very foundation: BASHIRI 2002, 79-80; OLIMOV 2002, 144-5). The enlarged «Kulabi» faction con- centrates in its hands the control over the main resources of the coun- try: the aluminium factory (more than 250,000 tons a year, 16 which consumes half the electric- ity produced by the country and has caused so many dramatic electricity cuts shortages last win- ters); the cotton production (ceded for years, by those who control it in the state apparatus, to Swiss companies whose activ- ity has caused an over-indebt- ment of cultivators, which should hamper for years any kind of re- form in this sector [see ICG 2003a]); the extraction of precious and semi-precious stones (a confi- dential sector, on which it re- mains difficult to obtain any valu- able statistical or cartographic information); and newly discov- ered oilfields (the symbol of a re- distribution of playing cards af- ter a privatization confiscated by the Communist nomenklatura, the state-owned firm Tajik-Gaz has been ruled during last years by the president of the opposition- al Democratic Party of Tajiki- stan). The biography of Saydullo Khayrullaev (born in 1945 in Gharm), an ingeneer in hydrology who has also passed through the Tashkent Party School, and who is since 2000 the President of the Lower Cham- ber of the Parliament, and since this year the number two of the regime (he was ubiquitous on the Tajik TV during the weeks preceding the June 2003 referendum), is char- acteristic of those technicians who, although not coming from Kulab, but like in his case from «loyal» families of the Gharm valley (a highland sanctuary of the Nahzat’s), have managed, in spite of «privatization,» to keep in their hands the main as- sets of the republic. (See his pres- idency of the strategic State Com- mittee for Precious Metals in 14 Conversation with Iskandar Asadullaev (former Director, the Institute of Strategic Stud- ies), Dushanbe, late April 2003. 15 Interview with Amb. Marc Gilbert, then chief of the OSCE mission in Tajikistan, Dushan- be, mid-May 2003. On Friday August 8, the day before our departure from Dushanbe, the ap- pearance of a new private, nation-wide news- paper, Ruzi nav [The New Day], was interpret- ed among leading members of the Nahzat as the launching of a «machine of war» by Ubaydul- loev for future electoral struggles - the inter- esting testimony of a state of mind, in a period characterized, as we shall see, by intense po- litical manoeuvres. 16 These are official figures, the real produc- tion probably exceeds 300,000 tons a year: conversation with Amb. Marc Gilbert, mid-May 2003; ICG 2003a. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 126 126 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1995-8,17 then his presidency of the no less strategic State Com- mittee of Agricultural Resources and Agricultural Development in 1998-2000: BASHIRI 2002, 157- 8; OLIMOV 2002: 214-5.) 1.2 Localised political clientelisms: the example of the Nahzat On the side of the opposition, the Nahzat does not seem to have a clear representation of its present electoral weigh, which has never been prop- erly measured and is probably very much overestimated by most ob- servers - who usually do not take into account the massive migration to Russia of many active young men from the large Highlands (Kuhisto- ni) community. (The lack of regu- lar opinion polls does not seem to bother the Nahzat’s leaders, neither the officers of the inter- national organizations established in Dushanbe. Such polls, indeed, could appear instrumental in the expansion of a culture of multi- partism in Tajikistan, and contrib- ute to reduce the present exclu- sive showdown of the Presidency and the Islamists - although, as we will still repeat in the current study, the disposal of armed forc- es, or the ability to mobilize them in a short time still continue to appear today in Tajikistan a mat- ter of survival for any political force worth of this denomination.) A «Tajik» political party which has, since its clandestine creation in 1973 (SATTORI 2003, 6) and its official recognition in 1991 limited its action to Tajikistan (ROY 1999) and, inside Tajikistan, to the Highland Tajik com- munities of Gharm in the East, Mast- Choh in the north and Khowaling in the south, the Nahzat appears more and more as the specific political instrument of «Tajik Highlanders» and of migrant communities from these Highlands in the Wakhsh basin, south and south-west of the country, largely devoted to cotton monoculture since the early 1950s. Highlanders still make off a yet un- measured, but probably considerable portion of Tajik economic migrants to the Russian Federation. The main preoccupation of the Nahzat seems to be maintaining its present position as the sole real interlocu- tor of the power, which may drive him to permanent one-upmanship and research of violent confron- tation with systematic appeal to the intervention of the OSCE, in order to avoid any further open- ing of the political system which would allow a reenforcement of newly created and potentially al- ternative political parties. The temptation of violence may be- come stronger in the next future, since the Nahzat has felt the limits of the PDP’s disposition for openness, whence the Tajik Islamist party itself has simultaneously lost a part of its initial legitimity by its participation in a regime where its position remains largely symbolic. (The Nahzat has recently lost key positions in the executive power, such as the im- portant Ministry of Economy oc- cupied in 1998-2000 by the influ- ent Davlat Usmon - opponent to Rahmonov in the November 1999 presidential election, in which D. Usmon was forced to participate at the last moment, receiving an official and symbolic amount of 2,1% of expressed votes -; be- sides, the party counts only for two deputies in the Parliament, including one who is not a mem- ber of the Islamist party, but a renegate from ... the PDP.) Dur- ing the last three years, the Nahzat has been more and more challenged by the development of the Hizb at-Tahrir, a non-violent but radical organization of Near-Eastern origin (e.g., ROY 2002: 200-201), espe- cially active in the Uzbek-peopled dis- tricts of northern and western Tajiki- stan, as well as by ... the agressive missionary activity throughout Tajikistan of Evangelist and Bap- tist Churches, which have commonly contributed to undermine the 17 On the developments of foreign investment in mine industry, interviews with Tim Dixon, a British businessman active in Tajikistan, Dushan- be, May and June 2003. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 127 127 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Nahzat’s prestige and legitimity in- side the country (see infra 3/B). Despite its recent loss of influence, the Nahzat has curiously continued to benefit by the sollicitude of for- eign and international organizations, as the only credible counter-weigh to the over-domination of the PDP - a foreign assistance which seems to be aimed at maintaining the political statu quo in the country, although it is more and more badly perceived in the presidency,18 and among new- ly created political parties, as well as in the popular base of the Nahzat itself. One of the numerous specificities of Tajikistan in recent years, if compared with neighbouring Central Asian states, has been the very phenom- enon of multiplication of political parties and organizations. Six offi- cially registered parties exist today in the country, plus several others (an Agrarian party, the «Wahdat» [Union] Party, etc.) waiting for their official recognition. Beside President Rahmonov’s hegemonic PDP, we find two parties with a potentially signifi- cant - although poorly quantified - electoral basis: the Communist Par- ty (CP) directed by the Pamir-born electricity ingeneer Shodi Shabdolov (b. 1943; BASHIRI 2002: 317), a his- torical figure of this organization (during Perestroika he was heir apparent to Qahhor Mahkamov, another ingeneer, specialist of mine industries),19 and the Nahzat, at this date the only credible opposi- tional party in Tajikistan. Then come mini-parties more or less closely as- sociated with the PDP and the state apparatus: the Socialist Party (SP) and the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), the personnel of which comes out from the Communist party and the state apparatus, and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), a former oppositional force of the Perestroika and civil war periods which shows from time to time impulses of oppo- sition (it has officially boycotted the June, 23 Referendum). It is stating the obvious to write that most of these organizations share a common political culture: that of the Soviet-time Communist party and Komsomol. An extreme ideological and sociological closeness can be observed, in particular, between the presidential party and the Commu- nists, whence the Socialists also come out of the Soviet Communist appa- ratus. (In the past, they had been inspired by Safarali Kenjaev (1943- 1999); a potential rival to Rah- monov among the victors of the civil war, and notoriously hostile to the President’s policy of high- er state executives’ appointments, Kenjaev was mysteriously assassi- nated in Dushanbe in the year of the second presidential election in the history of the country). Both aging Communists and young- er Socialists remain deprived of a charismatic figure, and of an armed force which would help them to rep- resent an alternative to President Rahmonov’s PDP. The leader of the still non-registered Agrarian Party, the 55 year-old Hikmatullo Nasriddinov, from Kulab, is himself a former lead- er of the Communist party in the Khatlan region - not the best guaran- tee of future diversification of the Tajik political arena. Moreover, leaders and representa- tives of political parties which claim to be oppositional use to occupy, sometimes until now, higher positions in various organs of the executive power.20 Scandals have recently aroused around some of these fig- ures, such as the president of the Democratic Party Mahmad-Ruz Is- kandarov, the director of the state- owned strategic company Tajik- Gaz,21 and Rahmatullo Zoyirov, the founder of the Social-Democratic Party and a close adviser to Presi- 18 Interview with Sayfullo Safarov, vice-director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Dushanbe, mid-May 2003. 19 On the evolution of the sociological basis of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in the first years after the independence, see the pio- neering and unfortunately still unique study by Saodat K. OLIMOVA, «Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v 1992-1994 gg. [The Com- munist Party of Tajikistan in 1992-1994],» Vostok 1996/2: 52-62. 20 See the analysis by Suhrob SHARIPOV (a politologist generally favourable to President Rahmonov), «Politicheskie partii RT: na pervyi- vtoroi rasschitaetes’!», Asia Plus (2003/2/6): 4. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 128 128 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... dent Rahmonov, until his recent res- ignation from this position.22 In May 2003, another scandal had occurred: that of those officials of the Com- munist party who, in order to pre- serve their personal carreer in the state apparatus, had also taken the card of President Rahmonov’s PDP.23 1.3 The political personnel This phenomenon of double political affiliation characterises the idea that most Tajik officials have of political «engagement.» The erratic attitude of most non-governmental parties before the referendum suggests, at the same time, the existence of fierce pressures from the PDP and from the state apparatus for the conformation of other political forces to the official lines. (See, in particular, the re- peated threats of re-opening the hostilities formulated by higher Tajik officials against the Nahzat, in May and early June 2003.) These pressures have made difficult, if not impossible, the reinforcement of the block or front of «opposition- al» parties which had been sketched in the months preceding the June ref- erendum - although the obvious lack of interest among voters may also explain the weak commitment of po- litical parties in this affair. The cur- rent reform of the electoral law and code for the 2005 parliamentary, and 2006 presidential elections, un- der the aegidus of the OSCE’s ex- perts, may allow in the short term a (slightly) stronger representation of existing registered parties in the Par- liament. At the same time, the ap- pearance of new leaders, and the eventual transformation of political parties into mobilisation tools at the service of these figures may on the longer term bring some change to the overall rules of the game. Of course the scanty Tajik press is still in the hands of a little amount of lob- bies closely linked with leading eco- nomic sectors, and remains mostly characterized by its non-profitability - a common feature of many peri- odicals of the post-Soviet era, includ- ing leading Russia journals, which in the Tajik case can explain occasional demonstrations of «venality.24» However, one may not totally ex- clude the possibility of a quick trans- formation of several of some recently appeared Tajik newspapers into «machines of war» for alternative candidates - as suggest the recent rumors on the creation of Ruzi naw by a lobby favourable to Mamad- said Ubaydullaev’s alledged presiden- tial designs. A prominent political figure like the Kazakhstan-born, Ukraine-educated young lawyer Rahmatullo Zoyirov (b. 1958) - a man of higher Sufi ances- try, still another strong and significant difference with most of his potential rivals in Tajikistan -, may appear in the perspective of the 2013 presi- dential election25 a credible alterna- tive to the 50/60 year-old ingeneers with a Communist background and a Tashkent Party School education (Ubaydullaev, Khayrullaev, Dostiev, etc.) who are still over-dominating the PDP, the state apparatus, and the integrated economic system of Tajikistan. However, this is not the scenario according to which the sys- tem is supposed to change in a pre- dictable future. Since the signature 21 Khurshid ATOVULLO, «GKChP dar hizbi demokrat «Tojikgaz»-ro besarvar naguzosht [The Coup in the Democratic Party Did Not Deprive Tajikgaz of Its Leader],» Tojikiston 30 [291] (2003/ 6/24): 5.22 Rajab MIRZO [interviewer], «Cha- ro Zoyirov az mushovirii prezident dast kashid? [Why Did Zoyirov Give Up His Position as an Adviser to the President?],» Nerui sukhan 22 (2003/7/3): 4-5. 23 See for instance the anonymous paper and interview: «Kommunisty: na dvukh stul’yakh ne sidet’ [Communists: One Armchair per Per- son!],» Asia Plus (2003/4/3): 2; «Karim Abdu- lov: Fraktsiiai HKT az tanqid megurezad [Karim Abdulov: The Fraction of the TCP Flees from Critics],» Tojikiston 24 [285] (2003/6/12): 5. 24 On the overall practice of subsidized adver- tisement papers, including papers paid by in- ternational organizations established in Dush- anbe: conversations with Andre Loersch, me- dia expert of CIMERA, Dushanbe, early August 2003. 25 Nobody in Tajikistan accepts the idea that a real challenge may be opposed to Rahmonov in the presidential election planned for 2006: see among others (although this author is not al- ways among the most non-conformists in the Tajik press, which allows us some doubt on the present serenity of the power, less than three years before the election) Suhrob SHARIPOV, «Tadzhikskii referendum: izvlechem uroki [The Tajik Referendum: Let’s Take Its Lessons],» Asia Plus (2003/6/25): 4. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 129 129 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... of the General Peace Agreement of 1997, we are situated in an overall institutional logics where representative organs of power, and the government itself, led by the pale Prime-Minister Oqil Oqilov, have been deprived of any political significance for the exclusive benefit of the presiden- cy. Although the United Tajik Op- position has been given since 1997 an apparently significant 30% quota in the governmental positions, most of political power has been concen- trated in the presidential office, de- priving oppositional leaders of their initial share (ABDULLAEV 2003, 4). This process of shift of the execu- tive power from the cabinet of min- isters to the presidential office, which is out of any kind of control from the parliament, has been characteristic of the extreme flexibility of the Tajik political system, a worth heir to the Soviet institutions where one and the same constitution used to allow spec- tacular movings of the centre of power from one place to another (e.g. LEWIN 2003: 429-439). One may add that, on a slightly lonfer duration, in Soviet time the Central Committee of the CP, whose build- ing is now occupied by the Presi- dency of the Republic, has always been exerting a tutelage over the Cabinet of Ministers. In this matter the shift of a part of central execu- tive power from the Presidency to- wards the Ministries during short-lived coalitions (with non-Communist par- ties in 1992, with the Khujandi lead- er Abdumalik Abdullojonov in 1993) appears in retrospect as mere perip- eties, before a kind of return to the norm with a more usual concentra- tion of decision power in the hands of what is called today the Presiden- cy. Moreover the country, for the moment, knows no division be- tween the executive, the regional executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers, which allows a lim- ited amount of people to hold all the political and economic might in their hands. Even the universi- ties are totally submitted to the authority of the Presidency, which makes still more difficult than in the past the appearance of an au- tonomous academic intelligenstia. Tajikistan remains deprived of a real- ly independent Constitutional Court, although the separation of powers was one of the formal goals of the confuse referendum of June 2003.26 The relative weakness of the Tajik press deprives the country of any kind of real counter-power, despite sensitive openings since early 2003. These recent changes have been symbolised by the appearance, in February of this year, of the radical independent newspaper Nerui sukhan [«The Strength of Word»], an organ with a rich history in clan- destinity, now edited at 500 copies by Mukhtar Boqizoda, the president of the Association for the Defense of Journalists, and distributed on Dus- hanbe’s main avenues. Published by a staff of 5 persons in all, Nerui sukhan has immediately become the main canal of written protestation throughout Tajikistan.27 As we have already suggested, the appearance on August 8, 2003 of the new pri- vate-owned, nation-wide newspaper Ruzi Naw [The New Day] was in- terpreted in Tajik oppositional circles as the first step of the mayor of the capital, Mamadsaid Ubaydullaev, to- wards a candidacy to the next pres- idential election in 2006 - an inter- pretation characteristic of the climate which prevails now in Tajikistan, where a relatively great variety of poorly diffused, but abundantly com- mented newspapers has been en- hancing the role of rumors in the making of an embryonic public opin- ion. The impact of recent innova- tions remain, in fact, limited by the weak circulation of the press. (The amount of printed copies of the most important non-commercial 26 R. ZOYIROV, «Izmeniat’ konstitutsiiu neobkhodimo v interesakh naroda [Changing the Constitution Is A Necessity for the Sake of the People],» Asia Plus (2003/3/13): 2. 27 The pessimistic Report on the Media situa- tion in Tajikistan by Andre LOERSCH and Mark GRIGORIAN (Geneva: Cimera, October 2000, 27 p.), although of an extreme acuteness on the dark period 1993-2000, should be offered, by the same authors, a second volume on more recent developments. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 130 130 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Russian-language newspaper of Tajikistan, Asia Plus, has fallen from 10,000 to 5,000 during the last five years.)28 Despite such slight changes, the lead- ing impression remains that of a low level of political education, and gen- eral lack of technicians of public life among the officials of political par- ties, government, and public institu- tions. An overall brain drain of specialists from these institutions towards international organiza- tions recently established in Tajiki- stan has been generally observed, and often deplored by our inter- locutors, local and foreign; this phenomenon can be considered one of the significant deregulat- ing side effects, among the politi- cal and intellectual elites of the country, of the massive influx of international technical assistance to Dushanbe during the last two years. The demand for more «spe- cialists» of law and government, in the parliament and the political par- ties, has been a moto of the meet- ings of party leaders and advisers at the OSCE during the spring and sum- mer 2003.29 The Nahzat has delegated to the Parliament its only lawyer and former president, Muhammad-Sharif Him- matzoda (b. 1951, also an engi- neer, with a later education in law and government at the University of Peshawar - an Islamic equiva- lent to the Tashkent Party School? - during his exile in Pakistan from 1993 to 1997). So we cannot ex- clude that the Nahzat deprived itself of a precious help during the ses- sions of the commission for the re- form of the election system. During the meetings of the commission at the OSCE, the lawyer Rahmatullo Zoyirov, the President of the newly recognized Social-Democratic party, who is graduated from the Kiev Academy of Law, has had no diffi- culty to appear as a judicial expert of international standard, although showing few interest, if at all, for existing rules in European, North American, and other democratic countries. (The only model pro- vided up by him till now has been that of the Federation of Russia, and the election of a State Duma still dominated by a hegemonic party submitted to the authority of President Putin.)30 One question remains: who, and where are the strategists, the think- ers of the current reforms, and op- position to these reforms? In the government and its various organs? In the political parties? In the interna- tional organizations present in Tajiki- stan? Or in the local NGOs which have been mushrooming in Dushan- be, with international support, dur- ing the last six years, with a special vigour since 2001? Inside the state apparatus, a first echelon can be dif- ferentiated: that of the president Rahmonov himself who, although sometimes considered a mere «wedding’s general,»31 has proved able to change pragmatically the alli- ance systems on which his power used to lie down, every time it was felt necessary. Such an unexpected political instinct has probably been fueled by the pil- lars of the regime and a handful of advisers (some officials like Dostiev, and specialists like Suhrob Sharipov or the mysterious, anti-conformist high-ranking economist who signs papers in the Tajik press under the pen-name «Anvar Kamolov» [infra note 47]). The president benefits from the fact that most officials come out of the Komsomol system: the ideological differentiation remains too weak, and the taste for con- sensus too high inside the ruling class for bringing any risk of open schism inside its ranks (Zoyirov, when referring, in a purely rhe- 28 Conversation with Andre Loersch, Dushan- be, early August 2003. 29 The author’s participation in the meeting of the Commission for the reform of the electoral system, Dushanbe, OSCE, 5 June 2003. 30 Meeting of the same commission, 26 June 2003; on the referendum, see the detailed pa- per by Rahmatullo ZOYIROV, «Vozrazheniia i predlozheniia [Objections and Proposals],» Vechernii Dushanbe 16 [280] (2003/4/18): 8-9. 31 In Russian: general svad’by, a grotesque figure of Anton Chekhov and other late 19th- century Russian playwriters: interview with a local officer of the OSCE, Dushanbe, May 2003. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 131 131 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... torical way, to the German or Swedish Social-Democracy, re- mains an exception). Moreover, all these peoples are united by a strong «counter-revolutionary» solidarity,32 reinforced by clien- telistic relationship: in spite of the increasing roles of political agencies with a NGO status, many of these new structures remain dependent on the Presidency and its numerous ad- visers for the allowance of interna- tional grants. Besides, the venality of most public offices, beginning with ministerial positions, reinforces the inter-personal relationship between the members of the executive power and their common benefactor: Pres- ident Rahmonov himself - as in the early 20th-century Emirate of Bukha- ra, if such an anachronical compari- son can be allowed: then the same venality of charges, or the payment of huge fines by the detainers of the main civil, religious and military offic- es, used to draw the same links of inter-dependence between the sov- ereign and the first circles of political power [DUDOIGNON 2003].) A methodological parenthesis, if al- lowed: through such a comparison with a past and alledgedly tradition- alist society - a common feature of area studies, especially when Islami- cate societies are concerned - should not serve as an ideological tool for underlying the archaism of Central Asian societies, vs. imported mod- ernism: as we have tempted to sug- gest in the above-quoted study on the Bukharan Emirate, the very log- ics of political clientelisms - a com- mon feature of modern societies, although they are usually underesti- mated in political studies on «devel- oped» societies33 - was then deep- ly affected by that of the Russian domination on Central Asia; in this framework of a functionalist, not cul- turalistic, analysis, it is sometimes in- teresting to put in perspective the clientelistic systems of one and the same region of the world over dif- ferent, although close periods of his- tory. A second echelon of expertise is made of mid-aged Tajik political and social scientists who have cut off their former ties with a rotten Academy of Sciences in the mid-1990s, and have been working since then in a limited number of private centres and NGOs financed directly (i.e., not through the Tajik Presidency, nor its agencies) through grants from abroad (mainly from the USA), or in international organizations based in Dushanbe. These scholars have ex- erted an undirect, although not ne- glectable influence on the course of events, partly through their publica- tions (although the latter remain for the most part ignored by Tajik authorities),34 mainly through their participation in the multifold working groups and seminars on topics as dif- ferent as the relations between the central state and the region, or the current reform of the election sys- tem of Tajikistan, which were being multiplied throughout Tajikistan since the 1997 General Peace Agreement. We may deplore the lack of audi- ence of these activists of their own among the greater public inside Tajiki- stan; the responsability of such a lack of echoe must be attributed in most cases to the Western organizations which finance them, and rarely take into account this specific aspect of public activity in Central Asian states.35 As to the Institute of Strategic Stud- ies, it could be recalled «Potemkin 32 Conversation with Sa’dullo Safarov, Dushan- be, May 2003. 33 For new, iconoclastic approaches, see Pierre TAFANI, Les clienteles politiques en France (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2003). 34 See for instance a bright comparative socio- logical study on youth in Tajikistan and in Uzbeki- stan, ordered by the UNESCO to the Sharq Research Center of Dushanbe, and promptly forgotten by the UNESCO itself soon after its publication in the summer 2002: conversation with Muzaffar Olimov, Director of the Sharq Research Center, Dushanbe, October 2002. 35 The Moscow-educated, well-known to CI- MERA politologist Parviz MULLOJONOV in the Public Committee, and the politilogist Dr. Ab- duali TOIROV in the OSCE are both considered close to the former opposition parties of the Perestroika and early independence periods; the historian Muzaffar OLIMOV and the sociol- ogist Saodat OLIMOVA in the Sharq Research Center are sometimes considered more con- servative, although all of these scholars active in the political field remain remarkable by their courageous independence of thought, and their often iconoclastic inquiries. Significantly enough, none of them has for the moment managed to acquire a real audience among the ruling cir- cles, nor among the greater public in Tajikistan. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 132 132 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Villages, Inc.» Most literature which comes out of this institution do not show outstandingly original, a major- ity of its experts having abandoned dialectocal materialism for various categories of Western political cor- rectness, in the intention of bringing more attention from donor institu- tions. Most of the researchers of the ISS seem lacking real convictions, and capable of defending any kind of position, or its exact contrary in the following quarter of an hour. It goes without saying that most de- clare themselves ready to write any study on any subject, including even decentralization, in a very short time (elementary politeness and our projects of future stays in Tajiki- stan forbide us to give concrete illustrations of these tendencies). If the Institute of Strategic Studies must be the main source of informa- tion on the country for the presiden- cy, many attitudes and decision of the power become then understand- able. A third echelon is made of overnu- merous ideologists educated in the humanities, who are in charge of purveying the overall philosophical legitimation of the regime. Deprived of any control on the economic ap- paratus and of a real influence on the course of political affairs, they fully rely on the meagre subsidies given to them by the presidential appara- tus. The members of this plethorical intelligenstia dispute each other the favor of the Prince, ands that of rare foreign organizations (among which the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran) through generally abstruse quibbles on the origins of the Tajik people, which carry on early 20th- century Soviet teachings on the «ethnogeneses» of the peoples of the USSR. (See for instance the harsh polemics of the last years between the Darwaz-born histo- rian Rahim Masov [b. 1939], a proponent of the restrictive south- ern «Bactrian» identity of the Tajiks, and the Bukhara-born, pan-Iranist literary critic Muham- madjan Shakuri [b. 1926] [MAS- OV 2001, TABAROV 2003, IBN QURBON 2003].) These academ- ic intellectuals are the heirs of those abundant literati who, in the last de- cades of the Soviet period, were in charge of shaping, and propagating the collective proletarian identity of each national republic. It is remark- able that nor the overall sociology of academic circles, neither the ideo- logical framework of their disputes have been substantially affected since the last decades of the Soviet period - today’s leading seventy- year-old scholars are those fifty-year- old ones who had taken power dur- ing Perestroika. In spite of official support, and the reinforcement of the Soviet theory of nationality, the main upheaval in matter of academ- ic life seems to be the growing limi- tation of these circles’ own audience throughout the country, thanks to the quick escheat of the school system, and the striking lack of social pres- tige of everything linked with sci- ence. In the religious field, one can only observe in Tajikistan the absence of a properly educated clergy which would be able to give re- sponses to challenges such as that of the Hizb at-Tahrir of that of re- formed Christian missionary activ- ity. (The most active, listened, and promissing ideologists and strategists of the Nahzat are non- religious peoples: Ibrohim Rah- namo, an adviser to the former mufti and Islamist moderator Hojji Akbar Turajonzoda, and Muhid- din Kabiri, Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri’s adviser - although Kabiri seems now tempted to use the NGO that he presides, and his personal ties in Europe for taking some dis- tance with the Islamic party, and for playing a more personal card: a strategy perfectly conform to that of Tajikistan’s political insti- tutions, but the contrary of what was probably waited from him by his European partners, probably not very well informed of the spe- cific functionning of these institu- tions since the mid-1990s). An- other peculiarity of present Tajiki- stan is the very weak theological TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 133 133 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... differentiation between the revo- lutionary proponents of the Nahzat and more quietist religious leaders (e.g., in Khujand the still active lineage of Abdulloh Ka- lonzoda, the Mufti of Tajikistan during the Brejnev era): both have read the same books, and advocate for instance the orthodox thought of the founder of the Naqshbandi-Mu- jaddidi mystical order, the 17th-cen- tury northern Indian religious thinker Ahmad Sirhindi, alias Imam Rabbani.36 There is, moreover, a deep genera- tional and qualitative gap between the generation of the locally famous neo-traditionalist Hanafi theologian Domullo Hindustoni (d. 1989), who was active during the second half of the Soviet period, and his much younger, mostly undirect disciples and followers of the Nahzat, whose ethical and intellectual education seems very weakly different from that of a handful of «official» mullahs educated in the same years. In this matter the gap between an old, now vanishing generation of whether «of- ficial» or «parallel» ulama, on the first hand, and on the second hand a largely secularized generation of «baby-boom» mullahs educated dur- ing the last years of the Soviet sys- tem seems culturally more significant than that between the young pro- ponents of such or such tendency of re-Islamization. (See BABADJAN- OV & KAMILOV 2001, passim; OLIMOVA & OLIMOV, 2003, passim; the latters have noticed current problems for authority building among the religious peo- ple - a characteristic which would suffice, if needed, to differentiate early 21st-century Tajikistan from pre-revolutionary Iran . . .).37 2. Some Paradigms of Policy Making 2.1 A «quota system?» It is universally admitted in Tajikistan that the current political schemes are contrary to any kind of change, and nobody seriously - or publicly, which is not exactly the same thing - ad- mits the idea of the possibility of a political alternance of any kind at the summit of the state for the decade to come.38 This apparent immobility of the political scenery has been un- expectedly reinforced by the ges- ture of the international community, first after the peace agreement of 1997 (with the mainly symbolic opening of the state structures to a limited number of representa- tives of what was then the armed opposition), second after the launching of the current «crusade» against terrorism (with pressures on the government for further open- ing of the political system, and on opposition forces for more moderation). The present governmental «coalition» repeats, more or less, the schemes of a first coalition set up in the spring 1992: the opposition parties had then got a share in the Communist gov- ernment, for the most part in the shape of the «ministries of talk» (THOM 1989), whence privatisation of the assets of the Tajik CP and state was already going on for several years in secrecy, with no control on it by representatives of oppositional forces. Even during those fatal months of 1992, at the eve of the civil war, a regime dominated by in- geneers of cotton culture, metallur- gy and mine industries, educated in the main party schools of the CPUS had managed to maintain its control over the key resources and political 36 Conversations with Hojji Domullo “Ibodullo Kalonzoda, vice-khatib of the Soghd region, Khujand, mid-April 2003, Muhammad-Sharif Him- matzoda, vice-president of the Nahzat, Dushan- be, early June 2003. 37 See also the author’s conversations with Sayyid Ahmad Qalandar, director of the «Sipe- hr» research centre and journal, Dushanbe, June and early August 2003. 38 In the weeks preceding the referendum, at a time when the Nahzat publicly advocated the «No», the present author jokingly asked Muhid- din Kabiri, political adviser to Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri, founding father and president of the Islam- ist party, what would happen if the result of the referendum would be favorable to the Nahzat, and President Rahmonov would decide to re- tire. The answer was simple: M. Kabiri an- swered that in such a most unpredictable case, Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri would refuse the respon- sability of government, and appeal to Rahmonov to come back to power. Interview with M. Kabiri, Dushanbe, early May 2003. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 134 134 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... positions of the country in spite of endless, hostile street demonstra- tions. This may explain why today the leaders of the former opposition, in the Nahzat and the Democratic Party in particular, are still much more preoccupated in the reform, or re- making of privatization, which was crucial to them fifteen years ago, than in problems such as the administra- tive relations between the central state and the regions. The composition of the parliament since the 2000 general elections pro- vides a clear illustration of the bal- ance of forces - in fact an unbalanced hegemony of the PDP, to which can be added the 6 sieges of the Com- munist party, against only 2 for the Nahzat. The itinerary of Atobek Amirbekov (b. 1950), a founder of the «La’l-i Badakhshan» Pamiri auton- omous movement, in the opposition to the Communist power in the years 1991-1993, now a deputy to the Parliament (OLIMOV 2002: 126-7), provides us an illustration of the des- tiny the Rahmonov presidency pro- poses to salient figures of opposi- tional parties. In fact, several opposition parties have been advocating for long a line of «cooperation» with the Rahmonov government. Such is the case of the Democratic Party, after first years in the opposition.39 As to the Nahzat, a tendency has always existed inside this party, since its recognition in 1991, for cooperation with the state appa- ratus. The now well-known to us in- geneer and lawyer Muhammad- Sharif Himmatzoda, the president of the party from 1991 to 1999, has long advocated cooperation with the Communist regime and then with the Kulabi faction,40 against the financist Davlat Usmon, an ephemerous min- ister of the Economy in 1997-1999 and the candidate of the Nahzat to the presidential election that year, beforehand a proponent of confron- tation with Communist authorities. (The temptation has long existed in the Nahzat, since Perestroika, for an alliance with the Commu- nists against the other political forces of Tajikistan. It must be noticed that in the late 1980s, the KGB itself was favorable to such a line of rapprochement with the Islamists, in order to marginalize the then aggressive political or- ganizations of the nationalist in- telligentsia.41 The current policy of the party for appearing as the only alternative force to the Rah- monov regime can be considered a continuation of this revolution- ary strategy.) As to the government, it has long inaugurated a tradition of selective engagement of alternative and non-conformist political figures into the executive apparatus. Some people see here a mere attempt at «harmonisation and stabilisation of the political sphere,» and attribute this attempt to the «pragmatism» of the head of the state?42 Such an expla- nation, however flattering for Presi- dent Rahmonov, does not take into account the capacity of the regime born from the Soviet period and the civil war to integrate those alien elements which are estimat- ed too dynamic to be let out of state structures. (Muhiddin Kabiri himself, today the main political adviser to Sayyid “Abdullah Nuri, founder and President of the Nahzat, was invited by the gov- ernment to integrate the state apparatus after his return from Moscow in 1997.) This system, enlarged to represen- tatives of political parties, could be called the «quota system.»43 Its his- tory is longer than that of indepen- dant Tajikistan, since its roots can be found in the politics of the CPUS in 39 M. ISKANDAROV [president of the DPT], «Nasha tsel’ - sozidatel’noe sotrudnichestvo [Our Goal Is a Constructive Cooperation],» Asia Plus (2003/3/5): 5. 40 Interview with Muhammad-Sharif HIMMAT- ZODA, Dushanbe, mid-June 2003. 41 Conversation with Sulton HAMAD, a Gharm- born former collaborator of the KGB, the former chief of the intelligence service of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan during its exile in Af- ghanistan, now an independent journalist and memorialist, Dushanbe, late June 2003. See also DUDOIGNON 1994. 42 SHARIPOV, «Politicheskie partii RT», 4. 43 A denomination borrowed from a Tajik offic- er of the OSCE, our regular interlocutor in Dus- hanbe, Summer 2003. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 135 135 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... the last decades of the Soviet peri- od. It consists in the selective ag- gregation to the hegemonic par- ty and to the state structure of a limited amount of prominent fig- ures from various political move- ments and forces. This is proba- bly the way the system will (try to) perpetuate itself, without big changes, during the next decade, at least until the 2013 presidential election, if this process is not in- terrupted in the meantime by a major landslide linked, for instance, to some external factor. In spite of tensions, sometimes inside the Kula- bi faction itself (see the overall fear of Mamadsaid Ubaydullaev’s per- sonal ambitions among both «oppo- sition» and official circles), a fragile consensus exists today, among po- litical leaders of Tajikistan, including former oppositional leaders, on this global evolution, or lack of evolution; discontent is mainly expressed, for the moment, on precise points such as the remaking of privatisation and the redistribution of political authori- ty at the local jamoat and mahalla level - two postulates essential, how- ever, for any structural change in the longer term, although they deserve, curiously enough, little attention from donor states and other foreign part- ners of the Tajikistani authorities. Despite guarantees given by the 1997 peace agreement and efforts by international organizations (the OSCE, in particular) at opening the Tajik political society, only three par- ties seem in situation of playing some role in the next future: Rah- monov’s PDP, the Communist par- ty, and the Islamist party (the Nahzat). The Communists and Is- lamists, two organizations with a limited but stable clientele, will probably satisfy themselves with the unequal sharing of state pow- er and, to a lesser extent, eco- nomic assets. As to «little» parties (the Perestroika-born Democrats, and the Socialists and Social-Dem- ocrats still deprived of an elec- toral past), their personnel and most of their programmes come out from the CP and PDP’s ranks and political culture. In the next political cam- paigns, these parties will probably appear as mere prolongations of the hegemonic presidential camp. All the strategy of these parties seems to be oriented towards the cre- ation of a niche inside the state apparatus and state owned eco- nomic system, rather than the en- largement of their still inexistent, or poorly quantified electoral ba- sis. An illustration of this phenomenon can be given by the case of Rah- matullo Zoyirov, a bright lawyer (ac- cording to Tajikistan’s criteria), an un- disputable virtuoso of manoeuvres inside the apparatus, and the presi- dent of a little Social-Democratic par- ty with a rather erratic ideology. (Advocating the suspension of taxes in order to favour the ap- pearance of SME, as Zoyirov did in a recent past, can hardly ap- pear specific to Social-Democ- racy.) A future adviser to Presi- dent Rahmonov, R. Zoyirov creat- ed his party in 1999, which imme- tiadely brought attention to him. What his case suggested then is that the creation of a political party, or the threat to create one, far from bringing obstacles to a suc- cessful political carreer, may on the contrary become a key instru- ment for personal promotion of a leader, or of a limited group of people inside the state appara- tus. (From this point of view, Tajikistan, and former Soviet Re- publics, do not constitute excep- tions: see the successful threat formulated by the French Social- ist leader Jack Lang in 2001 of participating in the Paris munici- pal election where the Socialists already had a candidate, for guetting a ministerial post that Lang effectively received very soon; or more recently, the threat by Valery Giscard d’Estaing to participate in the French 2002 presidential elec- tion, and to hamper President Jacques Chirac’s chances of re- election, if he did not receive the presidence of the European Con- FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 136 136 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... vention, that Giscard finally got thanks to President Chirac’s ef- forts.) «Little» parties in Tajikistan express no pretention to win elections: they should merely serve in the future as a reservoirs of young political leaders, as the Komsomol used to do during the Soviet period.44 These parties, as well as the Com- munists and the Islamists in most cas- es, satisfy themselves with the spo- radic denunciation of alleged «de- fects» (Rus. nedostatki) in the ad- ministration of the hegemonic party.45 The content of their press remem- bers more and more that of the Ko- msomol’s during Perestroika. Possi- ble federation of insatisfactions can occur on questions such as the failure of privatization, which has been cov- ered by confiscated in Tajikistan by corrupted figures of the state appa- ratus and several mafia groups, and resulted in the ruin of many of those enterprises concerned.46 Too much attention has been giv- en in the past to the Islamist movements in Tajikistan, not enough to the global function- ning, since the last decades of the soviet period, of the Tajik state, inside which the Tajik Islamists of the Nahzat have found a kind of niche of their own, which should be pro- gressively, and reasonably enlarged in the next future in the framework of the quota system, notably through the parliamentary elections in 2005. Nobody should nevertheless forget that, behind the overall curtain of a consensual culture inherited from a recent past, all the political forces in presence characterize themselves, like the CPUS at the time of its glo- ry, by a high «fissionability» and permanent research of alliances between antagonistic coteries (LEWIN 2003: 309) - which makes its obervation and prediction by out- siders a particularly thankless exer- cise. Whilst the Tajik Communist Party has given way, after indepen- dence, to the creation of the late Safarali Kenjaev’s Socialist Party (the Mensheviks?) and Emomali Rah- monov’s hegemonic Popular-Demo- cratic Party (the Bolsheviks?), the latter is for the time to come under constant threat of scission/coalition under the efforts of faction or party leaders such as Ubaydullaev and the «political adviser» Zoyirov - for whom the conquest of an electoral basis is probably, for the moment, a least preoccupation. The Nahzat it- self, according to the same political culture and logic, is very much ex- posed to permanent inner scission of its leadership, and autonomization of some of its figures - like that of Mu- hiddin Kabiri, another «political ad- viser» who, as we suggested earli- er, seems currently tempted to use his European connections for taking some distance with the direction of the Islamist party, and for playing his own card inside the overall system (a system which now includes the international organizations of all kinds present in Tajikistan, or linked through regular partner- ship with Tajikistani institutions). These tactics of autonomization of individual leaders, a specificity of the period immediately posterior to the referendum of June 2003 may bring significant changes in the alliance systems which have been prevailing grosso modo in- side Tajikistan’s political apparatus since 1997. However, in spite of upheavals such as the relative free- dom of speech enjoyed by Tajik mass-medias since the beginning of this year, this tactical changes will not necessarily affect the over- all logic of these systems. 2.2 The erratic, limited, but salutary foreign intervention Such evolutions, it may be remem- bered, could not be observed without the strong presence in Tajikistan of the international com- munity, and its strong pressures on the central power in Dushan- be. Until now, the Tajik authori- 44 Marat MAMADSHOEV [interviewer], «R. Zoyirov: demokratiya yavlyaetsya usloviem a ne sledstviem razvitiia [Democracy Is a Condition, Not a Result of Development],» Asia Plus (2003/ 1/9): 4. 45 ISKANDAROV, «Nasha tsel’ - sozidatel’noe sotrudnichestvo,» 5. 46 Ibid. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 137 137 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ties have perfectly negociated the unpredictable, sudden and prob- ably short-term sollicitude shown by foreign powers for their coun- try after the rise of the Talibans in a first step, then in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 - at a time when, it should be remembered, most Western compagnies and banks were preparing their withdraw- al from Central Asia . . . . Such a strategic reversal must remember us the superficiality and versatility of Western commitment in the region. This specific commitment has exert- ed locally deep deregulating effects. Among the latter, we may not for- get some favourable influences on the relative and still very limited opening of the political game. An example of these influences can be given by the role played in Tajiki- stan, during the last six years, by the OSCE Mission, which appears to many as the sole real guarantee of the new political order. (After the arrestation, in early June 2003, of Shamsiddin Shamsiddinov, a vice-president of the Nahzat from highland Mast-Choh and a founder of the Islamist party’s branch in the Soghd region, the direction of the party appealed not to the Tajik state, but to the OSCE representation in Dushan- be.) However the role played by inter- national organizations illustrates the fragility of the overall peace process, and of the inter-Tajik dialogue. The threats formulated by members of the presidential apparatus against the Nahzat, and conversely by Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri against the regime at the tribune of the party congress on the Reconciliation Day, remember a recent past of confrontation. As the same time, the highly declarative character of these confrontations between the Nahzat and the Presi- dency may remember to us that they are intended towards observers of international organizations, which have become a full protagonist of Tajiki- stan’s political arena. Nevertheless, these organizations, although inti- mately implicated in the political pro- cesses, have rarely proved capable of exerting a real influence on the very logics of the state apparatus in Tajikistan, especially on the imple- mentation of the quota system as it has been developing during more than a decade of independence, according to schemes experiment- ed under the guidance of security organs during the last decades of the Soviet period. It is true that international organiza- tions and foreign NGOs which have acquired a foothold in Tajikistan have lost, during the last years, a consid- erable part of the moral credit that they initially enjoyed in the country. The non-coordinated and often redundant offer of technical assis- tance has accentuated the attitude of ambivalence of the Tajik au- thorities, which had a long habit of dealing with contradictory and un- consequent demands from Moscow during the late Soviet period. If the multiplication of donor organiza- tions has had some mechanically positive impacts, especially on the pacification and on the relative opening of the political game, however the redundant character of that offer, the dispersion of re- sources, the lack of coordination, the lack of knowledge of the in- stitutional framework in Tajikistan, the weakness of these foreign or- ganizations’ local partners, wheth- er governmental or non-govern- mental, have complicated local perceptions of foreign assistance, whence they were permitting the most conservative segments of the state apparatus and economic sys- tem to elaborate means of resis- tance to change, allowing numer- ous members of this new nomen- klatura to use these new incom- ing resources for building fortunes sometimes considerable.47 (In the course of the past fifteen years, one could observe an interesting 47 Anvar KAMOLOV [pseud.], «Inostrannaia pomoshch’: pliusy i minusy [The Foreign Assis- tance: Pluses and Minuses],» Asia Plus (2003/ 2/6): 5; the author, an economist, is a high ranking official who regularly writes, under pseud- onyms, on the economic situation of Tajikistan in the local press; we unfortunately did not man- age to identify this interesting figure during our stay in Tajikistan. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 138 138 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... reversal of stereotypes about Tajikistan’s nouveaux riches - the «New Tajiks,» Tojikhoi naw -: fo- cused during a long time by the vox populi on petty merchants ac- cused of illicit commercial activi- ty, these stereotypes now con- cern mainly those members of the nomenklatura who notoriously misuse their position in the appa- ratus for diverting international assistance towards non-govern- mental structures created for this goal.) Moreover, most foreign NGOs ac- tive in Tajikistan are, in fact, inti- mately linked, for their survival, to Western governmental agencies and fundings, a general trend in the humanitary business since a decade (RYFMAN 1999: 114-129) - which make most western NGOs present in Tajikistan appear and act, in fact, like what should be called «MGOs»: Mainly Governmental Organizations (in French «OMG»: organisations moult gouvernementales). This characteristic is significant for our pur- pose, since these links often oblige these NGOs to act exclusively at the most official, governmental level, whence they have to deal with the ambivalent attitude and duplicity of most local partners from the government, the state apparatus and the presidential party, with very few real possibil- ities of action and effect on the local civil society - which may be, indeed, the last preoccupation of most European or Northern Ameri- can Foreign Ministries. (When asked why, although his party is preoc- cupied more in privatization than in decentralization, it has regu- larly participated in CIMERA’s programmes on the relations be- tween the centre and the regions, of which he and his party do not care very much at present, Mu- hammad-Sharif Himmatzoda, the vice-president of the Nahzat, an- swers: «Because, guys, that was a condition for obtaining your grants!»)48 Further losses of credit have been endured locally by international or- ganizations after promisses of mas- sive funding were not fulfilled in real- ity, which has contributed to fuel dis- trust and discontent among the Tajik authorities as well as population.49 It is true that a real will for a radical change in Tajikistan can hardly be discerned among donor coun- tries.50 «On the contrary, the idea of an evolutional development of re- forms, the supposed support and confidence of the population, the im- plementation of post-privatization programmes, the creation of an at- tractive image of the country for investors, the actual stimulation and technical armament of the small and medium production potential, etc. all appeared out of the priorities of the government as well as of the do- nors themselves.»51 If we add to these considerations the lack of any real follow-up of most assistance files, money be- ing distributed with no great care for its real attribution and, in an- other register, the contradictory action of Western companies (see for instance the impact of Swiss companies on the ever-growing endebtment of Tajikistan’s cotton cultivators and on the subsequent non-reformability of this econom- ic sector;52 the more recent im- pact of the activity of French com- panies on the ever-growing de- pendence of Tajikistan on its no- toriously non-rentable giant alu- minium factory), we get an idea the paradoxical way Western influ- ence can be perceived locally. All these realities have deeply influenced the paradigms of political thought and activity in Tajikistan during the last five years of further desovietization and rapprochement with the West. A special field of activity has appeared: that of the permanent reformulation and conformation of these paradigms for Western donor states and their agencies in Tajikistan. 48 Interview of M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, mid-June 2003. 49 ICG 2003a; the author’s informal interview with Jacob von WEIZSACKER, World Bank del- egate in charge of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, early May 2003. 50 ICG 2003b. 51 KAMOLOV, 5. 52 ICG 2003a. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 139 139 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... It remains that international orga- nizations and NGOs present in Tajikistan have played a key role in the shaping of a dynamics of inter-Tajik dialogue. Whatever may be the concrete result of such or such specific programme, mani- festations like the multiparty meet- ings organised under the aegidus of the OSCE about the current reform of the electoral system, or by CI- MERA on decentralization have played a crucial role in the last years in the shaping of a constructive dia- logue between various protagonists of Tajikistan’s political arena. The main result of such meetings has up till now lied less in their concrete re- sults - however crucial may show the future electoral reglamentation elab- orated under the auspices of the OSCE -, than in the dynamics and sense of common, if not public inter- est that they have contributed to create inside a nascent Tajik «politi- cal class.» In the next future, societal aspects of change should be less under- estimated by the main purveyors of technical assistance. More co- ordination, at all levels,53 will also prove decisive in the ability of the international community to obtain structural changes from the Tajik authorities. Less formal approach may also be favoured, and a better account of the specific recent histo- ry and functionning of the institutions of the Tajik state (through its spe- cific quota system, inherited from both the soviet era and the civil war, for instance): this only can al- low foreign protagonists to obtain from their Tajik partners something else than the ambivalent attitude they have shown until now, and to exert an impact on the durable opening of this specific system to new protago- nists. 2.3 The adoption of Perestroika-style legislations Tajik officials have up till now shown up a cosmetic commitment to norms ennunciated by interna- tional agencies, coupled with a total lack of political will for change. Strong resistances to change inside the state apparatus, added to an obvious lack of will for modifications among donor states (for which present stability is pref- erable to any kind of political ad- venture under pressure of an «Is- lamic threat»), make more compli- cate the work of organizations in- volved in a partial reform of Tajiki- stan’s closed political and economic systems. The newly adopted legis- lation on trade, which has great chances never to be really imple- mented, gives us an example of the way Tajik law-makers deal with cos- metic innovations imposed by donor states.54 The structure of the newly adopted legislation remains very sim- ilar to the preceding one. The Tajik parliament has used a well-known Perestroika technique, of a pure- ly rhetorical character, consisting of the vote of a lot of complicat- ed texts devoided of the begin- ning of an application measure, or containing articles mutually con- tradictory. The best example of such legislations doubtlessly remains that of the Law on the National Lan- guage voted on 22 June 1989, un- der pressure of street demonstra- tions - a founding event for the Tajik intelligentsia and for the first alterna- tive political organizations, and at the same time an excellent example of the faculty shown then by the party and state structures for resisting to change beside giving the impression of joining, if not guiding the flow of overall agitatsiia (see for instance AYUBZOD 2002: 235). At the same time many reforms - such as that, crucial, of the jamoats and other local communities - re- main impossible without deeply amending the constitution,55 which after the June 2003 referendum will hardly be imaginable for the time being. Instead of the separa- tion of powers demanded by some political actors, the referendum has 53 See the current, meritorious attempts of the ICG to obtain more coordination between two international European organizations very ac- tive in Tajikistan, the EBRD and the OSCE: ICG 2003b. 54 Interview with Amb. Marc Gilbert, Dushan- be, mid-May 2003. 55 DE MARTINO 2003a, 3. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 140 140 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... considerably added to those of the president, and postponed the real perspective for change at the head of the state until 2013, if not until 2020. Most dignitaries will keep unchanged cumulative responsabili- ties, such as the ubiquitous and enig- matic Mamadsaid Ubaydullaev, a political leader of the Kulabi faction during the civil war, now the Mayor of Dushanbe, as such a member of the government, and the President of the National Assembly of Tajiki- stan, which used to make him, until the past summer, the de facto and de jure N°3 of the regime. In the cat and mouse game played by the international community and the Tajik government, a fatal occasion may have been lost by the formers to obtain minimal legal conditions for change. On the contrary, the worst habits of the former Soviet regime may have been perpetuated for some time, which arises fears as to the organization of Tajikistan’s next parliamentary and presidential elec- tions in 2005 and 2006. As to the decentralization advo- cated for Tajikistan by various for- eign organizations, it may remain devoided of signification unless the privatization process under- taken since the mid-1980s, and the current reform of the tax system have come to an end that would be satisfactory for the main par- ties. The decentralization process offers us a perfect example of those working groups which have been organised in Dushanbe under pres- sure of the donor states (in order to please the latters and receive the funds linked with the adoption of new legislations); those groups are usual- ly dispersed at the moment when they give their first concrete results.56 Our interrogation of many protano- gists concerned with change have convinced us of the necessity to as- sociate legal change in administrative matters with transformation in the economic system - transformations already demanded by the Nahzat and the Democratic Party on the eve of the independence of Tajikistan (DUDOIGNON 1994), but still unsat- isfied for the most part after almost twelve years of a much agitated his- tory. 3. Some Tracks for Future Studies 3.1 Regional power and local communities The structural changes demanded at the grassroot level in the provinces, as well as in several political parties in Dushanbe concern primarily the redistribution of both economic/fis- cal and political powers between the centre and regions. In the provinc- es of Tajikistan, it is generally admit- ted that 80 to 85% of the income of taxes goes to the state, whence 15 to 20% remain at the level of the districts.57 In an overall context of extreme rarefaction of resources (present «decentralization» is seen locally, since independence, as a total suppression of public dotations)58, this can be only insat- isfactory for the local tax payers. In the comparatively rich region of Khu- jand (Khujandi people use to speak of the «parasytism» of other re- gions),59 strong demands are be- ing formulated for a liberalization of the legislation which would au- thorize local tax payers, especial- ly big companies or production units, to pay a significant part of their taxes directly to the local public institution of their choice.60 Another key aspect of demanded reforms concern sub-district local communities, jamoats and mahal- las, both institutions with a strong past, an a decisive economic and social role, but no political status of their own - they remain under control of nominated administrators who also preside local assemblies, 56 Interview of M.-S. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, June 2003. 57 Conversations with Iskandar Asadullaev, former director of the Institute of Strategic Stud- ies, Dushanbe, late April 2003; with Jakov von Weiszacker, World Bank representation in Dushanbe, late June 2003. 58 Interview with the director of Khujand Town Hospital, April 2003. 59 Iskandar Asadullaev in our interview with him. 60 Conversation with the director of the Town Hospital of Khujand, late April 2003; confirmed by further interviews of local enterpreneurs. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 141 141 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... according to the same logic of non- separation of powers which prevades at the centre of the state as well as in its most remote peripheries.61 Generally speaking, in Tajikistan as well as in neighbouring former SSRs, the state has been for some time tempted to play these local entities as a mere intermediaries of the cen- tral power, and as a self-financed in- strument for keeping local popula- tions under control. Whence numer- ous «anti-jamoats» and «anti-ma- hallas» have made their appearance for resisting this tendency (in Uzbeki- stan, notably, where the state’s effort at controlling these local in- stitutions have been particularly strong since half a decade [MAS- SICARD 2004]), powerful grassroot demand are being formulated for a depersonalisation of the local execu- tive power, now concentrated, in Tajikistan, in the hands of nominat- ed, non-elected presidents of local assemblies (the reincarnations of the former local secretaries of the Communist party). Most alterna- tive political leaders in Dushanbe point out the importance of the jamoat level as the only space for introducing elections for the local officials, and bringing some real political pluralism to the country in a predictable future.62 A reform such as that of the fiscal system would of course bring con- sequences of various character, in- cluding the creation or reinforcement of strong local clientelistic relations on the local and regional level, which could escape the control of political power. Furthermore, a change of this kind would run counter to the official opposition of numerous offi- cials to the idea of decentralization, especially in the framework of co- operation with NGOs.63 Decentrali- zation in fiscal matter would oppose the nationality theory elaborated, under the influence of the Uzbeki- stani model, by another leading po- litical adviser to President Rahmonov, the philologist Ibrohim Usmon (b. 1947) - a theory based on the prin- ciple of a unitary state, open to affir- mative action but with one language, and where nobody wants to hear about autonomous entities or nation- al minorities.64 Then the potential economic aspects of any change in the centre/regions relation retain most of the attention among simple citizens as well as among the main protagonists of the political game. Whilst the fiscal leg- islations has been submitted to four changes in ten years, no satisfac- tory impact has been observed yet in this field of relations between the centre and the regions. Our interlocutors in the Soghd region have generally underlined the under-rep- resentation of the 98 jamoats (98) and 405 mahallas of this area in the process of decision making (see the report by Prof. Alijon Boymatov on the economic aspects of the integration of the Soghd region in Tajikistan). The region (in Rus- sian oblast’) remains in many fields the unique intermediary level be- tween the state and local communi- ties, whence the effects of newly legislations laws generally stops at the city or district (raion) level. Ja- moats and mahallas still remain de- prived of a proper budget, and re- main outside the economic and so- cial life of the country life: taxes are gathered, and remain at the level of the town and raion. Up till now, administration executives come from the centre, and the ne- cessity of a radical change of para- digm, and to «go to the mahalla» (an adaptation of a late 19th-cen- tury moto «go to the villages» of the Russian Populist movement) is largely felt even outside the precints of the Nahzat, although judging by legislation now in preparation, resis- tances to any kind of change remain very strong in the Tajik state as well as among foreign donor states, and any further modifications of the ex- isting texts will probably have a main- 61 DE MARTINO 2003a, 3. 62 DE MARTINO 2003a, 4; interview with Mu- hiddin Kabiri, Dushanbe, «Dialog» Centre, May, 2003. 63 Interview of Sayfullo Safarov, vice-director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Dushanbe, early May 2003. 64 Interview with Sayfullo Safarov, Dushanbe, early May 2003. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 142 142 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ly cosmetical character. It is true that in Tajikistan people remain generally unaware of these plethoric new leg- islations, and continue to ignore the rights which have been conceded to them during the last half-decade. Only petty entrepreneurs have man- aged in the recent past to develop a juridical culture, in the main goal of protecting themselves against imped- iments brought on their path by re- gional and local authorities ....65 3.2 A Religious threat: Islam... or its present weakness? The «Islamic factor» arbitrarily isolat- ed by security agencies and outside observers makes the bulk of current literature on Central Asia - even more than on the worlds of Islam as a whole since September 11, 2001. Most of these publications and ex- pertise usually do not take into ac- count the specificity of the current politization of Islam in Tajikistan, if compared only with other regions of the former USSR. An essentially cul- tural movement at its very origin in the 1950-60s, in the years following Stalin’s death, re-Islamization in Tajiki- stan took a political dimension as soon as 1973,66 through opposition of a young generation of Muslim «Baby boomers» to the Mufti “Abdullah Kalonzoda”s quietism and «lack of devotion» to the cause of Faith - al- though, it should be noticed, there was no theological schism among them: if the «young mullahs»67 of the early Nahzat used to differenti- ate themselves from «official Islam» by references to the «pure Islam» of the Prophet and his Caliphs, they nevertheless always remained very far from those called nowadays «Wahhabis» by their refusal to cut off with the rituals of the traditional Hanafi school, and by the importance they use to give up till now to re- formed Sufi learning (a tendency Tajik Islamists share with their more quietist religious leaders of the late Soviet period, although they reluctantly accept to admit it).68 This relative conservatism of the Nahzat, an organization inspired, al- though undirectly, by the neo-tradi- tionalist teachings delivered by Da- mulla Hindustani (1892-1989) in Dus- hanbe from the 1950s to the 1970s, makes it relatively fragile against the assault of newly born and more radical Islamist organizations such as the Hizb al-Tahrir. The Nahzat’s current flimsiness can also, if not mainly be explained by the lack of educated mullahs and ulamas who would be able to oppose the mes- sages of the Tahrir as well as that of Christian missionary activists (e.g., KABIRI 2002, OLIMOVA & OLIMOV, 2003). This social and in- tellectual lacuna seems to be specif- ic to Tajikistan, a country which, dur- ing the Soviet period, did not enjoy an important access to Islamic higher educational institutions, then located in Uzbekistan (the Imam-Bukhari In- stitute in Tashkent and the Mir-i “Arab Madrasa in Bukhara). Tajikistan is now a country where the unfathomable institutional weakness of Islam, and the temp- tation of reaction against de-cul- turation through violence, makes a problem more important than Islam itself ever was. Moreover, the Nahzat must face a current political weakening and del- 65 Interview with Domlo “Ibodullo Kalonzoda, Shaykh-Muslihiddin Great Mosque, Khujand, April 2003. 66 Foundation by Sayyid “Abdullah Nuri of the «Nahzat-i Javanan-i Islami-yi Tajikistan» [Renewal of the Youth of Islam of Tajikistan], the basis of the future IRP of Tajikistan: see for instance SATTORI 2003, 6. This periodisation is exclu- sively based, for the moment, on testimonies by leading members of the Nahzat (see also my interview of M.-Sh. Himmatzoda), and should be taken with precaution, since it remains oth- erwise poorly documented (see for instance RO’I 2000: 357-8). 67 Javan mullayan, by analogy with the Young- Bukharans of the early 20th century. 68 See in particular the role of the locally famous Naqshbandi murshid “Abdurahman-Jan in the religious education of Muhammad-Sharif Him- matzoda - an education based on the practice of traditional ceremonies of dhikr, as well as the reading and comment of the early 18th- century Northern-Indian Muslim mystical poet Bidel”s verses, of the arch-classical Mathnawi of the 12th-century C.E. Persian poet Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi, and of the Maktubat of the 17th-century Indian reformer of the Naqsh- bandiyya Imam Rabbani Ahmad Sirhindi (inter- view of M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, June 2003). TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 143 143 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... egitimisation, that we can explain in part by its cooperation with the Tajik state institutions - a long-term ten- dency in the Nahzat, as was suggest- ed earlier, but a policy also dictated by general circumstances since 1997: the elaboration of the anti- Taliban coalition with support of Rus- sia, the USA and Iran; the peace agreement and the disarmament of the Islamist milicias; then the launch- ing of the current «crusade» against terrorism with massive support of the international community to Tajikistan’s political authorities; and on the other hand the massive emigration to Rus- sia of Tajik Highland young manpow- er - the main electoral support of the party -: all these phenomena have considerably reduced the Nahzat’s room for manoeuvre. One of the consequences of this conjunction of factors is the present embarassment of the party lead- ers in front of the expansion of US-based Christian (mainly re- formed) missionary activity in Tajikistan - a phenomenon with no equivalent in the region, except Qyrghyzstan, although in the Tajik case, the wave of conversions has been more recent and spectacular, which contributes to reinforce the political speciticity of Tajikistan among the Central Asian states. Some sev- enty churches are now active throughout the country, with more than 20,000 faithful of various na- tional background, among whom many Tajiks, young and old, who have embraced such or such re- formed Christian faith.69 The already rich, although very recent, histo- ry of Christian missionary activity in Tajikistan has been marked by violence which, for example, was not observed in Qyrghyzstan: on October 1st, 2000 ten persons are said to have been killed, eighty in- jured in the bombing of the «Core- an Church» of Dushanbe (a Califor- nian-based Evangelical congre- gation, led by a Corean pasteur with strong personal ties in South Corea). Narratives of miraculous healing of a dozen of badly burnt victims have greatly contributed to unite the young community, and permitted its resurrection after the eventual reconstruction of the church, which has been considerably en- larged and is today coupled with an academy of taekwondo.70 According to our data and per- sonal observations, most conver- sions to Christianity remain indi- vidual, and they affect mainly the outcast youth of the main cities of the country, among whom Tajiki- stan’s residual minorities are over- represented (beside the Coreans, who show particularly receptive, we have met Russian, German, Tatar, and Qazaq converts). Convertions still rarely concern full families or communities - except nu- clear families in the relatively rare case of aged converts. The propa- ganda for the new faith is oftenly coupled with moral (teaching of children and adults on Sundays) and material assistance (distribution of parcels, disposition of collec- tive meals at the church on Sun- days), or medicine. (See the trav- el to Dushanbe of a Corean team of specialists of acupuncture led by a famous pracitian from Seoul in July, 2003, a moment when the rebuilt «Corean church» was at- tended every day by more than 2,000 persons exposed to inten- sive propaganda as well as med- ical care - which created condi- tions of various receptivity to acu- puncture among the patients.)71 Although this phenomenon has not yet taken the social dimension it has found in Qyrghyzstan, it has aroused a great alarm among opinion and political leaders. Those of the Nahzat could be tempted to use it in the next future, in different manners, for recovering a part of their lost legiti- mity. Anyway, the Islamo-Christian cleavage, which have proved so sig- nificant in other regions of the former USSR during the past decade (in 69 Interview of Abduali Toirov, local officer of the OBSE, Dushanbe, mid-July 2003. 70 Personal inquiries among the faithful, Dush- anbe, spring and summer 2003. 71 Parviz Mullojonov’s courageous testimony have reinforced our previous consideration on the decisive placebo effect of confidence in medical care, whatever may it be. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 144 144 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Chechnia, in particular), has al- ready taken a special symbolic and political weigh in Tajikistan - a weigh probably increased by the perma- nent presence of many organizations of the international community in Dus- hanbe, which can be invoked by both parties in the regulation of ever growing conflicts.72 3.3 Uzbek minorities: a multiple cleavage? In this case of Christian missionary activity, a religious cleavage re- covers regional, social, ethnic, eco- nomic and political ones. (New converts, as already suggested, come mainly from the big cities’ outcast youth from residual na- tional minorities, with poor per- spectives of economic integration in the future Tajikistani society.) Curiously enough, such is also, at least in part, the case of alterna- tive Islamic missionary activity as it has been developing in Tajik land since the turn of the 21st centu- ry.73 Inside the Muslim community of Tajikistan itself, in spite of this new Christian pressure and under an ap- pearance of stabilization and normal- ization of relations between the reli- gious and the civil political organiza- tions, we also face the same quintu- ple problem of a religious, regional, ethnic, economic and political cleav- age. The social and intellectual weak- ness of traditional Hanafi Islam (even in its politicized way as it is sym- bolised by the Nahzat, a party of Tajik Highlanders poorly estab- lished in big cities and lowlands, except the migrant-peopled sub- urbs in Dushanbe and numerous kolkhozes in the Wakhsh cotton valley) has paved the way for a rap- id expansion of the Hizb al-Tahrir as an organization promoting ri- gourous ethical and cultural norms acceptable to the people of the bazaar and other city-dwellers, and as a party which defends the interests of lowland and urban Uzbek-speaking populations throughout former Soviet Central Asia.74 To such an extent that, during the last years, the Tahrir has been gain- ing popularity among the Urghuti «progressive class»75 of the val- leys and cities of northern and western Tajikistan, including the cap- ital Dushanbe. These Uzbek-speak- ing petty traders, shopkeepers, changers, and shop-tour organisers originating from the Uzbekistani city and district of Urghut make off, in Tajikistan, an overall population of some 35,000 persons, which has managed to take control of signifi- cant segments of trade activity - for instance, no less than one third of the «luggage-holder» (in Turkish ba- vulcu) international trade mainly with Turkey or China. The direction of the Nahzat now admits, although not always willingly, that it has lost con- tact with this dynamic «Urghuti» cli- entele with solid roots and connec- tions in Uzbekistan. The problem here is not the Hizb al-Tahrir itself, but rather that par- ty’s growing popularity among 72 For instance: Shodi MUHIDDIN, «Isoi Maseh dar kuchahoi Dushanbe chi mejuyad? [What Does Jesus the Messiah Try to Find in the Steets of Dushanbe?],» Tojikiston 32 [293] (2003/8/7): 6. 73 For general considerations on the way con- fessional cleaveges mask in Tajikistan national and ethnic fractures, see DZHALILOV 2002. 74 On recent arrestations of Uzbek members of the Hizb al-Tahrir in Tajikistan, and the instal- lation of this party in Uzbek-peopled areas of Central Asia, see notably Aleksei MATVEEV, «Tsentral’naia Aziia: bor’be za demokratiiu meshaet ekstremizm [Extremism, an Obstacle to the Struggle for Democracy],» Asia Plus (2003/ 6/12): 9. On the party’s establishment in Uzbek- peopled regions of Northern Tajikistan and South- Western Qyrghyzstan, see two papers, very different in their spirit, by Kurbonali MUHAB- BATOV [the Procuror of the Soghd Region], «Religiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Tadzhiki- stane: Hizb-ut-Tahrir) [Religious Oppositional Groups in Tajikistan: The Hizb al-Tahrir], in Lena Jonson, Saodat Olimova & Muzaffar Olimov, eds., Religioznyi ekstremizm v Tsentral’noi Azii. Problemy i perspektivy. Materialy konferentsii Dushanbe, 25 aprelia 2002 g. [Religious Extrem- ism in Central Asia. Problems and Perspec- tives. Proceedings of the Dushanbe Confer- ence, 25 April 2002] (Dushanbe: Devashtich [for the OSCE]): 73-87; and by Saniia SAGNAEVA, «Religiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Kyrgyzs- tane: Hizb-ut-Tahrir) [Religious Oppositional Groups in Qyrghyzstan: The Hizb al-Tahrir],» ibid.: 64-72. 75 «Sinf-i pesh-qadam»: interview with M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, early June 2003. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 145 145 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... various Uzbek-speaking commu- nities of Tajikistan, on the basis of economic and national discontent, whence the Nahzat, a purely «Tajik» party from the beginning with few interest for political and religious affairs outside Tajikistan (weel seen by ROY 1999), has been cultivating its specific and lim- ited geographical establishment among the Tajik-speaking High- land and Highlander migrant com- munities of the central and south- ern parts of the country. Nothing has still been said here of the Loqay Uzbek communities of the South, one of the poorest and most poorly inte- grated in the limited labor market of Tajikistan: in short, the reverse of the more dynamic and fortunate Urghuti community. In such conditions, it remains of course difficult to speak of a united Uzbek community or mi- nority in Tajikistan. However, the common denominator of Urghuti, Loqay and other Uzbek- speaking populations of Tajikistan (25% of the overall population according to official statistics), in spite of their heterogeneous economic status in this country, is their lack of political representation (except two Uzbek MPs: one for the giant alu- minium factory in Regar, and one for the city of Regar itself), cou- pled with a common insatisfaction which drives them towards radical organizations which use to promote, outside of Uzbekistan, the interests of compact Uzbek minorities. In Tajiki- stan, where the Uzbek president Is- lam Karimov, in spite of the failure of various military adventures (the last one in Khujand under Colonel Khu- doyberdiev in Fall 1998),76 has nev- er completely given up his ambitions of having installed in Dushanbe a po- litical regime more conform to his wishes, the existence of structured demands for representation among Uzbek minorities may give Tashkent an interesting, although risky, playing card. A partial solution to this prob- lem may be the current reform of the electoral legislation, and redefini- tion of the electoral districts (okrugs) in search of a better coincidence be- tween the electoral and administra- tive/national okrugs in regions with a compact Uzbek population,77 - al- though a possible side effect of such a legislation could also be the enforce- ment of a still volatile «Uzbek» politi- cal identity in Tajikistan .... Beside the new interest of Uzbek- speaking minorities of Tajikistan for the Hizb al-Tahrir, direct Saudi in- fluence has proved powerful in some specific areas of northern Tajiki- stan such as the little city of Chorkuh, in the Soghd region. In this case, such links can be explained by the presence of an emigre community from Chorkuh in the Hejaz since the 1920s (SABBAGH 1999), and by the cultural and economic influence of this emigre community in northern Tajiki- stan since the very first years of in- dependence. However, according to various testimonies received dur- ing our stay in Tajikistan, several hun- dreds of Tajik students are said to be studying now in various edu- cational institutions of the Hejaz. If the shabby-looking Imam-Termezi Madrasa in Dushanbe remains con- servative in its teaching (its poor li- brary, although composed for 70% of Saudi publications, re- mains dominated by classical Ha- nafi literature)78, however its cur- sus seems hardly capable of satisfy- ing the religious demands of the Tajik society. The future return to Tajiki- stan of numerous young theolo- gians, after several years in Saudi madrasas, may not remain devoid- ed of impact on the religious situ- ation in this country, still deprived of authoritative Hanafi ulama whose authority could offer a counterweigh to direct or undi- rect Wahhabi influence. Only the high degree of secularization of Tajik society, and a strong attachment to cultural traditions specific to medieval and modern Central Asia seem to- 76 Significantly enough, this event is seen, in both Dushanbe and Khujand, among both pro- ponents and adversaries of the reunion of Tajiki- stan with Uzbekistan, as the most important event since the independence in 1991. 77 Meeting of the multiparty commission for the reform of the electoral legislation, OSCE, Dushanbe, 5 June 2003. 78 Personal visit to the Imam-Termezi Madrasa and its library, early July 2003. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 146 146 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... day79 able to protect Tajikistan from such an «shock of [Islamic] civili- zations» - if the growing pressure of Christian missions from abroad, and the current de-legitimation of the Nahzat do not drive the Tajik Islamist leaders, or their young concurrents of the Tahrir and Nahzat’s most rad- ical wing, to the search for violent confrontation with everything West- ern. Conclusions Beside external factors briefly evoked at the beginning of this study, five main elements of destabiliza- tion of Tajikistan have been identi- fied by security agencies for the coming decade: (1) a possible come back of the past warlords; (2) pov- erty; (3) drugs; (4) Islam; (5) nation- alities.80 The danger of a possible rap- prochement between the Tajik warlords of the civil war period, especially the still active Mahmud Khudoyberdiev, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has been oftenly mentionned in a recent past as an important threat to the overall stability in the Central Asian region.81 Yaqub Salimov’s arrest in Moscow in early July 2003 gives us an inter- esting element on the Tajik author- ities’ will to cope with this poten- tial danger, whilst the search for a direct implication of Russia in this process may indicate a choice of Dushanbe for internationalizing the regulation of this problem - in order, perhaps, to exert a better pressure on Uzbekistan, which had backed Khudoyberdiev during his last unsuccessful coup in Khujand in 1998, and is now suspected to favour the activities of Islamist organizations like the (armed) IMU and the (non-vio- lent) Hizb al-Tahrir in defense of the Uzbek populations outside of the country’s boundaries (in the Qyrghyz and Tajik territories of the Ferghana Valley, in the West- ern regions of Tajikistan, in the Charjuy region of Turkmenistan, and in the south of Qazaqstan). As to persistent poverty and its di- rect impact on the political sphere, an aspect which remains out of the scope of the present study, Tajiki- stan remains a country which lives beyond its means. The question of drugs is intimately linked with that of poverty: most of the predominantly rural population of Tajikistan struggles by on subsistence agriculture, remi- tances from relatives working abroad, and humanitarian aid. A growing number benefits from drug money and other aspects of an ever growing shadow economy. If Mos- cow used to fund some 80% of the national budget before inde- pendence, the present relayance on foreign assistance is generally perceived as the only chance for the Tajik state to maintain a ple- thoric administration and redun- dant body of poorly paid civil servants - the key of the overall corruption of public bodies in the country. However foreign recom- mandations of reducing the finan- cial burden of civil service has to this date met no real success. Be- cause these purely accounting pre- occupations of international orga- nizations rarely take into account the decisive societal functions of this abundant administrative body: it has permitted the Tajik state to integrate, at relatively low cost, large segments of the society into the overall system of social net- working. As to «corruption» linked with the practice of low salaries for this nu- merous body of civil servants, the clash between the definitions of cor- ruption held by international organi- zations and the practices of ritual 79 See Muhammad-Sharif Himmatzoda’s words, when speaking of the radicals and one of their main ideologists, the Pakistani al-Maududi, about the specific taste for mysticism in Persian and Urdu culture - including al-Maududi’s writings: interview with M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, June 2003. 80 Interview with Ambassador Marc Gilbert, Dushanbe, mid-May 2003. 81 Sayyid Abdullo NURI, «Nasha partiya ope- spokoena [Our Party is Worrying],» Asia Plus (2003/4/24): 4; on the IMU as a threat to Tajiki- stan, see for instance Ludwig GIBELHAUS [a journalist of Die Deutsche Welle], «Tsentral’noi Azii ugrozhaet eskaladiia napryazhennosti [Cen- tral Asia Is Threatened by a Growth of Ten- sion],» Asia Plus (2003/5/22): 8. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 147 147 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... exchanges which are characteristic of modern Central Asian societies comes from the fact that most ap- proaches by development agen- cies fail to take into account local definitions of what kinds of be- havior are appropriate forms of social networking. Gift giving, even between citizens and government officials, is part of the fabric of social life in Central Asian countries (WERN- ER 2000; ADAMS 2003). It should be seen in its cultural - and socio- political - contexts before bringing about new legislations with a mainly cosmetical effect, and subsequent aggravations of the ambivalent atti- tude of local partners towards the self-legitimating requirements of do- nor states and organizations. Islam and the nationality question have been given more attention in the preceding pages, since they lie at the foundament of political life and strategy in Tajikistan. The national- ity question, in particular, when coupled with all the criteria men- tionned above, as in the case of Uzbek minorities, remains a cru- cial threat for the future of the country. Another of the manyfold aspects of this question is the politi- cal segregation of the Soghd region, which has been left out of the 1997 General Peace Agreement, and thus has little access to political power, as well as the Badakhshan and the Rasht [former Gharm] Valley. *** What to do? If it seems difficult to pretend to exert an action on the long term on external factors, whatever decisive these factors may prove in the next future for the sta- bility of Tajikistan and the whole Cen- tral Asian region - it should, in fact, be the task of diplomats to exert pressures, for instance, on the Rus- sian and Uzbek governments, in or- der to facilitate the establishment of Tajik immigrants, or to ease the fur- ther opening up of Tajikistan’s bound- aries to free movement of persons and goods. Something, however, may be undertaken on the inner level, for favouring evolutions of the current political situation. CI- MERA’s overall project on decen- tralization in Tajikistan had been based upon one fundamental pos- tulate: «Where reform is slow to come, is in the regions.»82 Not that any significant change may be ex- pected in the short term at the cen- tral government level (especially without a major and coordinated pressure from key international operators such as the funding in- stitutions). According to our inquir- ies, however, the local, self-gover- nance level is probably the one where a much expected and fruitful work may be carried out. Support- ing the debates at local level (where the distance between the government and those who are governed is the shortest) consti- tutes, in the present political frame- work of Tajikistan, an opportuni- ty to stimulate much awaited changes in the long term (see DE MARTINO 2003b, 2). At the same time, it would be only to the ad- vantage of such activities if they are enlarged to a wider public, notably through media and pub- lic discussions (ABDULLAEV 2003, FREIZER 2003, and the present au- thor’s oral recommendations to CI- MERA during the 2002-3 term). The permanent redefinition of pro- grammes of humanirary and a fortio- ri those of technical assistance has been a characteristic of any coordi- nated action in Tadjikistan. From this viewpoint, the challeges that CIME- RA has been facing since the begin- ning of this year is a matter of norm. Whence most chanceries active in Central Asia remain dependant on short-sighted, day-after-day policies, a technical assistance worth of this denomination cannot choose to over- look the necessity of the mid-term investment of important resources. Up to this date, most NGOs which are dealing with political reform have acted exclusively inside a narrow cir- cle of deciders with few interest for the intermediaries of political power in the regions and sub-regions of the 82 SMEC Team Leader Ed Hankin, quoted by Luigi de MARTINO 2002a, 3. FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY? SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN Page 148 148 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... country, and even less interest for different categories of opinion mak- ers, however specific may be the typology of opinion makers in post- Soviet Tajikistan. The concept of in- formal consultation with interlocutors outside the Tajik administration seems indeed to be an unusual con- cept an a new instrument of techni- cal assistance in the CIS. However, in a UNTOP meeting on December, 2002 nineteen representatives of the Nahzat had already voiced that they were not aware of the Government initiatives in the local governance field, and that no political discussion was taking place in this matter.83 Up till a recent date, clearly formulated political demands continued to face a total lack of a real public debate. Instead of a formal and, as we have tried to suggest earlier in this study, fatal concentration on legislation writ- ing, the founding role of initial public meetings should have been enlarged to a wider range of protagonists. A good many differences one can observe between the Tajik and the Iranian societies lies in the colonial, then Soviet past of Tajikistan, and its specific culture of both public debate and relation to donor countries of all kind. The ambivalent attitude of most of our local interlocutors towards everything partaining to the hege- monic political systems and cultures, as well as the lasting lack of space for public debate constitutes perhaps the main non-visible difference be- tween the Tajik and the Iranian cas- es; it should probably constitute, in the near future, two of the main obstacles to reform in Tajikistan, es- pecially in foreign intervention is to be developed in the years to come. Another key difference, underlined ad nauseam in the present study, is the surprising weakness of Tajikistan’s Islamic religious institutions - a factor of social violence, as we have sug- gested in the body of this study, which should be less underestimat- ed by international donor organiza- tions. Last, as to analogies between the Tajik and the Iranian cases, if the scope of this paper did not allow us to develop as we would have liked to do the initial idea of a compara- tive approach between the two, there is probably one key common point between them - which is also one of the main taboos in both Tajik and Iranian political cultures: a com- mon reluctance of the leaders of each country to recognize their re- spective ethnic diversity, and to pro- mote measures for a better identifi- cation of sometimes very dynamic minorities to the state in which they live. A potentially dangerous fact in a region, Central Asia, where, in a context of very quick differentiation, religious differences, including those inside the Islamic community, tend to recover ethnic, social, and eco- nomic cleavages. Dushanbe and Paris, September 2003 83 DE MARTINO, 2002b, 4. 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Tajikistan at a Crossroad: Contradictory Forces at the Heart of the Tajik Political System. ....................................................................................................................................... By Luigi De Martino Project Director CIMERA, Geneva, Switzerland Summary This paper1 analyses the political situ- ation of post-conflict Tajikistan and identifies two sets of contradictory forces as being at the centre of the Tajik political system: the centralisa- tion vs. decentralisation trend and the inclusion into the government vs. exclusion trend. The elite that came into power with the civil war has used a strategy of centralisation of power and inclusion of the opposition and has thus so far been able to success- fully manage the political forces of the country in order to establish po- litical and economic domination. The author makes the hypothesis that this mode of operation may reach its lim- its due to the emergence of opposi- tion forces that are not easy to inte- grate into the present political sys- tem. As perspectives for broader political change and reform are grim in Tajikistan, government-supported repression and violence may become the only instrument to deal with such opposition. The paper is based on published materials and on research produced within the frame of the CIMERA project «Strengthening the Inter-Tajik Regional Dialogue», an ini- tiative supported by the Swiss Min- istry of Foreign Affairs. A conflict for the control of the state and its resources In 1991, the breakdown of the So- viet Union suddenly projected onto the international scene a group of new states, among them, the five Central Asian republics, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Nothing had prepared the popula- tions and their authorities to this new «independence» and to the sudden disappearance of the socialist eco- nomic system into which the «new» states were integrated. For these states the world had changed, a whole system of references, politi- cal, economical and social had disap- peared. One of the challenges that Newly Independent States (NIS) had to deal with was that of identity and of the legitimacy of the political system in place. The former socialist republics of Central Asia had been created in the 30s by integrating vast spaces characterised by a strong geograph- ical and cultural diversity and, at the same time, by a strong social and economical coherence and comple- mentarities into a vertically integrat- ed system where the centre, Mos- cow, was the ultimate source of power. The breakdown of the soviet sys- tem has led to a crisis situation af- fecting all social and political relations. It has been a moment of political flu- idity, a «multi-sectorial crisis « reshap- ing the relations regulating the inter- actions among social groups (Dobry, 1996). Uncertainty becomes thus a central parameter of such moments of «transition» (Banegas, 2001). Confronted with a crisis that had no precedents and with the necessity to (re)-build the state, the political elites in power during the Gorbachev period played the card on national construction in order to give legiti- macy to their power. 1 A previous version of this paper was present- ed at the 4th Annual Conference of the Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) held in Cam- bridge, Massachusset on October 2-5 2003. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 153 153 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... In 1992 in Tajikistan, a competition for power among local elites trig- gered a conflict, the consequences of which can still be felt today. The main aim of the conflict was the con- trol of the state, at the confluence of political and economical power. In 1992 Tajikistan did not have an economic sector outside of the state itself. The economy was the polity; in this situation winning political pow- er simultaneously ensures a preserve on all or most economic opportunity (Haysom, 2002). The Tajik civil war (approx. 1992-97) was driven by overlapping antago- nisms arising from generational, ideo- logical, regional and inter-communal competition (Akiner, 2001: 40). Re- gional political entrepreneurs and warlords fought the Tajik conflict and succeeded to various degrees in securing mass support in their respec- tive areas (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 24). The war however, in weakening the authority of the na- tional government, re-emphasized regional divisions (Akiner, 2001: 66, Seifert, 2002: 67). This led to a deep fragmentation of the society and economy of Tajikistan and to an in- creased authority for sub-national elites. The war has furthermore allowed a change of elites at the top of the state, the «Kulyabis» replacing the previously politically dominant «Len- inabadi»2. «Regionalism», sub- social networks based on patronage and to a certain extent on geography, has not only been the instrument for mobilizing support for fighting the war, but continued to be the key instrument to assert the predomi- nance of certain groups and to ac- cess economic resources through control of the state. Rebuilding the state using old recipes Tajikistan is in many ways an amaz- ing country. Considering the magni- tude of the challenges of the post- conflict period and the double heri- tage of the civil war and break down of the Soviet Union, it almost surpris- ing to see that during the period from 1999 to 2003 the political situation in Tajikistan has stabilised, the Gov- ernment has successfully integrated the opposition, including the Islamic Revival Party (IRP), and has been able to marginalize those opposition forc- es that refused integration. At the same time it could also bargain agree- ments with those elements within the «government camp» that posed se- rious military threats to the stability of the situation. After the Septem- ber 11 2001 events, the US-led mil- itary intervention in Afghanistan, and the support given to the anti-terror coalition by the Rahmonov govern- ment, the Tajik authorities gained important goodwill at the international level. All these factors contributed to the stabilisation into power of the incumbent President and his team. These processes can be considered as positive developments in a war- torn country like Tajikistan, on the other hand no deep political reform or change of the functioning of the political system has taken place. Even though the 1994 Constitution de- clares that Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, law governed, secular and unitary state with separated ex- ecutive, legislative and judicial pow- ers (Abdullaev, 2003), the current regime and its political personnel have operated according to established political models and cultures which were in place in the Soviet Union. This is no major surprise since the political personnel in Tajikistan are a very homogenous group in terms of education (mostly engineers with KOMSOMOL and Communist party education) and in terms of political culture and references (URSS sys- tem, Russia) (Dudoignon, 2004). It is important to recall that at the signature of the Peace Agreement in 1997, the conflict parties were confronted with the enormous task of (re)-building the state, a task that required the central government to (re)-assert its control over the entire country (large parts of the country 2 «Kulybis», «Leninabadis» or «Gharmis» are rough, general terms that indicate patronage networks that are partly regionally based. These groups are not monolitical but their structures of alliance change constantly. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. Page 154 154 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... were under the military control of the opposition) and to give new sub- stance and content to its institutions (the war had not only destroyed much of the social infrastructure in certain regions but also severed the links between state institutions in the capital and in the regions). At the same time, the post-conflict period has been characterised by the necessity to implement the power- sharing agreement at the base of the 1997 Peace Agreement, to integrate personnel from the United Tajik Op- position (UTO) and to reward those groups that supported the new gov- ernment during the conflict. First Trend: Centralisation vs. Decentralisation As mentioned above, the groups that came into power with the civil war and took over control of the central government have tried to monopolize both political and eco- nomical power. The centralisation of state power in the hands of the Pres- idency has been at the base of this strategy. Currently, the President appoints the heads of provincial and district governments; in turn district authorities nominate local self-gov- ernment level chairpersons. More- over, the Presidential Office controls all finance, state property and mon- ey flows through the Office of State Finance Control. With the creation of the Council of Justice in 1999 the President has the power to nominate judges and control courts. Finally, as a leader of the most powerful re- gional grouping of Kuliabis, the Pres- ident enjoys the might and support of its regional elite and armed forces (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 22). This strategy corresponded to the concept of state adopted by the Kuliabi elite: a presidential regime, a highly centralized «strong state» and clearly steered by the top (Seifert, 2002; Dudoignon, 2004). If prior to the conflict the state was the source of most economic oppor- tunities, and for this reason the con- trol of the state was one of the main objectives of the conflict, the war has disrupted the control of central government over the economic re- sources of the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent civil war in Tajikistan pro- voked what certain experts call a «re- 3 In many cases military commanders have trans- formed their military power over a certain re- gion in economic and political power by trans- forming themselves into entrepreneurs, or by acquiring public office etc. (Seifert, 2002; 69) 4 In such a situation, where the central govern- ment has few available resources to be used for meeting the challenges of reconstructing the country and the state, it is important to note that the central authorities have usually a privileged access to an important source of funding: the external resources from interna- tional organisations such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, the European Bank for Reconstruc- tion and Development or the Asian Bank for Development. In this sense (especially after the September 11, 2001 events), the Tajik Gov- ernment has been able in recent years to at- tract considerable, though often inconsistent, international financial support. gional feudalism», a situation charac- terised by the disruption of the pre- vious economic links between differ- ent regions and markets, the emer- gence of several «appanage princ- es» (Avezov, 2004:34), extending their authority in specific territories and over resources of the country and being unwilling or unable to pay taxes to the state budget. While the groups controlling the cen- tral government have tried to mo- nopolize political and economic re- sources at central level, regional elites and groups have fought bitter bat- tles for the control over regional and local economic resources and oppor- tunities (most notably the Aluminium smelter, cotton production, markets and roads, hotels and restaurants etc.) (Seifert, 2002: 67)3. This situation of loss of control over economic resources by the state has been further increased by the pro- gramme of privatisation of state property pushed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which has strengthened the econom- ic basis of local and regional groups and elites (Seifert, 2002). Polity is (still) the economy: and vice versa The weak central state power, heavi- ly dependent on cotton and alumini- um for hard currency and on interna- tional loans for funding4, was unable TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 155 155 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... to avoid the economic fragmenta- tion of the country or to efficiently collect taxes. The elites controlling the central gov- ernment are confronted with a situa- tion where their model of highly cen- tralised state has to deal with a de- centralised economical power5. In this situation, they have to negotiate with other local and regional elites (Seifert, 2002). If political power gives access to economic resources (for example the control of the privatisation process), at the same time economic power is easily transferable into political power. The yearly preparation of national and sub-national budgets is one major occasion for observing the negotia- tion process between centre and regional actors. The system of gov- ernment financial management, inter- governmental distribution of revenue and capital spending still follows a highly bureaucratic but often unclear Soviet-era model. Intergovernmen- tal transfers are organised according to a combination of differential tax- sharing rates and general fiscal-gap closing grants (Davis, Dunn and Na- zirova, 2003). If on one hand the system is undesirable from the per- spective of efficient and equitable public financial management (Davis, Dunn and Nazirova, 2003), on the other hand the system allows for a large space for political bargaining. The lack of transparency of the sys- tem permits that the distribution of tax revenues, offset revenues, of central government grants and trans- fers for budgetary support from the national budget to the oblast level and below, be the object of a be- hind-the-scenes negotiation process where differential regional political influence becomes a key significant factor affecting the distribution of funds. This situation is reinforced by the fact that the laws and processes regulating the budget formulation al- low for year-to-year and inter-juris- dictional variation within a given year (Davis, Dunn and Nazirova, 2003). Second Trend: Inclusion vs. Exclusion, Two forces at the heart of the political system The war in Tajikistan has allowed a change of elites at the top of the state. These groups making the best use of networks of patronage have tried to monopolize political and eco- nomical power. Thanks to alliances in constant movement, this ruling elite has so far been able to marginalize the most dynamic and creative po- litical opposition. This elite has been able to establish its control over the state and is able to use its structures and institutions as a tool to manage alliances, access resources and main- tain power.6 This system is characterised by two forces, one striving for more cen- tralisation (allowing increased control), but excluding the majority of politi- cal forces from power, and the oth- er tending to integrate opposition forces in order to gain support and better control them. The potential for contradictions between these two forces is important, since the system can only integrate a fraction of those excluded from power. According to Dudoignon (2004:123), «During the past six years, the higher personnel of former oppositional forces of the Perestroika and civil war periods - the Nahzat and the Democratic Par- ty of Tajikistan - have been partly integrated into the state structures, whether political or economic. As to the newly founded parties (the So- cialist Party and the Social-Democratic Party), they appeared until these very last months as mere think-tanks or reservoirs of young politicians for the PDP and the government, with a status analogous to that of the Komsomol (Communist Youth) for the former Communist Party». The success of the «integration tac- 5 Even though the Kuliabi elite has made sure that key enteprises in the South of the country would fall under their control (Seifert, 2002). 6 Maintaining power and cumulating economic resources seem still to be the main goals of the elites in place. The groups controlling the state institutions seem still to function without long- term perspectives, tactically reshaping allianc- es whenever needed, making best use of the vocabulary of democracy (and anti-terror war) to extract as many resources as possible from the international organisations. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. Page 156 156 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... tic» is dependant probably on two main factors. Firstly, the existing po- litical forces have been a relay for specific group interests (the IRP for the Tajik «Highlanders») or an «instru- ment for personal promotion of a leader or a limited group of people inside the state apparatus» (Dudoi- gnon, 2004). As a consequence, none of the existing political forces has been able to federate the de- mands coming from the different groups and sectors of society. Sec- ondly, the traumatic experience of the civil war combined with the exclusion from political life at the national level has produced disenchantment and a large disaffection from politics. After the civil war, the demands for access to economic resources, for increased political participation and representa- tion seem not to have been system- atically expressed in a political way. In the present situation, marked by an overwhelming domination of Pres- ident Rahmonov’s Popular-Democratic Party (PDP) and his clique, where the executive controls the legislative and the judiciary powers, the possibilities for an open political discussion on the redistribution of power are clearly lim- ited. One hypothesis could be that in such a situation political demands are expressed through economic chan- nels. The research carried out by Du- doignon (2003) on political culture in Tajikistan casts some light on these demands and their channels of ex- pression, though more should be done in order to systematically map and assess them. In summary, Sughd, the Uzbek com- munities and the entrepreneurs’ net- works seem to be the most vocal groups in terms of demanding eco- nomic and political reform of the re- lations between the state and the regions (at least devolution). Accord- ing to Dudoignon (2004:159) «an- other key aspect of demanded re- forms concerns sub-district local com- munities, jamoats and mahallas, both institutions with a strong past, a decisive economic and social role, but no political status of their own».7 In any case the «fragmentation» and «de-politization» of demands has contributed to the success of the ruling elite’s tactics of exclusion and compensatory integration of specif- ic opposition forces. A practical example: The Case of «Decentralisation» I would like now to illustrate some of the traits characterizing the functioning of the political system on the basis of the example of «decentralisation»8. Since mid- 2002 the Tajik Government has been speaking openly about «de- centralisation», a topic previously a political taboo since it would put in question the vision of a unitary state with one language. Responding to pres- sure from the international organisations (in this case the World Bank, UNDP and USAID), Tajik authorities even launched several initiatives related to the relations between central govern- ment and regions. However these could be characterised as follows: There is no overall steering / coordinating body of the ex- isting processes The initiatives are centralized in the Executive Office of the President though there is some openness to accept external actors in the discus- sion (international organisa- tions and partly-political par- ties) There is no overall agreed vision of reform of the state structure Communication and co-ordi- nation among the govern- ment initiatives and among international support is often problematic. The processes within the 7 At the same time, the government’s ideology of Tajikistan as a unitary state with one language and no role for autonomous entities or national minorities will not be a factor facilitating the expression of such demands. 8 These reflections are based on the author’s observations carried out as project director for a project funded by the Swiss Ministry of For- eign Affairs aimed at proposing a platform at national level for informal political discussion on the topic of «regionalism» and «centre-regions relations». TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 157 157 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... groups mandated by the gov- ernment are of juridical / ad- ministrative nature. This is not a major surprise given the nature of power and govern- ment in Tajikistan. The central power’s internal struggles for the reinforcement of the President’s position, com- bined with the secondary role of the parliament and of the political parties, a lack of con- sultation culture etc., all con- tributes to the predominance of the top-down, technical and juridical perspective. Following the June 22 2003 consti- tutional referendum a new modifica- tion of the constitution is unlikely to happen in the coming years, so de- spite the openness of the govern- ment to initiate reform initiatives con- cerning «decentralisation», these aim chiefly at increasing the efficiency of the existing system without question- ing the control of the centre on the different layers of government. The Tajik authorities have been very proficient in negotiating the non-co- ordinated and often redundant offer of technical assistance by the inter- national organisations (Dudoignon 2004:136). Having as a reference the experience of managing the de- mands of Moscow during the Soviet era, the Tajik authorities have devel- oped an attitude of ambivalence to- wards the international community. According to Dudoignon (2003, 27): «The redundant character of that offer, the dispersion of resources, the lack of coordination, the lack of knowledge of the institutional frame- work in Tajikistan, the weakness of these foreign organizations’ local partners, whether governmental or non-governmental, have complicat- ed local perceptions of foreign assis- tance, whence they were permit- ting the most conservative segments of the state apparatus and econom- ic system to elaborate means of re- sistance to change, allowing numer- ous members of this new nomencla- tura to use these new incoming re- sources for building fortunes - some- times considerable.9» Also in the case of the recent «de- centralisation» initiatives, the Tajik officials have until now shown a cos- metic commitment to norms enunci- ated by international agencies, cou- pled with a total lack of political will for change (Dudoignon, 2004:138). In a context where the process of political consolidation is far from com- plete and a high level of uncertainty permeates life in Tajikistan, allowing a structural reform of the present political system would currently be unacceptable to the ruling groups. The present system, where the cen- tre controls inter alia the appointments of the heads of the executive (and legislative) down to the district, al- lows the team around the President to use these appointments as a means to reward its own supporters or as a channel to integrate opposi- tion forces into the system. In this context, the state structures are thus an instrument in the hands of the rul- ing groups for consolidating their net- work of alliances and allegiances and «regionalism» becomes a rational and appropriate mode of functioning that allows groups and individuals to ac- cess resources (political and econom- ical). In this sense, it is not surprising that the research conducted by the project indicates important support for this social and political phenome- non (Olimova, 2004). Conclusion: The limits of the system Following the signature of the peace agreement and taking advantage of a period of «stabilisation», the groups that came into power with the civil war are reinforcing their position and centralizing the real decision-making power in the hands of the Presiden- tial administration. With the end of the armed conflict and thanks to in- 9 Anvar KAMOLOV [pseud.], «Inostrannaia pomoshch’: pliusy i minusy [Foreign Assistance: Pluses and Minuses],» Asia Plus (2003/2/6): 5; the author, an economist, is a high ranking offi- cial who regularly writes, under pseudonyms, on the economic situation of Tajikistan in the local press. We unfortunately did not manage to identify this interesting figure during our stay in Tajikistan. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. Page 158 158 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... creased international support, the central government has put more and more effort into trying to be- come less «virtual», consolidating the state at central level and striving for a better control over its structures at all levels. If during this period the combined effect of the above-mentioned trends and forces (centralisation vs. decentralisation and inclusion vs. ex- clusion) has allowed the Popular Dem- ocratic Party (PDP) to establish its domination, it is unclear what capac- ity the current regime has to contin- ue with the tactic of integrating some opposition forces in compensation for the exclusion from power of the majority of the population. The increasing distance between the government and the population10 seems to contribute to the develop- ment of opposition forces that can- not be easily integrated into the cur- rent system (see for example the Hiz-ut-Tahrir11). The development of such forces would push the regime’s tactic of integration to its limits. The regime has no interest in reform- ing the current system and balance of power. In the past12, it has shown capacity to use dialogue as a politi- cal means to solve disputes, though it has bargained power-sharing agreements with an opposition that had access to military forces or has integrated small parties with no mili- tary or political base but that were useful as a pool for political person- nel for the state apparatus. However, in cases where the inte- gration tactic cannot be applied, it seems that the government (at least at central level) has no other alterna- tive methods of dealing with the eventual pressure put on it by a structured opposition (or does not have enough incentives to use such alternative methods). This situation would be likely to provoke a violent response from the regime. In any case, the control of the state remains at the centre of the inter- ests of the current ruling elites and their supporting (regional) networks. On the one hand the state is the key to the exercise of legitimate author- ity, the centre of the legitimate po- litical space and, as in other Central Asian countries, is the motor of na- tional construction (Petric, 2002: 235). On the other hand, controlled by specific groups operating with a network-based, patron-client rational- ity, the state and its institutions (at all levels) become tools for managing alliances, integrating opposition forc- es and re-distributing resources. In this perspective and with the present political personnel, a strong and cen- tralised control at the level of the Presidency seems the (only) strate- gy adopted by the ruling groups to ensure the reproduction of their pow- er. In my view this situation is not likely to change significantly in the next five years. All these factors seem to corrobo- rate the hypothesis of a semi-institu- tionalisation of power struggles among different individuals and / or interest groups (Akiner, 2001: 88). This would produce constant trials of strength among groups with integra- tion as the main tool to manage such crisis and a violent response for those situations where demands cannot be integrated without a structural change of the system. References ABDULLAEV, Kamol (2003), Current Local Government Policy Situation in Tajikistan, unpublished document. ABDULLAEV, Kamol and FREIZER Sabine (2002), What Peace Five Years After the Signing of the Tajik Peace Agreement? DFID, London. AKINER, Shirin (2001), Tajikistan Disintegration or Reconciliation? Roy- al Institute of International Affairs, London. AVEZOV, Aziz (2004), Economic 10 Including the incapacity of the government to respond to the demands of the population for a more evenly distributed economic development or for social justice. 11 Even though this party seems to have be- come the main relay for demands from the Uzbek communities 12 Especially up to the 2000 parliamentary elec- tions, a moment that marked the formal conclu- sion of the peace process. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION Page 159 159 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Aspects of the Interrelation be- tween Centre and Regions in Tajiki- stan, Geneva, CIMERA, Situation Report 4. BANEGAS, Richard (2001), «Les transitions democratiques: mobilisa- tions collectives et fluidite politique», in Cultures et Conflits, 12, automne 2001. DAVIS Marilynne, DUNN Johnatan, NAZIROVA Khursheda (2003), As- sessment of Intergovernmental Re- lations and Local Governance in the Republic of Tajikistan, report prepared by the Urban Institute for USAID, Dushanbe. DOBRY, Michel (1986), Sociologie des crises politiques. La dynamique des crises multisectorielles, Paris, Presses de la FNSP. DUDOIGNON, Stephane (2004), An Iranian Syndrome? Some Paradigms of Political Thought and Practices in Tajikistan, Geneva, CIMERA, Situa- tion Report 4. OLIMOVA, Saodat (2004), Per- ceptions of Regionalism in Tajiki- stan, Geneva, CIMERA, Situation Report 4. PETRIC Boris - Mathieu (2002), Pouvoir, don et reseaux en Ouzbekistan post-sovietique, Par- is, PUF. SEIFERT Arne Clemens (2002), Risik- en der Transformation in Zentralasien, der Beispiel Tadschikistan, Hamburg, Deutsches Orient-Institut, Mitteilun- gen, Band 64. TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. Page 160 160 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Page 161 161 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ABOUT CIMERA CIMERA is a private, non-profit organisa- tion that conducts research, provides ad- vice and implements projects in the fields of media, governance and education. CI- MERA works in «regions in transition» such as the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans where civil wars and ethnic con- flicts have aggravated the difficulties in- herent in social and economic change. We categorise our work under the conceptu- al umbrella of governance, based on the premise that the access to and the qual- ity of public information and debate is a precondition for more effective public policies and for a peaceful society. We implement media programs and offer vocational training to journal- ists in order to support access to public information and debate through the media; We engage in policy research and conduct programs to strengthen ed- ucations systems to deal with con- flict and social change; We promote participatory gover- nance and political dialogue to pre- vent conflict and heighten awareness about the importance of active citi- zenship; We conduct collaborative research and in-depth analysis on the rapid and complex socio-political changes that societies in transition face. CIMERA’s interdisciplinary team of pro- fessionals includes journalists, political and social scientists, psychologists, linguists and experts on international relations. They organise conferences and vocational training, conduct research and evalua- tions, support the organisational devel- opment of associations and educational institutions, lecture and advise others on our areas of expertise. Through our pub- lications series, we wish to contribute in the East as well as in the West, to the on- going reflection and debate about the future of countries of transition. For more information: www.cimera.org Page 162 162 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... cimera www.cimera.org ISBN: 2-9700358-9-8 Rue de l’Athenee 28, P.O.Box 474 CH-1211 Geneva 12, Switzerland Tel. + 4122 347 52 06 Fax + 4122 830 18 41 contact@cimera.org Luigi De Martino is a cultural anthropologist and is currently responsible for a CIMERA project supporting the dialogue in Tajikistan on the relation between the central government and regions. He has worked as a Programme Coordinator in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, a nd as a Programme Officer in the United Nations Development Programme in Tajikistan. As consultant, he has conducted evaluations and research mandates for CIMERA and other organizations such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. Eidg. Departement fur auswartige Angelegenheiten - Politische Abteilung IV Departement federal des affaires etrangeres - Division Politique IV Dipartimento federale degli affari esteri - Divisione Politica IV Department of Foreign Affairs - Political Affairs Division IV ..............................